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The state immunity rule was founded upon such sound rationales as respect for the sovereign 
equality of all states and non-interference with state functions. However, its application in the 
international criminal justice system produces numerous problems. These include impunity for 
violation of peremptory international legal norms (like the prohibitions on serious international 
crimes) and violation of human rights. It also undermines the individual accountability and 
justice administration missions of the system because it shields state officials from criminal 
responsibility and subjects their victims to injustice. The international community has adopted 
various legal mechanisms which attempt to respond to these problems by abolishing state 
immunity for international crimes. However, some weaknesses, including external political 
influence, selective justice, and lopsided implementation against developing states, render the 
mechanisms sometimes ineffective. This thesis examines the problems arising from the rule‟s 
application, evaluates the response mechanism‟s strengths and weaknesses, and suggests reforms 
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1.1 Background Information 
As a branch of international law, international criminal law and the international criminal 
justice system have developed principally to prohibit and punish the commission of certain acts 
considered so heinous as to amount to serious crimes against the international community.
1
 
These crimes include genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and the crime of 
aggression. Another mission of this branch of international law is to provide substantial justice to 
victims of these crimes (mostly human beings) and also to protect these victims and 
national/international societies from the scourge of the crimes.
2
 An important goal from the 
earliest beginning of the system has been to obviate the situation where state officials who 
deliberately commit these crimes would escape liability by arguing that they acted as agents of 




Despite the centrality of these goals, one of the challenges for the system is the 
application of the rule of state immunity.
4
 By virtue of this rule, a sovereign state is immune 
(shielded) from civil and criminal judicial processes abroad in other states. Thus, it cannot be 
sued in the courts or other judicial tribunals of another state without its (the former state‟s) 
                                                             
1  See, e.g., Currie, Robert J & Joseph Rikhof, International and Transnational Criminal Law, 2nd ed (Toronto: Irwin 
Law Inc, 2013) at 4-13. 
2  Damaska, Mirjan R, “What is the Point of International Criminal Justice” (2008) 83:1 Chicago-Kent L Rev 329 at 
331-340.  
3
  Ibid at 331-333. 
4 Wuerth, Ingrid, “International Law in Domestic Courts and the Jurisdictional Immunities of the State Case” 
(2012) 13 Melbourne JIL 1; Foakes, Joanne, “Immunity for International Crimes? Developments in the Law on 
Prosecuting Heads of State in Foreign Courts”, Chatham House Briefing Paper, International Law Programme, 
November 2011, IL BP 2011/02; Akande, Dapo & Sangeeta Shah, “Immunities of State Officials, International 
Crimes, and Foreign Domestic Courts” (2011) 21:4 EJIL 815; Bankas, Ernest K, The State Immunity Controversy in 







  One basic rationale for the evolution of this rule of state immunity is respect for the 
concept of the sovereign equality of states.
6
 By virtue of this concept, all sovereign states are 
deemed legally equal in status, irrespective of variations in geographical size, military might, and 
economic prowess. This rationale is aptly expressed in the Latin maxim: “par in parem non 
habet imperium” (an equal has no authority over an equal).
7
 Another rationale is the need for 
non-interference with the smooth governance of states.
8
 
However, these abstract entities called sovereign states cannot exercise their rights and 
observe their obligations on their own. They must function through the instrumentality of natural 
persons (individuals) who are their heads of state and/or government. State immunity protection 
extends to these heads of state and/or government and to some other high-ranking officials 
appointed to administer the state‟s official/public powers, e.g., foreign, defence, and other senior 
cabinet ministers/secretaries.
9
 It can also extend to lower officials who act as state agents.
10
 In 
Chuidian v Philippine National Bank
11
, the US Federal Court held that “it is generally 
recognized that a suit against an individual acting in his official capacity is the practical 
equivalent of a suit against the sovereign directly.” 
                                                             
5  See The Schooner Exchange v McFaddon 7 Cranch 116 (1812) (“Schooner Exchange case”). See also Tomuschat, 
Christian, “The International Law of State Immunity and Its Development by National Institutions” (2011) 44 
Vanderbilt JTL 1105 at 1116-1127; Talmon, Stefan, “Hague International Tribunals: International Court of Justice: 
Jus Cogens after Germany v. Italy: Substantive and Procedural Rules Distinguished” (2012) 25:04 LJIL 979 at 979-
981. 
6  Charter of the United Nations, 1945, 1 UNTS XVI (“UN Charter”), art 2(1).  
7  Schaack, Beth Van, “Par In Parem Imperium Non Habet: Complementarity and the Crime of Aggression” (2012) 
10:1 JICJ 133 at 149; Yang, Xiadong, State Immunity in International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2012) at 51; Trahan, Jennifer, “Is Complementarity the Right Approach for the International Criminal Court‟s 
Crime of Aggression? Considering the Problem of “Overzealous” National Court Prosecutions” (2013) 45 Cornell 
Int‟l LJ 569 at 587-588.  
8
  These and such other rationales as the fundamental right rationale and the practical courtesy (“comity”) rationale, 
are discussed in Chapter 2. 
9  Murphy, Sean D, “Immunity Ratione Personae of Foreign Government Officials and Other Topics: The Sixty-Fifth 
Session of the International Law Commission”, GWU Law School Public Law Research Paper No. 2013-125; GWU 
Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2013-125.  
10  This is distinct from diplomatic immunity which the thesis does not deal with. 





 The UK Court of Appeal (per Diplock, LJ) had, much earlier, clearly emphasized this 
position in Zoernsch v Waldock
12
 in the following words: 
A foreign sovereign government, apart from personal sovereigns, can only act 
through agents, and the immunity to which it is entitled in respect of its acts 
would be illusory unless it extended also to its agents in respect of acts done 
by them on its behalf. To sue an envoy in respect of acts done in his official 
capacity would be, in effect, to sue his government irrespective of whether the 
envoy had ceased to be „en poste‟ at the date of his suit. 
 
Consequently, these high-ranking state officials and other state agents cannot be sued, 
arrested, prosecuted, or subjected to other foreign judicial proceedings for their unlawful acts, 
including (at least, in principle) the heinous international crimes noted above. This is so, whether 
these officials committed the alleged crimes within the territory of their home state or within a 
foreign state‟s territory, against their home state‟s nationals or foreigners, or against a foreign 
state‟s governmental apparatuses and other vested interests. This is because these officials are 
deemed the alter ego of their home state in the exercise of that state‟s public/official powers, in 
the course of which their alleged unlawful acts are committed.
13
 This state immunity rule 
originated in customary international law.
14
 It has also been codified under some multilateral 
international treaties
15
 and municipal statutes of some states.
16
 
                                                             
12  [1964] 1 WLR 675, at 692, per Diplock, LJ. 
13  See Jurisdictional Immunities of the State Case (Germany v Italy: Greece intervening) (2012) ICJ Reps 99 (“ICJ 
Jurisdictional Immunities Case”).  
14  The Schooner Exchange case, supra, note 5. 
15  E.g., the European Convention on State Immunity, 1972, 1 ETS 74; 1495 UNTS 181; UN Convention on 
Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property, 2004, UN Doc A/59/508 (“UN Jurisdictional Immunities 
Convention”).  
 16 US‟ Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 1976, Pub L No 94-583, 90 Stat 2891 (1976); (1976) 15 ILM 1388; UK‟s 
State Immunity Act, (1978) 17 ILM 1123; Singapore‟s State Immunity Act, 1979, as amended, online: < 
http://statutes.agc.gov.sg/aol/search/display/view.w3p;page=0;query=DocId%3A%221be1a8f7-0968-4fcc-ac26-3 
9d3a51b7b70%22%20Status%3Ainforce%20Depth%3A0;rec=0>; Pakistan‟s State Immunity Ordinance, No VI, 
1981, reproduced in Dickinson, Andrew et al (eds), State Immunity: Selected Materials and Commentary (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2004) 496 ; South Africa‟s Foreign States Immunities Act 87, 1981, as amended by 
Foreign States Immunities Amendment Act 48, 1985, also as amended by Foreign States Immunities Amendment Act 
5, 1988, online: <http://www.dfa.gov.za/chiefstatelawadvicer/documents/acts/foreignstatesimmunitiesact.pdf>; 
Canada‟s State Immunity Act, RSC 1982, c S-18; (1982) 21 ILM 798 ; and, Australia‟s Foreign States Immunities 





1.2 Statement of Research Problems 
 Though the original rationales for the evolution of the state immunity rule may be 
commendable, application of the rule in the international criminal justice system does more harm 
than good to international society. Today, the rule unduly shields high-ranking state officials 
from individual accountability for international crimes committed in both peacetime and armed 
conflict situations. This is so, notwithstanding that international law deems perpetrators of these 
crimes “hostis humani generis” (enemies of all humankind)
17
 and imposes on all states an 
obligation “erga omnes” (owed to the whole world)
18
 to bring them to justice, because the crimes 
offend the values of the international community.  
 In R v Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate & Ors, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte 
(No. 3)
19
 (the “Pinochet case”), the UK House of Lords, while trying to disregard the immunity 
of a former head of state, held that a serving head of state is still protected by state immunity 
even in respect of serious international crimes like torture and crimes against humanity. Also, in 
the Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April, 2000 (Democratic Republic of Congo v. 
Belgium)
20
 (the “ICJ Arrest Warrant Case”), the International Court of Justice (ICJ) held that an 
incumbent foreign minister enjoys immunity from foreign criminal prosecution, even for torture, 
war crimes and crimes against humanity.
21
 Recently, the General Prosecutor of Paris, France 
dismissed, on grounds of state immunity, legal proceedings commenced against Donald 
Rumsfeld (a former US Defence Secretary) for war crimes and for torture on Iraqi prisoners at 
                                                             
17  Greene, Jody, “Hostis Humani Generis” (2008) 34: Critical Inquiry 683; Werkmeister, Andreas, “International 
Criminal Law as a Means to Fight the „Hostes humani Generis‟? – On the Dangers of the Concept of Enemy 
Criminal Law” (2013) 3 KULRB 1. 
18 De Hoogh, Andre, Obligations Erga Omnes and International Crimes: A Theoretical inquiry into the 
Implementation and Enforcement of the International Responsibility of States (The Hague: Kluwer Law Int‟l, 1996) 
at 91-95. See also Tams, Christian J, Enforcing Obligations Erga Omnes in International Law (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010). 
19  (2000) 1 AC 147. 
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the Abu Ghraib Jail in Iraq and prisoners at the US detention facility in Guantanamo Bay, 
Cuba.
22
 Other examples of such dismissals on grounds of state immunity include: Re Gaddafi
23
 
before the French Cour de Cassation; Re Sharon & Yaron
24
 before the Belgian Cour de 
Cassation; and, Re Mugabe
25
 before the English High Court.
26
   
Consequent upon the protection accorded by this rule, the high-ranking officials who 
benefit from it abuse the rule with such impunity that its continued observance in the 
international criminal justice system poses a potential conflict with some peremptory norms of 
general international law or “jus cogens”.
27
 Among these jus cogens norms are the prohibitions 
on the commission of the above-stated and other forms of international crimes, and the ban on 
the violation of other states‟ territorial integrity and political independence, i.e., breach of 
international peace and security.
28
 
Today, high-ranking officials of one state could deliberately violate the sovereignty of 
another state through such aggressive acts as unwarranted wars and still plead state immunity as 




                                                             
22 Centre for Constitutional Rights, “French War Crimes Complaint Against Donald Rumsfeld, et al.”, online: < 
http://ccrjustice.org/ourcases/current-cases/french-war-crimes-complaint-against-donald-rumsfeld,-et-al.>;  Dobbie, 
A et al (eds), “French Prosecutors Throw out Rumsfeld‟s Torture Case”, online: <http://www.reuters.com/article/P 
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23  Arrêt no. 1414, (2001) 125 ILR 456. 
24  (2003) 42 ILM 596. 
25  Reported in Warbrick, Collin, “Public International Law: I. Immunity and International Crimes in English Law” 
(2004) 53:3 ICLQ 769. 
26  See also Akande & Shah, op cit, note 4 at 819-820, footnotes 15-17. 
27
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international community of states as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be  
modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same character. See the Vienna                   
Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969, 1155 UNTS 331, (1969) 8 ILM 679, art 53.  
28  UN Charter, supra, note 6, art 2(4). 
29  See, e.g., Sawma, Gabriel, “Immunity of Heads of State under International Law”, online: <http://www. gabriel 





Such impunity also encourages deliberate and indiscriminate violation of the municipal 
laws of one state by the officials of another state
30
, and it can lead to deliberate and gross 
violation of other important norms of the international legal order. These other norms include, 




Furthermore, application of the state immunity rule creates inequality between high-
ranking state officials and other individuals who are not in the category of high-ranking state 
officials as regards accountability for international crimes. These individuals have become 
sacrificial “scapegoats” who must bear full legal responsibility for their international crimes, 
while high-ranking state officials are treated as untouchable “sacred cows” who may never be 
held accountable for their own crimes.
32
 Consequently, the rule‟s application defeats the notion 
of “equality before the law”, which is an essential component of the age-old doctrine of the “rule 
of law”
33
 as codified in relevant international instruments.
34
 
The state immunity rule‟s application in the international criminal justice system also 
leads to injustice, as victims of the international crimes committed by high-ranking state officials 
                                                             
30  See Gardiner, Richard, International Law ((Harlow, Essex, England: Pearson Education Ltd, 2003) at 340. 
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are denied justice, because the state officials who commit the crimes against them are unduly 
shielded from prosecution by the rule of state immunity.
35
  
The application of the rule also leads to many other social, political, and economic 
problems other than the aforementioned. One of these problems is political self-perpetuation. 
Culpable state officials know that stepping out of political power means losing state immunity 
protection, while remaining in power implies perpetual protection by immunity from judicial 
scrutiny of their international crimes. As such, they often devise means, fair or foul, to hang on 
to political power. Typical examples are Augusto Pinochet‟s self-conferred “Senator-for-life” 
status in Chile with perpetual immunity from criminal prosecution, and Robert Mugabe‟s 
unending presidency in Zimbabwe.
36
  
In view of the foregoing, it will be argued here that application of the state immunity rule 
in the international criminal justice system substantially undermines one of the principal 
purposes of the United Nations. This purpose is: “To achieve international co-operation in 
solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in 




In order to overcome the foregoing and other problems and ensure compliance with 
international criminal law norms, the international community has adopted some legal response 
mechanisms. These mechanisms entail adoption of legal instruments that create certain 
international or hybrid criminal tribunals and/or, expressly or impliedly, abolish state immunity 
                                                             
35  See, e.g., Roht-Arriaza, Naomi, “Punishment, Redress and Pardon: Theoretical and Psychological Approaches”, 
in Roht-Arriaza, Naomi (ed), Impunity and Human Rights in International Law and Practice (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1995) 13 at 17-18. 
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in international criminal proceedings before these tribunals or before national courts.
38
 These 
response mechanisms are described in this thesis as: the Old and New Ad hoc International 
Criminal Tribunal Mechanisms, the Universal Criminal Jurisdiction Mechanism, the 
Hybrid/Internationalized Criminal Tribunal Mechanism, and the Permanent International 
Criminal Court Mechanism.  
 However, these mechanisms have many weaknesses which essentially leave the 
problems of state immunity in place. For example, the geographical and temporal jurisdictions of 
the tribunals established under the ad hoc international and hybrid criminal tribunal mechanisms, 
respectively, are very limited. Thus, the tribunals cannot address many crimes committed by 
state officials outside these geographical and temporal frameworks.
39
 These tribunals‟ 
substantive jurisdictions were never uniform. Some lack jurisdiction to try some crimes that 
others could try.
40
 Similarly, essential elements of a particular crime may differ under the 
tribunals‟ respective legal instruments. Thus, an official may lose his or her immunity over a 
given international crime before one tribunal, while a counterpart appearing before another 
tribunal for the same act may not necessarily suffer the same fate.  
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These tribunals are often alleged to be administering “victor‟s justice”, i.e., they are 
mostly post-conflict institutions set up by the victorious parties to punish the vanquished.
41
 
Equally culpable high-ranking officials of the victorious parties are exempted from the 
jurisdictions of these tribunals, while their counterparts from the vanquished parties have their 
immunities removed and get tried and punished.
42
  
As for the universal criminal jurisdiction mechanism, there is some controversy as to the 
scopes and limits of its anti-state-immunity potential.
43
 For the permanent international criminal 
court mechanism, the operation of the International Criminal Court (“ICC”) established pursuant 
to this mechanism and its efforts against state immunity have been so far selective. They have 
focused almost exclusively on state officials from one region of the world (Africa)
44
, despite 
situations of commission of serious crimes under the ICC‟s jurisdiction by state officials in other 
regions. In addition, the ICC‟s enabling legal instrument contains provisions that undermine its 
efforts to disregard or abolish state immunity. 
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1.3 Research Questions 
 In the light of the foregoing, the present thesis examines the following questions:   
1) What is the scope and effect of the state immunity rule with respect to international 
criminal law? 
2) What is the usefulness of the state immunity rule to international criminal justice and the 
sovereign equality of states? 
3) How does the continued application of the state immunity rule in the international 
criminal justice system ensure respect for other norms of international law, such as 
ensuring international peace and security and respect for human rights? 
4) What are the merits and demerits of the international mechanisms of legal response to the 
problems of state immunity in the international criminal justice system and how could 
these mechanisms be improved to more effectively counter the adverse consequences of 
state immunity? 
5) To what extent do the efforts to disregard state immunity in the international criminal 
justice system reflect the sovereign equality of all states? 
6) To what extent does the anti-state-immunity efforts of the international criminal justice 
system ensure equal standard of justice for all individuals, states and regions of the 
world? 
7) How can the current legal response mechanisms be used in order to ensure that developed 








1.4 Description of Research Argument 
 The present thesis argues that application of the state immunity rule in the international 
criminal justice system leads to serious injustice and other problems. It also argues that existing 
international legal response mechanisms have not been able to sufficiently address these 
problems. It concludes that due to this situation, the problems sought to be overcome by these 
mechanisms significantly continue, a fact that calls for serious reforms of the mechanisms.   
 
1.5 Research Scope 
This thesis examines the problems arising from the application of the international law rule of 
state immunity in the international criminal justice system. It also analyses the operational 
successes of the various legal mechanisms so far adopted by the international community to 
overcome these problems. Furthermore, it examines the weaknesses of these mechanisms and 
suggests reforms by recommending that some of the mechanisms should be reformed in order to 
be more effective, while others should be scrapped outright. 
Before doing these, it first traces the historical evolution of the state immunity rule and 
conducts an overview of some other general issues relating to the rule. The thesis does not deal 
with state immunity in civil proceedings, although some issues relevant to this area of state 
immunity are addressed in the general overview mentioned above. Also, the thesis does not treat 









1.6 Research Methodologies 
A combination of research methodologies is employed in producing this thesis. First, a 
doctrinal research methodology
45
 is adopted. In this regard, relevant provisions of pertinent 
international instruments
46
 and municipal statutes
47
, as well as material decisions of relevant 
international and national judicial tribunals are appraised. The aim of using this methodology is 
twofold. The first is to show how far the provisions of some of these instruments and their 
judicial interpretations have contributed to the aforementioned problems generated by the 
application of the state immunity rule. The second is to show the extent to which the provisions 
of the other instruments and the ratios of the other judicial decisions are disposed to disregarding 
state immunity in appropriate cases and holding state officials accountable for their international 
crimes high-ranking state officials who commit international crimes. 
Also, this thesis adopts the postulations of different legal theories. First is the natural law 
theory. This theory maintains that law gains its authority or legitimacy, and at least some of its 
content, from certain immutable principles that are inherent in nature and morality and/or reason 
(whether by virtue of God or not).
48
 Along these lines, the thesis maintains that the inherent 
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dignity and equality of human beings demand that all natural persons who commit international 
crimes should be brought to justice without distinction as to political status. Thus, the thesis 
argues against the discrimination which the state immunity rule engenders between state 
officials, on the one hand, and ordinary individuals, on the other hand, as regards international 
criminal accountability. It also argues that human victims of international crimes are the same 
the world over and should be entitled to equality of justice, whether the crimes against them were 
committed by ordinary persons or by state officials. 
 This natural law theory is also employed in the critique of the existing anti-state-
immunity response mechanisms. Here, the thesis argues that on the basis of the sovereign 
equality of all states, the current disregard/abolition of state immunity in the international 
criminal justice system should apply to culpable state officials in all states and regions of the 
world equally and without any exemption. Since the sovereign equality of all states presupposes 
the equality of all states‟ officials (who are also equal individuals), culpable officials of some 
states should not be stripped of their immunity, while their counterparts in other states are not so 
treated. Thus, there should be no selectivity or double standard. More so, since the international 
criminal justice system is meant to protect all human beings and societies without discrimination, 
and since the pains of international crimes are the same in all victims, notwithstanding the 
particular state whose officials have committed the crimes or where they are committed.  
 The thesis also employs the postcolonial theory, which is particularly interested in a 
critique of current international legal arrangements from the perspective that they reflect and 
maintain colonial relations and are complicit in subordinating or silencing peoples and states 
from the so-called “Global South” and “third world”.
49
 To this end, the thesis argues that the 
current efforts at disregarding/abolishing state immunity in the international criminal justice 
                                                             





system are lopsided. They are made in such a way as to target officials of the developing states. 
This practice gives the erroneous impression that officials of these developing states are the only 
political leadership-level violators of international criminal law norms, while their counterparts 
in the “northern/western” hemisphere and the developed world are all innocent.  
  In addition, elements of the critical race theory (CRT) run through some parts of the 
thesis that deal with critique of the current response mechanisms. CRT maintains that racism is 
engrained in the system of the international society, and that international law and power 
structures are based on white privilege and white supremacy, which perpetuate the 
marginalization of people of colour.
50
 Accordingly, the thesis maintains that the fact that all the 
state officials so far stripped of immunity by the ICC are black African officials from African 
states at least raises a question as to whether the ICC has become an instrument of racist 
oppression against black African people and states.     
 Finally, the idealist approach also influences the present research. The idealism theory 
maintains that ideas form and create systems and that the current international legal system 
(including the state immunity rule) is founded on a state-based set of ideas which prevent the 
system from better serving the interests of humanity as a whole. For this theory, since ideas are 
the foundations of all social structures, to change ideas about how such structures ought to be 
arranged will inevitably lead to changes in those structures.
51
 In tune with this theory, this thesis 
advances the position that the state immunity rule was created to uphold the old and 
controversial idea that international law was invented for sovereign states only and not for 
individuals. The thesis further shows that in view of the human protection and individual 
                                                             
50  UCLA School of Public Affairs / Critical Race Studies, “What is Critical Race Theory”, online: < http://spacrs. 
wordpress.com/what-is-critical-race-theory/>; Delgado, Richard & Jean Stefancic, Critical Race Theory: An 
Introduction (New York: New York University Press, 2011) at 6-9. 





accountability missions of the international criminal justice system, coupled with state 
immunity‟s numerous problems, this idea of the state as the sole actor is ripe for change.   
 
1.7 Chapter Breakdown 
 This thesis is made up of six chapters.  Chapter 1 is titled “Introduction” and deals with 
such preliminary issues as background information and statement of research problems. These 
two sub-segments, put together, attempt to summarize the thematic preoccupation of this thesis. 
They do this by providing a brief overview on the state immunity rule, the problems arising from 
its application in the international criminal justice system, and the successes and failures of the 
legal mechanisms adopted by the international community to respond to these problems. The 
chapter also contains the research questions raised by the thesis, as well as the research 
argument. The research argument is to the effect that application of the rule in the international 
criminal justice system results in serious injustice and significant social, political, economic, and 
allied problems which existing international legal response mechanisms are not able to solve, a 
situation that calls for reforms. It further highlights the research aims and objectives of the thesis, 
the research scope, and the various research methodologies employed in writing the thesis. 
  Chapter 2 traces the historical evolution of the state immunity rule in international law by 
examining different sources advanced by academics and judges as the origins of the rule. These 
sources include the personal equality of sovereign heads of state, the old English feudal system, 
the principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs of states, and the consensus of a great 
majority of states. The chapter observes that despite the arguments as to the origin of the rule, it 
has become an established and functional rule of international law. This chapter also performs a 





essence, an examination of the absolute and restrictive theories
52
 of the rule, and an analysis of 
the entities protected by the rule. These entities range from the state itself to high-ranking state 
officials like heads of state, heads of government, and foreign ministers. Besides, it discusses the 
types of immunity available to foreign high-ranking state officials before the municipal courts of 
the forum state, i.e., immunity ratione personae and immunity ratione materiae, respectively. In 
addition, the chapter assesses the arguments on whether state immunity operates as a substantive 
defence or a procedural bar, and it supports the latter view. Again, it reviews the various 
rationales put up in support of the state immunity rule in international law. These range from the 
symbolic sovereignty and non-intervention rationale to the fundamental state right rationale, the 
practical courtesy (comity) rationale, and to the functional necessity rationale. Finally, the 
chapter discusses waiver of immunity.   
 Chapter 3 unfolds numerous problems generated by the application of the state immunity 
rule in the international criminal justice system. It shows that despite the commendable rationales 
for the rule and its usefulness in preserving the sovereign equality of states and ensuring non-
interruption of their smooth governance, high-ranking officials protected by the rule grossly 
abuse it. Consequently its application in the international criminal justice system causes a lot of 
problems that essentially undermine the individual criminal accountability and justice 
administration missions of the system, and, therefore, requires some reconsideration. These 
problems include impunity for violation of peremptory norms of international law, such as the 
prohibitions on the commission of heinous international crimes like genocide, war crimes, 
torture, crimes against humanity and the crime of aggression. Others are systematic violation of 
internationally protected human rights and indiscriminate violation of the municipal laws of 
                                                             






other states, perpetuation of injustice to victims of international crimes committed by state 
officials, and contradiction of the concept of equality before the law by discriminating between 
state officials and ordinary individuals regarding accountability for international crimes. Yet 
another problem discussed in the chapter is the fact that the state immunity rule indirectly leads 
to the habit of political self-perpetuation among some high-ranking state officials. 
 The contributions of the various mechanisms of legal response which the international 
community has adopted in order to overcome these problems are discussed in Chapter 4. These 
mechanisms, as described in the thesis, include the old ad hoc international criminal tribunal 
mechanism and the new ad hoc international criminal tribunal mechanism, respectively. Under 
these two mechanisms, the legal regimes of the following ad hoc international criminal tribunals 
examined: the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg (the “Nuremberg Tribunal”), the 
International Military Tribunal for the Far East (the “Tokyo Tribunal”), the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (the “ICTY”), and the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda (the “ICTR”). Another mechanism is the hybrid criminal tribunal 
mechanism. The tribunals whose legal regimes are appraised under this include the UN Special 
Court for Sierra Leone, the Iraqi Special Tribunal/ Iraqi Higher Criminal Court, and the 
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia. Furthermore, the chapter examines the 
permanent international criminal court mechanism represented by the current International 
Criminal Court (the “ICC”).  
One major achievement of the foregoing mechanisms, as shown by the chapter, is that the 
enabling legal instruments of all the relevant tribunals/courts expressly abolish the immunity rule 
in international criminal proceedings before the tribunals/courts. Consequently, many high-





been deservingly tried and punished by the foregoing tribunals for their international crimes. 
Others have been indicted or are undergoing trials, especially before the ICC. 
In addition, the chapter treats the universal criminal jurisdiction mechanism under which 
customary international law and, to some extent international treaties, confer jurisdiction on the 
national courts of all states or all states parties, as the case may be, to try and punish any person 
who commits any one of certain heinous international crimes. This jurisdiction may be exercised, 
despite the perpetrator‟s nationality or official status, place of commission of the crime, or 
absence of any other jurisdictional connection with the forum state. It is conferred on the ground 
that the affected crimes (e.g., genocide, war crimes, torture, crimes against humanity, and the 
crime of aggression) have attained the status of jus cogens and every state, therefore, has an 
obligation erga omnes to bring the perpetrators to justice.          
 Chapter 5 examines the weaknesses that render these mechanisms ineffective to 
overcome the problems referred to in Chapter 3. The peculiar weaknesses of each of the 
mechanisms are discussed. In addition to these, some general weaknesses that are common to all 
the mechanisms are addressed. These include the fact that the efforts at the disregard/abolition of 
state immunity in the international criminal justice system are currently lopsided against the 
developing states, while no significant action is taken against culpable officials of the developed 
states, a situation that promotes the “North-South” divide in contemporary international relations 
and politics. On the whole, the chapter concludes that all these weaknesses substantially 
undermine the efforts and enable many state officials who commit international crimes to still 
escape justice. 
 Chapter 6 concludes the thesis and makes some findings. It maintains that although the 





among states, its application in the international criminal justice system defeats the principal 
aims of the system and leads to many social and allied problems. It finds that due to several 
peculiar and general weaknesses, all the legal mechanisms adopted by the international 
community to respond to these problems are not effective enough to achieve their goals, and 
thus, high-ranking state officials still escape individual accountability for international crimes. 
On this basis, the thesis suggests some reforms. These include the repeal of article 98 of the 
Rome Statute that encourages the powerful states to conclude BIAs that shield their officials 
from the ICC‟s jurisdiction, and the repeal of the provisions of the Rome Statute that vest in a 
state party the discretion to reject or defer the commencement of the ICC‟s jurisdiction over 
certain international crimes committed by its nationals or on its territory.
53
 They also include 
creation of permanent and jurisdictionally harmonized regional and sub-regional international 
criminal tribunals
54
 in place of the ad hoc international and hybrid criminal tribunals, and 
conferment of universal jurisdiction on the ICC over all crimes under the Rome Statute.  
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CHAPTER 2  
      STATE IMMUNITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: HISTORICAL    
       DEVELOPMENT AND GENERAL OVERVIEW  
 
2.1 Introduction 
 In international law, every sovereign state has, as one of its principal attributes, the 
jurisdiction (power) to affect people, property and circumstances within its territory by its 
municipal law. This is called „state jurisdiction‟. It reflects the basic international law principles 
of state sovereignty, equality of states and non-interference in the internal affairs of each state.
1
 
In the words of David Harris: 
State jurisdiction is the power of a state under international law to govern 
persons and property by its municipal law. It includes both the power to 
prescribe rules (prescriptive jurisdiction) and the power to enforce them 
(enforcement jurisdiction). The latter includes both executive and 
adjudicative powers of enforcement. Jurisdiction may be concurrent with 
the jurisdiction of other states or it may be exclusive. It may be civil or 
criminal. The rules of state jurisdiction identify the persons and the 
property within the permissible range of a state‟s law and its procedures 
for enforcing that law. They are not concerned with the content of a state‟s 
law except in so far as it purports to subject a person to it or to prescribe 




 This definition naturally leads to the division of the concept of state jurisdiction into 
legislative jurisdiction, executive jurisdiction and, judicial jurisdiction, along the lines of the 
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 This thesis concerns state immunity from judicial jurisdiction. Judicial jurisdiction is 
concerned with the power of the courts and other judicial tribunals of a particular state to try 
cases involving a foreign element and hand down judgments binding upon the parties thereto.
4
 In 
turn, the courts of a state may claim to exercise this power on the basis of the heads of legislative 
jurisdiction recognized in international law. In criminal matters, these grounds may range from: 
the territorial principle (determining jurisdiction by reference to the place where the crime is 
committed); the nationality principle (determining jurisdiction by reference to the nationality or 
national character of the person committing the crime); and, the protective principle (determining 
jurisdiction by reference to the national interest injured by the crime). Other grounds are: the 
universality principle (determining jurisdiction by reference to the nature of the crime and the 
custody of the person committing it); and, the passive personality principle (determining 




 As established as this concept of state jurisdiction is in international law, the state 
immunity rule (already described in Chapter One) operates parallel to it.
6
 According to one 
commentator, it follows from the rule of state immunity that since each sovereign state is, in 
international law, deemed equal to every other sovereign state, no one state, its government or – 
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2.2 Meaning of State Immunity  
 From the outset, it is essential to define the terms “immunity” and “state immunity”, 
respectively. Regrettably, none of the multilateral treaties and municipal statutes on the subject-
matter of state immunity
8
 has an express definition of any of these terms. They only provide 
clues to the terms‟ meanings in the contexts of the acts deemed immune or non-immune under 
the respective instruments. Thus, this thesis shall have regard to the dictionary meanings of the 
terms and to academic and judicial comments on them. 
 According to Black‟s Law Dictionary
9
, “immunity” means “any exemption from a duty, 
liability or service of process; especially, such an exemption granted to a public official.” L.B. 
Curzon also defines “immunity” as “freedom or exemption from some obligation or penalty.”
10
 
Similarly, David Walker refers to it as “a state of freedom from certain legal consequences or the 
operation of certain legal rules.”
11
 
 Regarding “state immunity”, on the other hand, Chike Okosa, for example, has stated 
thus: 
The doctrine of [state] immunity is a judicial doctrine derived from the 
rules of public international law. It precludes bringing a suit against a 
foreign government in a local forum without its consent. It bars holding 
the government or its subdivisions liable for breaches of its officers or 
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agents unless such immunity is expressly waived by statute or by 




 According to this commentator, state immunity extends to both direct actions against the 
state or sovereign and indirect actions against its property, and, until relatively recently, foreign 
states were afforded immunity not only with regard to government activities, but also with regard 
to their commercial activities.
13
 
 In the words of Ian Sinclair: 
… The residual rule of [state] immunity precludes the courts of the state of 
the forum from assuming jurisdiction in a case where a foreign state is 
directly or indirectly impleaded and where the validity of acts which it has 
performed in its sovereign capacity may be in issue. In other words, it 
operates as a bar in limine to the continuance of the proceedings.
 14
 
 The earliest known judicial expression of the meaning of state immunity was laid down 
in the old case of The Schooner Exchange v McFaddon
15
 by the United States Supreme Court. 
Here, Chief Justice John Marshall threw light on the rule as follows: 
The full and absolute territorial jurisdiction being alike the attribute of 
every sovereign, and being incapable of conferring extraterritorial power, 
would not seem to contemplate foreign sovereigns nor their rights as its 
objects. One sovereign being in no respect amenable to another; and being 
bound by obligations of the highest character not to degrade the dignity of 
his nation, by placing himself or its sovereign rights within the jurisdiction 
of another, can be supposed to enter a foreign territory only under an 
express license, or in the confidence that the immunities belonging to his 
independent sovereign station, though not expressly stipulated, are 




                                                             
12
  Okosa, Chike B, “The Limits of Sovereignty and Diplomatic Immunity” (2004) 4:1 The Constitution 88 at 88.  
13  Ibid.  
14 Sinclair, Ian, “The Law of Sovereign Immunity: Recent Developments” (1980) 167 HR 113 at 117. See also 
Abegunde, Babalola, “Irrelevance of Immunity for International Crimes Particularly Crimes under International 
Humanitarian Law” (2007)  4:2 JLD at 1.  
15  11 U.S. 7 Cranch 116 (1812) at 116. 





 In Alamieyeseigha v The Crown Prosecution Service
17
 (a case involving, inter alia, a 
claim of state immunity by a governor of a component unit of the Nigerian federation before a 
UK court), the English High Court of Justice also affirmed that: “It is a basic principle of 
international law that one sovereign state (the forum state) does not adjudicate on the conduct of 
a foreign state. The foreign state is entitled to procedural immunity from the process of the forum 
state. This immunity extends to both criminal and civil liability.” 
 In the light of the foregoing, one can safely assert that the rule of state immunity in 
international law naturally flows from the inherent features of sovereign equality and political 
independence of states. It operates as a procedural bar
18
 and shields one sovereign state, its 
government, administrative departments, property and high-ranking officials from the 
adjudicatory powers of the judicial tribunals of another sovereign state with respect to the official 
or public acts of the former state. It, therefore, exists as an except ion to a sovereign state‟s 
judicial jurisdiction. 
 
2.3 Rationales for State Immunity in International Law 
As referred to throughout the above discussion, various rationales have been proposed for 
the application of the state immunity rule in international law. Some of the more important of 
these are discussed in more detail below. 
 
 2.3.1 The Symbolic Sovereignty and Non-Intervention Rationale 
 According to this rationale, the justification for the grant of immunity to a foreign state 
and its high-ranking officials is implicit in the very sovereignty of the state itself and the 
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consequent need for non-intervention in its internal affairs. This rationale is expressed in so 
many variations, including: “sovereign capacity” or simply “being a sovereign”; 
“independence”; “equality”; “dignity”; and their various permutations and combinations.
19
     
 Sovereignty is the hallmark of statehood, and the forum state‟s exercise of jurisdiction 
over the foreign state will not only defeat the very foundation of statehood on which the foreign 
state is built, but also amount to interference in the foreign state‟s independence and internal 
political administration. Thus, according to Akande and Shah
20
: 
A Head of State is accorded immunity ratione personae not only because 
of the functions he performs, but also because of what he symbolizes: the 
sovereign state. The person and position of the Head of State reflects the 
sovereign quality of the state and the immunity accorded to him or her is 
in part due to the respect for the dignity of the office and of the state which 
that office represents. The principle of non-intervention constitutes a 
further justification for the absolute immunity from criminal jurisdiction 
for Heads of State. The principle is the „corollary of the principle of 
sovereign equality of states, which is the basis for the immunity of states 
from the jurisdiction of other states (par in parem non habet imperium). 
To arrest and detain the leader of a country is effectively to change the 
government of that state. This would be a particularly extreme form of 
interference with the autonomy and independence of that foreign state. 
The notion of independence means that a state has exclusive jurisdiction to 
appoint its own government – and that other states are not empowered to 
intervene in this matter. Were the rule of Head of State immunity relaxed 
in criminal proceedings so as to permit arrests, such interference right at 
the top of the political administration of a state would eviscerate the 
principles of sovereign equality and independence.   
  
 However, this rationale is not viewed as very sound and convincing, and has, therefore, 
been criticized in some quarters. According to Xiaodong Yang, for example, „sovereignty‟ is a 
dubious concept to serve as the basis of immunity. The simple fact is that both the defendant 
state and the forum state have sovereignty. If the defendant state has reason to claim immunity, 
the forum state has even more reason to demand submission to jurisdiction. That is to say, 
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sovereignty can serve equally forcefully as the basis for immunity and the denial of immunity, 
depending on from whose perspective the matter is approached. Thus, the idea that immunity is 
derived from sovereignty is doctrinally self-contradictory and self-defeating, and this conclusion 
with regard to sovereignty also applies to independence, equality, dignity or any other attribute 
of statehood.
21
 For Yang, one way to avoid such difficulty, and apparently to be always on the 
safe side, is to assert that all these qualities and attributes of statehood collectively serve as the 
basis of state immunity. This amounts to saying that a state enjoys immunity because of the sum 
total of all its attributes in the eyes of international law, because it stands as n amalgam of such 
attributes. This is to say that a state enjoys immunity because it is a state.
22
   
 However, this line of argument is not convincing. There is no doubt that international law 
recognizes the sovereignty of both the forum and the foreign state. The forum state is recognized 
as sovereign within its own territory, likewise the foreign state. However, it could be argued that 
part of the essence of the state immunity rule is to ensure that the sovereignty of one state does 
not take supremacy over that of another. Consequently, while recognizing the forum state‟s 
sovereignty, international law tries to ensure that the sovereignty of one state does not take 
supremacy over that of another. Furthermore, the words and phrases such as “independence”, 
“sovereign capacity”, and “being a sovereign”, it is arguable, are nothing but other ways of 
expressing the word “sovereignty”. They are mere synonyms of “sovereignty” and do not convey 
meanings different from this root word. Finally, such words as “equality” and “dignity” in the 
context of state immunity could be seen as attributes or aspects of sovereignty and should not be 
taken as conveying meanings parallel to or independent of “sovereignty”. 
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 2.3.2 The Fundamental Right Rationale 
  For the proponents of this rationale
23
, state immunity is a fundamental right of a state by 
virtue of the principle of sovereign equality of states.
24
 According to them, the traditional starting 




 Theodore Giuttari (a major proponent of this rationale) explains the maxim‟s historical 
origin in the classical period of international law as follows: 
In this period, the state was generally conceived of as a juristic entity 
having a distinctive personality and entitled to specific fundamental rights, 
such as the rights of absolute sovereignty, complete and exclusive 
territorial jurisdiction, absolute independence and legal equality within the 
family of nations. Consequently, it appeared as a logical deduction from 
such attributes to conclude that as all sovereign states were equal in law, 




 This rationale has been supported by the Italian Cour d‟ Cassation in Special 
Representative of the Vatican v Piecinkiewiez
27
. Some publicists have also been among the 
strongest supporters of this rationale.
28
 For Sompong Sucharitkul, while acknowledging the basic 
principle of territorial jurisdiction, a state‟s right to sovereign equality should also be 
emphasized. According to Sucharitkul, the principle of state jurisdiction must give way to the 
principle of sovereign equality to effectuate a state‟s right to immunity.
29
 
 In the words of the Nigerian Court of Appeal: 
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The basis of which one state is considered to be immune from the 
territorial jurisdiction of the courts of another country is expressed in the 
Latin maxim, “par in parem imperium non habet” which literally means 
that an equal has no authority over an equal. In other words and in legal 
parlance it means that the sovereign or governmental acts of one state or 




 This argument also appears to have been supported by the ICJ in the Jurisdictional 
Immunities of the State Case (Germany v Italy: Greece intervening)
31
 (“ICJ Jurisdictional 
Immunities Case”). According to the Court: 
… the rule of State immunity occupies an important place in international 
law and international relations. It derives from the principle of sovereign 
equality of States, which, as Article 2, paragraph 1, of the Charter of the 
United Nations makes clear, is one of the fundamental principles of the 
international legal order. This principle has to be viewed together with the 
principle that each State possesses sovereignty over its own territory and 
that there flows from that sovereignty the jurisdiction of the State over 
events and persons within that territory. Exceptions to the immunity of the 
State represent a departure from the principle of sovereign equality. 
Immunity may represent a departure from the principle of territorial 
sovereignty and the jurisdiction which flows from it.  
 
As to this line of argument, Xiaodong Yang says it is tempting to think that the basis of 
state immunity is to be found in the Latin maxim “par in parem non habet imperium”. Yang 
admits there is nothing wrong with such a notion, since the Latin maxim seems to be an almost 
universally held belief within the circles of international law and beyond, as can be seen from 
repeated references in national court decisions and in scholarly writings.
32
 
 The thesis argues, however, that a state has no fundamental right to state immunity. The 
fact that this Latin maxim “par in parem non habet imperium” appears to be universally 
recognized does not imply a legal right in favour of a state. The rule of state immunity is 
intended to act as a limitation on the adjudicatory powers of the forum state. It only makes 
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impleading a foreign state an exception to the forum state‟s exclusive territorial jurisdiction. This 
rule, therefore, places an obligation on the forum state not to exercise its judicial powers over a 
foreign state. This obligation does not necessarily translate into a legal right for the foreign state, 
since an obligation without more does not create a right. According to David Lyons: 
The pattern of relations between rights and obligations … does not seem 
to be universal. When behavior is simply required or prohibited by law or 
morals, without presupposing such special relations or transactions 
between particular individuals …, we often say that “duties” or 
“obligations” are imposed. But since these duties or obligations are not 
“owed” to anyone in particular, we cannot determine who, if anyone, has 
corresponding rights by noting to whom they are “owed.” Indeed, 
although rights sometimes do correlate with such duties or obligations, we 
cannot infer that there are such rights merely from the fact there are such 
duties and obligations…. From the fact that the law requires that A be 
treated in a certain way, it does not follow, without any further 
assumptions, that A may be said to have a right to be treated in that way. 
That is, rights do not follow from duties or obligations, or from 
requirements or prohibitions, alone. Other conditions must be satisfied.
33
     
 
 2.3.3 The Practical Courtesy (“Comity”) Rationale 
This rationale views the state immunity rule as evolving from a forum state‟s voluntary 
desire to suspend its right to adjudicatory jurisdiction as a practical courtesy in order to facilitate 
interstate relations. For supporters of this rationale, state immunity arises not out of a 
fundamental right of a state, but rather as an exception to the principle of state jurisdiction and 
justified on the desire to promote international comity.
34
 The proponents of this rationale, 
therefore, maintain that the state immunity rule does not constitute a truly binding legal rule.
35
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 According to this rationale, state immunity is ascribed to practical necessity or 
convenience and, particularly, the desire to promote goodwill and reciprocal courtesies among 
nations.
36
 The US is at the forefront of arguments in support of this rationale, and this is manifest 
in a number of American judicial decisions. Chief Justice Marshall recognized this rationale in 
the Schooner Exchange case
37
 when he stated that “intercourse” between nations and “an 
interchange of those good offices which humanity dictates and its wants require foster mutual 
benefit”, and that “all sovereigns have consented to relaxation in practice … of that absolute 
complete jurisdiction within their respective territories which sovereignty confers”
38
. In 
Verlinden BV v Central Bank of Nigeria
39
, the US Supreme Court held, inter alia, that the grant 
of state immunity to a foreign state before the US Courts is “a matter of grace and comity on the 




 This rationale has, however been severely criticized as not representing the position of 
international law. For Martin Dixon, for example, the assertion that the grant of state immunity 
by one state to another is based on comity does not mean that the requirement of state immunity 
is itself based on comity, as opposed to legal obligation. According to him, it is clear that a 
territorial sovereign is under an international duty to grant immunity. Immunity derives from a 
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 2.3.4 The Functional Necessity Rationale 
This rationale postulates that the essence of state immunity is not necessarily to shield 
state officials from the forum state‟s domestic jurisdiction regarding their misconduct, but rather 
to ensure that the functions of the foreign state are effectively carried out without unnecessary 
hindrances.
42
 Thus, the benefit of the immunity does not accrue personally to the officials but to 
the state they represent.
43
 According to Michael Tunks, for example: 
Head-of-state immunity allows a nation‟s leader to engage in his official 
duties, including travel to foreign countries, without fearing arrest, 
detention, or other treatment inconsistent with his role as the head of a 
sovereign state. Without the guarantee that they will not be subjected to 
trial in foreign courts, heads of state may simply choose to stay at home 




The same rationale also applies to other high-ranking state officials that are also entitled 
to immunity ratione personae. This was why the ICJ, in the ICJ Arrest Warrant Case
45
, 
concluded that though state officials have immunity under international law while serving in 
office, the immunity is not granted to them for their own benefit, but given to ensure the 
effective performance of their functions on behalf of their respective states. According to the 
World Court:  
In customary international law, the immunities accorded to Ministers for 
Foreign Affairs are not granted for their personal benefit, but to ensure the 
effective performance of their functions on behalf of their respective 
States. In order to determine the extent of these immunities, the Court 
must therefore consider the nature of the functions exercised by a Minister 
for Foreign Affairs. He or she is in charge of his or her Government‟s 
diplomatic activities and generally acts as its representative in 
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international negotiations and intergovernmental meetings…. In the 
performance of these functions, he or she is frequently required to travel 





 A similar argument in support of this rationale is that the grant of state immunity in 
international law is justifiable on grounds of non-intervention in the internal affairs of other 
states.
47
 For one proponent of this argument, there is no doubt that court proceedings against 
foreign states may generate inter-state tensions and interfere with the conduct of international 
relations.
48
 Thus, in the words of Ian Brownlie, “the rationale rests equally on the dignity of the 
foreign nation, its organs and representatives, and on the functional need to leave them 
unencumbered in the pursuit of their mission.”
49
 
 On this note, the thesis concludes its examination of the rationales for state immunity and 
proceeds to the question of whether or not state immunity can be waived. 
 
2.4 Historical Origin of State Immunity 
 State immunity is a rule of customary international law, and has evolved primarily 
through the gradual accumulation of state practice in the form of domestic court decisions and 
domestic legislation.
50
 However, the historical origin of this rule has been traced by academic 
scholars and judges to various sources. These sources are discussed below. 
 
 
                                                             
46  Ibid at 21-22, para 53. 
47 Gaukrodger, David, “Foreign State Immunity and Foreign Government Controlled Investors” (2010) OECD 
Working Papers on International Investment 2010/2 at 13-14. 
48  Ibid. 
49  Brownlie, Ian, Principles of Public International Law, 7th ed (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008) at 326.  
50  Whytock, Christopher A, “Foreign State Immunity and the Right to Court Access” (2013) 93 Boston Univ L Rev 
2033 at 2042; Woudenberg, Nout Van, State Immunity and Cultural Objects on Loan (Leiden, The Netherlands: 
Martinus Nijhoff, 2012) at 390; Damrosch, Lori Fisler, “Changing the International Law of Sovereign Immunity 





 2.4.1 The Personal Equality of Sovereign Heads of State 
 The rule of state immunity is said to have developed from the personal immunity of 
sovereign heads of state. For Rosanne Van Alebeek, for instance, the rule according immunity to 
heads of state “reflects remnants of the majestic dignity that once attached to kings and princes 
as well as remnants of the idea of the incarnation of the state in its ruler.”
51
   
 In the words of Lord Browne-Wilkinson of the UK House of Lords
52
, 
It is a basic principle of international law that one sovereign state (the 
forum state) does not adjudicate on the conduct of a foreign state. The 
foreign state is entitled to procedural immunity from the process of the 
forum state. This immunity extends to both criminal and civil liability. 
State immunity probably grew from the historical immunity of the person 
of the monarch. In any event, such personal immunity of a head of state 
persists to the present day; a head of state is entitled to the same immunity 
as the state itself … This immunity enjoyed by a head of state in power … 
is a complete immunity attaching to the person of the head of state … and 
rendering him immune from all actions or prosecutions whether or not 




On the international plane, all sovereigns were considered equal and independent. It 
would, therefore, be inconsistent if one sovereign could exercise authority over another.
54
 This 
immunity of sovereigns was traditionally expressed in the Latin maxim: “par in parem non habet 
imperium” (an equal has no authority over an equal).
55
 
 In medieval times, „ruler‟ and „state‟ were regarded as synonymous, and sovereignty was 
regarded as a personalized concept. Furthermore, by the decision in the Schooner Exchange 
case
56
, it was made clear that the sovereign had a representative character, and actions taken on 
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behalf of the sovereign and in the name of the sovereign were capable of attracting the same 
immunities. In the words of Chief Justice Marshall
57
, the “perfect equality and absolute 
independence of sovereigns … have given rise to a class of cases in which every sovereign is 
understood to waive the exercise of a part of that complete exclusive territorial jurisdiction, 
which has been stated to be the attribute of every nation.” 
 These notions of equality and immunity of sovereign heads of state later accrued to the 
states themselves, thus, making the contemporary rule of state immunity a derivative of the 
sovereign equality of states. In international law, the basic rule is that all sovereign states (bigger 
and smaller, mightier and weaker) are legally equal, and none is supreme over the other.
58
 One of 
the logical consequences of this rule, as Richard Gardiner observes, is that a sovereign state 
cannot be impleaded in the courts of another sovereign state without the former state‟s consent.
59
 
Otherwise, it would be an affront to the interest and integrity of the former state. Similarly, the 
British House of Lords has held, per Lord Millet, in Holland v Lampen-Wolfe
60
 as follows: 
State immunity … is a creature of customary international law and derives 
from the equality of sovereign states. It is not a self-imposed restriction on 
the jurisdiction of its courts which the United Kingdom has chosen to 





 This historical development of the equality and immunity of sovereigns would explain 
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 2.4.2 The English Feudal system 
 Another view situates the origin of the rule of state immunity in the ancient notion of the 
immunity of the English monarch from suits in his own courts.
63
 According to Babalola 
Abegunde: 
Sovereign immunity is an English doctrine of great antiquity originating 
from the old feudalistic structure of the English society. One concept 
which some people in positions of power have used to escape judicial as 
well as criminal sanctions is the concept of sovereign immunity. 
Sovereign immunity was anchored on the belief that the King, being the 
great overlord of all and at the apex of the English feudal pyramid, could 
not be sued either in his own court or in the court of any of his vassals. 
Similarly, the notion that „the King can do no wrong‟ implies that no act 
or omission of the sovereign was open to impeachment, investigation or 





 2.4.3 Non-interference in Domestic Affairs  
 Another view holds that the evolution of the rule of state immunity in international law is 
linked to the international law prohibition on one sovereign state interfering in the internal affairs 
of another.
65
 In Buck v Attorney-General
66
, the English Court of Appeal was called upon to 
determine the validity of certain provisions of the Constitution of Sierra Leone. The court 
declined jurisdiction. In his judgment, Diplock, LJ stated, inter alia: 
The only subject-matter of this appeal is an issue as to the validity of a law 
of a foreign independent sovereign state … As a member of the family of 
nations, the government of the United Kingdom observes the rules of 
comity … the accepted rules of mutual conduct as between state and state 
which each state adopts in relation to other states and expects other states 
to adopt in relation to itself. One of those rules is that it does not purport to 
                                                             
63
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exercise jurisdiction over the internal affairs of any other independent 
state, or to apply measures of coercion to it or its property, except in 
accordance with the rules of public international law. One of the 
commonest applications of this rule … is the well known doctrine of 
sovereign immunity. 
 
 2.4.4 International Consensus 
 A fourth view on the origin of the state immunity rule maintains that it originated from 
the consensus of the civilized nations. According to this view, majority of states agree upon this 
rule, and so it becomes part of the law of nations.
67
 
 However, this notion of consensus has been dismissed in some quarters as a mere fiction. 
This dismissal is based, inter alia, on the differences in the mode of application of the rule among 
states. In the words of Lord Alfred Denning, MR: 
The doctrine of sovereign immunity is based on international law. It is one 
of the rules of international law that a sovereign state should not be 
impleaded in the courts of another sovereign state against its will. Like all 
rules of international law, this rule is said to arise out of the consensus of 
the civilized nations of the world. All nations agree upon it. So it is part of 
the law of nations. To my mind, this notion of a consensus is a fiction. The 
nations are not in the least agreed upon the doctrine of sovereign 
immunity. The courts of every country differ in their application of it. 
Some grant absolute immunity. Others grant limited immunity, with each 
defining the limits differently. There is no consensus whatever. Yet this 
does not mean that there is no rule of international law on the subject. It 
only means that we differ as to what that rule is. Each country delimits for 
itself the bounds of sovereign immunity. Each creates for itself the 
exceptions from it. It is, I think, for the courts of this country [UK] to 
define the rule as best they can, seeking guidance from the decisions of the 
courts of other countries, from the jurists who have studied the problem, 
from treaties and conventions and, above all, defining the rule in terms 




 From this statement, it appears that Lord Denning‟s dismissal of the notion of consensus 
is based on the differences in the approaches to this rule that states have developed over the 
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 Thus, although the rule is agreed upon, its parameters remain uncertain.
70
 However, it 
could be argued that Denning‟s perception of the notion of consensus in this case appears 
misconceived. All nations need not agree on a particular practice before it attains an international 
custom. It is sufficient if a strong majority of states accepts the practice as binding. The test of 
“general practice”
71
 required for the formation of an international custom does not imply 
unanimity or universality.
72
    
 
 2.4.5 The „Sovereign Equality versus Exclusive Territorial Jurisdiction‟ Conflict 
 Fifth, the rule of state immunity in international law is said to have been borne out of a 
tension or conflict between two international law norms, namely, sovereign equality of states, on 





 itself presents a classic example of this theoretical conflict. In 1812, while sailing off 
the American coast, the commercial schooner, Exchange, owned by two citizens of Maryland, 
USA, was seized by the French navy. By a general order of the French Emperor, Napoleon 
Bonaparte, the French navy converted the Schooner into a ship of war. When bad weather forced 
the ship into the port of Philadelphia, USA, the original owners brought an action in a US 
District Court against the ship for recovery of their property. The French government resisted the 
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action, arguing that as a ship of war, the Exchange was an arm of the Emperor and was entitled 
to the same immunity privilege as the Emperor himself.
75
  
On appeal to the US Supreme Court, Marshall, CJ identified the theoretical dilemma in 
issue. On the one hand, he observed that international law dictated that “the jurisdiction of the 
nation within its own territory is necessarily exclusive and absolute.”
76
 According to this long-
established principle, at the moment the Exchange entered US territorial waters it became subject 
exclusively to the national authority of the US government, an authority that encompassed the 
US District Court‟s initiation of adverse legal proceedings against the Exchange. On the other 
hand, he took notice of another fundamental principle of international law, i.e., that the world is 
comprised of distinct nations, each endowed with “equal rights and equal independence.”
77
 This 
principle of sovereign equality, the Chief Justice believed, discouraged one sovereign from 
standing in judgment over another sovereign‟s conduct. The result in this case was that sovereign 
equality took pre-eminence over exclusive territorial jurisdiction. 
 For Sompong Sucharitkul, 
… contact between two states may result in a clash between two 
fundamental principles of international law, namely, the principle of 
territoriality or territorial sovereignty, and, the principle of state or 
national sovereignty…. Normally, the principles of territorial jurisdiction 
and sovereign equality work individually and often collectively – to 
promote order and fairness in the international legal system. The former 
serves to delineate each state‟s authority to govern a single geographical 
area of the world, while the later guarantees to all states, regardless of size, 
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According to this view, this conflict arises any time a forum state seeks legitimately to 
exercise its right of jurisdiction under international law over a foreign state defendant, regardless 
of the physical location of the foreign state‟s representatives. An example usually cited in this 
regard is where a plaintiff sues a foreign state in domestic proceedings for alleged human rights 
abuses that occurred outside the forum state.
79
 
 Notwithstanding the various opinions as to its origin, state immunity is an established and 
functional rule that governs inter-state relations under international law. This leads to a 
discussion of the theories of its application.   
 
2.5 Theories of State Immunity 
 In the history of the application of the state immunity rule, two theories have developed. 
These theories are (a) the absolute immunity theory; and (b) the restrictive immunity theory. 
 
 2.5.1 The Absolute Immunity Theory 
 Until the end of the nineteenth century, state immunity was absolute, total and 
complete.
80
 This is called the absolute immunity theory, and it posits that immunity attaches to 
all actions of foreign states, irrespective of the nature and circumstances of the actions.
81
 
 Commenting on this theory, Richard Gardiner states that: 
The notion of sovereignty in an international context means absolute 
authority subject only to the rules of international law. The natural 
consequence of this concept would be that a state‟s activities and assets 
could in no circumstances be the subject of legal proceedings or any 
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  The theory of absolute immunity arose from the relatively uncomplicated role of the 
sovereign and of government in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.
83
 As noted above, the 
earliest known judicial expression of this theory is the Schooner Exchange case
84
. At the peak of 
this theory in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the UK was one of its leading 
proponents. Its position was established in a number of important judicial decisions. In the 
leading case of The Parlement Belge
85
, the English Court of Appeal affirmed that every state 
“declines to exercise by means of its courts any of its territorial jurisdiction over the person of 
any sovereign …of any other state, or over the public property of any state which is destined to 
public use …though such sovereign, … or property be within its jurisdiction.”
86
  
 The hardship occasioned by the absolute immunity rule on individuals and other entities 
necessitated a change to a more liberal theory. Consequently, the restrictive theory was founded. 
  
 2.5.2 The Restrictive Immunity Theory 
 In the course of time, states‟ engagement in commercial and allied activities increased. 
Furthermore, the process of globalization led to a situation where states no longer confine 
themselves to purely sovereign acts, but also engage in activities ordinarily belonging to the 
domain of private persons. As a result, states started shifting from the theory of absolute 
immunity to that of restrictive (qualified) immunity. This remains the more popular theory today. 
                                                             
82
  Gardiner, Richard K, op cit, note 59 at 343.  
83  Shaw, Malcolm N, op cit, note 3 at 701.   
84  Supra, note 15.  
85  (1880) 5 PD 197.  
86  Ibid at 214-215, per Brett, L.J. See also the Porto Alexandre case (1920) PD 30; Cristina case (1938) AC 485; 
Krajina v Tass Agency (1949) 2 All ER 274; Duff Development Co v Kelantan (1924) AC 797; Juan Ysmael v 





 By virtue of this later theory, immunity attaches only to acts of a foreign state which are 
of a strictly public or governmental nature (acts jure imperii). For acts of a commercial or other 
private nature (acts jure gestionis), state immunity is denied. On this development, David J 
Harris
87
 observes that: 
Since the 1920s, socialist states and others have come to engage in trading 
activities (acts jure gestionis) as well as exercising the public functions 
traditionally associated with states (acts jure imperii). In response, many 
states have moved in their practice to a doctrine of restrictive immunity by 
which a foreign state is allowed immunity for acts jure imperii only. A … 
study shows that the courts of a great majority of states in which the 
matter has been considered in recent years … now favour the doctrine of 
restrictive immunity.  
 This theory remains the more popular theory of state immunity today, as can be seen 







 that approve it. A major worrisome factor, however, is that the restrictive 
immunity regimes of these judicial decisions, treaties and statutes only apply to civil cases and 
not to criminal proceedings. Consequently, it could be safely concluded that the absolute-theory-
restrictive-theory shift is only in relation to state immunity in civil proceedings. As regards 
criminal prosecution of state officials for international crimes, the rule of state immunity under 
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customary international law still continues to apply.
91
 The continued application of this 
customary international law version of this rule without codification leads to inconsistent results 
among national courts.
92
 In circumstances where the courts of one state may grant immunity, the 
courts of another may deny it. 
Having discussed the two theories of state immunity, the next sub-section will deal with 
an examination of the entities to whom the protection of the state immunity rule accrues.  
 
2.6 Entities Entitled to State Immunity Protection 
 In the application of the state immunity rule (whether absolute or restrictive, and whether 
in civil or criminal proceedings), one preliminary but vital issue is the determination of the exact 
classes of entities entitled to immunity protection. These entities could be either instrumentalities 
of government and integral parts of the foreign state, on the one hand, or government figures 
(high-ranking officials of the state), on the other hand. 
 
 2.6.1 Instrumentalities and Parts of the State 
 In international law, for a foreign entity to be entitled to the protection of state immunity 
before the domestic courts or other judicial tribunals of a forum state, the entity must be the 
government or constitute an integral part of the government of the foreign state. It must be so 
closely connected with the government as to be an organ or department of the foreign state, one 
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through which the foreign state carries out part of its governmental functions.
93
 In this situation, 
a department or agency of a foreign state is entitled to state immunity, though it has a separate 
legal personality under the domestic law of the foreign state.
94
  
 An area of controversy under this aspect of the state immunity rule is entitlement to 
immunity of component units of federal states.
95
 In contemporary times, the determining factors 
appear to be twofold. The first is the degree of independence and autonomy enjoyed by the said 
component units within the federal arrangement in question. The second is the ability of these 
units to conduct international relations on their own under the relevant constitutional 
arrangement of the federal state in question. In Mellenger v New Brunswick Development 
Corporation
96
, one of the questions for determination by the English Court of Appeal was 
entitlement to state immunity of the Province of New Brunswick, a component unit of the 
Canadian federation. The Court observed, inter alia, that under the Canadian Constitution, “Each 
provincial government, within its own sphere, retains its independence and autonomy directly 
under the Crown …  it follows that the Province of New Brunswick is a sovereign state in its 
own right and entitled, if it so wishes, to claim sovereign immunity.”
97
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 In Alamieyeseigha v The Crown Prosecution Service
98
, the issue arose before the English 
High Court as to whether Bayelsa State, a component unit of the Nigerian federation, could, on 
its own, be entitled to state immunity under international law. On this, the court held thus:  
… there is no authority that the federal unit of the state, which is what 
Bayelsa State is, can in certain circumstances, partake of the sovereignty 
of the state as a whole and obtain state immunity… it does not follow that 
every part of a federal state is entitled to immunity from criminal 
proceedings, but it is a case-sensitive decision if a particular member of a 
federal state can be regarded as a separate state so that its head becomes 
entitled to immunity from criminal proceedings.
99
  
 In Bank of Credit and Commerce International v Price Waterhouse
100
, Justice Laddie of 
the English High Court held that the head of a member of a federation, in that case the Ruler of 
Abu Dhabi, was not entitled to immunity, while the President of the federal state of which Abu 
Dhabi formed part, i.e., the United Arab Emirates, was entitled to state immunity. 
A vivid explanation for this approach can be found in Oppenheim‟s International Law
101
, 
where the learned authors are of the view that: 
Where, as happens frequently, a federal state assumes in every way the 
external representation of its member states, so far as international 
relations are concerned, the member states make no appearance at all…. 
Here the member states are sovereign too, but only with regard to internal 
affairs. All their external sovereignty being absorbed by the federal state, 
they are not international persons at all. 
 
Some relevant municipal statutes and multilateral treaties have also adopted this trend of 
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 2.6.2 Government Figures 
 In international law, treaty and judicial practice have established that the following high-
ranking state officials may benefit from state immunity before the courts of foreign states: 
 
  2.6.2.1 Heads of State and/or Government 
 The most senior public figures of a state to whom the protection of state immunity is 
most readily accorded in international law are serving heads of state and/or government.
103
 In 
line with this position, the courts of various states have declined jurisdiction in both civil and 
criminal cases instituted against heads of state and/or government of other states.
104
 In Re 
Gaddafi
105
 (which dealt with alleged complicity in acts of terrorism), the French Cour de 
Cassation held that a serving head of state (former Libyan leader – Muammar Gaddafi) is 
immune from prosecution in national courts, even in relation to serious acts of terrorism. In Re 
Castro
106
, the Spanish Audiencio Nacional reached a similar conclusion. It held that the Spanish 
courts had no jurisdiction to try Fidel Castro, the then Cuban President, even for international 
crimes, since he enjoyed state immunity, as long as he was serving in his capacity as head of 
state. Also, in Tachiona v Mugabe
107
, a US court held that the US‟ Torture Victim Protection 
Act
108
 did not override the traditional immunity given to heads of state. In Application for Arrest 
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Warrant against Robert Mugabe
109
 (“Re Mugabe”), an English court held that a warrant could 
not be issued for the arrest of the Zimbabwean President on charges of international crimes on 
the basis that he was a serving head of state at the time the proceedings were brought. 
 The immunity of heads of state and/or government may become relevant in many 
different ways before foreign courts. It may concern current heads of state and/or government 
officially visiting another state or leading an official mission or, regardless of their physical 
presence in the forum state, it may arise in connection with acts carried out by them in their 
home states.
110
 In Saltany v Regan
111
, a US District Court granted head of state immunity to the 
UK Prime Minister in an action in tort for personal injuries and damage to property brought by 
some civilian residents of Libya in the aftermath of the US bombing of Libya. The claimants 
alleged that the UK Prime Minister had allowed military bases in the UK to be used by the US 
air force for the operation against Libya. 
 Surprisingly, head of state immunity has also been granted by a US Court to Prince 
Charles, Prince of Wales, as the heir to the British throne, even though he is not yet the British 
Monarch.
112
   
 
  2.6.2.2 Foreign Ministers 
Like heads of state and/or government, foreign ministers may, under contemporary 
international law, enjoy state immunity. This is mainly due to the nature of their functions as the 
principal link between their states and other members of the international community of states. 
As Rohan Perera put it: 
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… heads of states, heads of governments and ministers of foreign affairs 
constitute the „basic threesome‟ or the triumvirate of state officials who 
enjoy personal immunity. Under international law, it is these three 
categories of officials who are accorded special status by virtue of their 
office and their functions…
113
 
Speaking specifically on the immunity of foreign ministers, he continued: 
The centrality of his role in the conduct of international affairs on behalf 
of the sovereign would demand that the minister of foreign affairs be 
treated on par with the head of state, with regard to the scope and extent of 
the jurisdictional immunities he would enjoy. The basic rationale which 
underlined the according of jurisdictional immunities to a head of state 
would apply with equal force to a foreign minister, given the 




The ICJ has expressly endorsed the immunity of the foreign minister in its judgment in 
the ICJ Arrest Warrant Case
115
. In this case, a Belgian judge issued an arrest warrant against Mr. 
Abdulaye Yerodia Ndombasi, the then serving Foreign Affairs Minister of the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC). The DRC initiated proceedings against Belgium in the ICJ, arguing, 
inter alia, that Belgium‟s non-recognition of the immunity of the DRC‟s serving Foreign Affairs 
Minister was a violation of international law. In its judgment, the Court upheld the Minister‟s 
immunity. It found that Belgium had failed to respect the immunity from criminal jurisdiction 
and the inviolability which the DRC‟s foreign minister enjoyed under international law.  
It appears that, apart from the nature of their office, the special position of foreign 
ministers in this regard also has a treaty foundation. Under article 7(2) of the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties
116
, the foreign minister is considered to represent his or her state and to 
have authority to perform all acts relating to a treaty without the need for full powers. In 
confirming this special position, the ICJ stated that “A Minister for Foreign Affairs, responsible 
                                                             
113  Perera, Rohan, “Immunity of State Officials from Foreign Criminal Jurisdiction”, online: < http: //www. lankam 
ission.org/content/view/598/>.  
114  Ibid.  
115  Supra, note 45. 





for the conduct of his or her State‟s relations with all other States, occupies a position such that, 
like the Head of State or the Head of Government, he or she is recognized under international 
law as representative of the State solely by virtue of his or her office. He or she does not have to 
present letters of credence.”
117
 The consequence of such status was, on the facts before the Court, 
to confer personal inviolability and immunity from criminal jurisdiction, the Court stating that no 
distinction can be drawn between acts performed by a serving foreign minister in an „official‟ 
capacity, and those claimed to have been performed in a „private‟ capacity. 
 
  2.6.2.3 Other Persons of High Rank 
For this class of persons, it appears that their entitlement to state immunity in 
international law is still controversial.
118
 These persons may include the defence minister or head 
of the armed forces, trade minister, and other senior cabinet members of the government of a 
sovereign state.
119
 For example, in Belhas v Ya‟alon
120
, a US Court of Appeal affirmed dismissal 
of criminal charges for, inter alia, war crimes and crimes against humanity leveled on General 
Moshe Ya‟alon, the retired Head of Intelligence of the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF). The charges 
stemmed from General Ya‟alon‟s alleged involvement in the IDF‟s April 1996 shelling of a UN 
peacekeepers‟ compound in Qana, South Lebanon, in which several hundred Lebanese civilians 
suffered injury or death. The complainants contended that Ya‟alon‟s failure to prevent the 
shelling violated principles of international law and, inter alia, constituted war crimes, extra-
judicial killing and crimes against humanity, in that General Ya‟alon bore command 
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responsibility. However, a US District Court dismissed these charges on grounds of state 
immunity for General Ya‟lon. The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal.  
In considering the immunity of these other persons of high rank, it must be noted that 
important international treaties
121
 acknowledge the existence of a category of “other persons of 
high rank” without elucidating the category. The ICJ judgment in the ICJ Arrest Warrant 
Case
122
, while confirming the existence of such category, does not proceed beyond this. It seems 
clear, however, that the ICJ had in mind holders of offices of similar ranks and political 
significance to those of the traditional triad of heads of state, heads of government, and foreign 
ministers. In practice, such immunity is likely, therefore, to be confined to senior officials at 
„cabinet level‟ (including, presumably, vice-president or deputy prime minister) who frequently 
represent their states internationally and arrest or detention of whom could reasonably be 
construed as a serious interference with the government of the foreign state concerned.
123
 This is 
consistent with the view of the International Law Commission‟s (ILC‟s) Special Rapporteur, 




Some other judicial pronouncements on this position do not also offer a clear solution. In 
Application for Arrest Warrant against General Shaul Mofaz (“Re Mofaz”)
125
, for instance, 
District Judge Pratt of the English Magistrate Court stated thus: 
The function of various Ministers will vary enormously depending upon 
their sphere of responsibility. I will think it very unlikely that ministerial 
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appointments such as Home Secretary, Employment Minister, 
Environment Minister, Culture, Media and Sports Minister would 
automatically acquire a label of state immunity. However, I do believe that 




The distinction drawn by the judge in this case between the Defence Minister and other 
ministers is difficult to accept. In contemporary international affairs where many ministers 
represent their states internationally on official matters affecting their respective portfolios, it is 
difficult to imagine why these ministers should not qualify for state immunity like their Defence 
counterpart. Rohan Perera
127
 thinks that the right approach should be criteria-based rather than 
enumerative. For him, 
It would … be more productive and useful to embark on a process of 
identification and defining of applicable criteria, in according 
jurisdictional immunities to high ranking officials, paying due regard to 
the functional and representative character principles. This process by 




In line with this reasoning, it may be argued that in view of the enormous state powers 
that that many other cabinet members of a modern government exercises in their different fields, 
they may, in some circumstances, benefit from state immunity like the traditional triumvirate of 
heads of state, heads of government, and foreign ministers. For example, the exercise of the 
powers of the defence minister, particularly in the conduct of armed conflicts, stationing of 
troops on foreign soil, or other activities relating to military alliances, may necessitate taking 
holders of such offices as “other high-ranking state officials” for state immunity purposes. In this 
connection, it needs also to be recognized that the defence and foreign policies of the modern 
state are inextricably linked, and their line of demarcation could be tenuous. Another example 
relates to the powers of the interior minister in the co-ordination of the state‟s police. 
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 This argument appears vindicated by a relatively recent event in France. Here, the Paris 
Prosecutors‟ Office dismissed a suit accusing Mr. Donald Rumsfeld, a former US Defence 
Secretary, of torture.
129
 The reason for the dismissal, according to the Prosecutors‟ Office, was 
that Mr. Rumsfeld benefited from a “customary” immunity from prosecution granted to heads of 
state and government and foreign ministers.
130
 In Re Mofaz
131
 and Re Ehud Barak
132
, 
respectively, the English Magistrate Court granted immunity to defence ministers. This court has 
also accorded the same immunity to a minister of commerce and international trade.
133
 However, 
in Bat v Investigating Judge of the German Federal Court & Ors
134
, the English High Court held 
that the secretary of the executive office of the National Security Council of Mongolia fell 
clearly outside the circle of high officials entitled to such immunity, describing him as an 
administrator far removed from the narrow circle of those who hold the high-ranking office to be 
equated with the state they personify and from those identified by the ICJ.
135
  
The ICJ‟s decision in the Case Concerning the Armed Activities on the Territory of the 
Congo (Democratic Republic of Congo v Rwanda) (Jurisdiction and Admissibility of the 
Claim)
136
, though not based on state immunity, could be said to have impliedly approved the 
grounds suggested above for the extension of immunity to “other persons of high rank”. In that  
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case the ICJ, while recognizing the powers of the triumvirate of heads of state, heads of 
government, and foreign ministers to represent the state and make statements that bind the state, 
also took note of similar powers of finance ministers. The World Court further stated thus: 
… with increasing frequency in modern international relations other 
persons representing a State in specific fields may be authorized by that 
State to bind it by their statements in respect of matters falling within their 
purview. This may be true, for example, of holders of technical ministerial 
portfolios exercising powers in their field of competence in the area of 





  2.6.2.4 Members of Foreign Armed Forces 
 Tim Hillier asserts that this category of persons usually enjoys limited immunity from 
local jurisdiction while in the territory of a foreign state.
138
 Such immunity only applies where 
the forces are present with the consent of the host state, and the nature and extent of the 
immunity generally depends on the circumstances under which the forces were admitted, 
although simple admission itself can produce legal consequences. The receiving state impliedly 




 Under a status of forces agreement, the commander of visiting forces ofr the courts of the 
sending state have primacy of jurisdiction over offences committed within the area where the 
forces are stationed or while members of the forces are on duty. Usually, the status and immunity 
of foreign troops is the subject of specific agreement. Thus, under the Agreement Regarding the 
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Status of Forces of the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty
140
, the sending state has the primary 




  2.6.2.5 Heads of Component Units of Federal States 
 Another area of controversy is whether the head of a component unit of a federal state is 
entitled to state immunity under international law. As earlier observed, a component unit of a 
federation is entitled to state immunity if it enjoys independence and autonomy within the federal 




 It, therefore, logically follows that the head of a component unit of a federal state (e.g., a 
state governor in the US and Nigeria, a provincial premier in Canada or a Canton head in 
Switzerland) is not entitled to state immunity in international law, unless his or her component 
unit is independent and autonomous within the federation and can, on its own, conduct 
international relations with foreign states. As noted earlier, Laddie, J. of the English High Court, 
apparently gave effect to this position (in a civil claim) in Bank of Credit and Commerce 
International v Price Waterhouse.
143
 He held that the head of a component member of a 
federation (the Ruler of Abu Dhabi) was not entitled to state immunity, while the head of the 
federation of which Abu Dhabi formed part (the United Arab Emirates) was so entitled. 
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 In Alamieyeseigha v The Crown Prosecution Service
144
, the English High Court extended 
this proposition to criminal matters (money laundering) when it denied immunity from criminal 
prosecution in the UK to the then governor of Bayelsa State of Nigeria, Mr. Diepreye Solomon 
Peter Alamieyeseigha. Part of the court‟s conclusion was that Bayelsa State does not qualify as a 
state in international law and does not have the competence to conduct international relations or 
external affairs under the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria
145
. Consequently, the 
governor of Bayelsa State does not qualify as a head of state [or a high-ranking state official] and 
is, therefore, not entitled to state immunity in international law.  
 Part of the difference here may be that in some jurisdictions, such as Canada, the sub-unit 
gets its immunity not as a “state” but as a component part of the state.  
In view of the above analysis regarding the classes of state officials entitled to the 
protection of state immunity, the next sub-heading of this thesis examines the types of immunity 
available in international law to these classes of officials. 
 
2.7 Types of Immunity of State Officials 
 In international law, the state immunity available to high-ranking state officials is divided 
into two types according to the categories of the officials. These types of immunity are: 
immunity ratione persona (personal immunity or status-based immunity), and immunity ratione 
materiae (functional immunity or function-based immunity).
146
 This is a particularly important 
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point here, as the effect of this classification is more felt in international criminal proceedings 
against these state officials. 
 
 2.7.1 Immunity Ratione Personae (Personal Immunity) 
 This type of immunity attaches to a restricted class of high-ranking state offices. 
According to the ICJ, these offices are those of the triad of heads of state, heads of government, 
and foreign ministers, and possibly, a limited category of other very high-ranking state 
representatives.
147
 The ICJ, however, failed to define the state officials that belong to this limited 
category of other very high-ranking state representatives. This lapse, it is argued, will certainly 
lead to confusion and inconsistent practice among national courts of states. In criminal cases, 
while an incumbent occupies any of these offices, he is personally immune and inviolable and, 




 The effect of immunity ratione personae before national courts is uncontroversial. It 
absolutely bars from criminal prosecution – including procedural steps such as arrest - an 
incumbent of a protected office (provided he has not left office) in respect of both his official and 
personal acts, whether done before or during the incumbency of his office.
149
 In the ICJ Arrest 
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, for example, the Court held that the absolute nature of the immunity ratione 
personae enjoyed by a serving foreign minister subsists even upon allegations of his commission 
of international crimes and applies even when the foreign minister is abroad on a private visit. As 
well, the ICJ admitted that it “has been unable to deduce . . . that there exists under customary 
international law any form of exception to the rule according immunity from criminal 
jurisdiction and inviolability to incumbent Ministers for Foreign Affairs, where they are 
suspected of having committed war crimes or crimes against humanity.”
151
 For the court: 
… the functions of a Minister for Foreign Affairs are such that, throughout 
the duration of his or her office, he or she when abroad enjoys full 
immunity from criminal jurisdiction and inviolability. That immunity and 
that inviolability protect the individual concerned against any act of 
authority of another State which would hinder him or her in the 
performance of his or her duties. In this respect, no distinction can be 
drawn between acts performed by a Minister for Foreign Affairs in an 
"official" capacity, and those claimed to have been performed in a "private 
capacity", or, for that matter, between acts performed before the person 
concerned assumed office as Minister for Foreign Affairs and acts 
committed during the period of office. Thus, if a Minister for Foreign 
Affairs is arrested in another State on a criminal charge, he or she is 
clearly thereby prevented from exercising the functions of his or her 
office. The consequences of such impediment to the exercise of those 
official functions are equally serious, regardless of whether the Minister 
for Foreign Affairs was, at the time of arrest, present in the territory of the 
arresting State on an "official" visit or a "private" visit, regardless of 
whether the arrest relates to acts allegedly performed before the person 
became the Minister for Foreign Affairs or to acts performed while in 
office, and regardless of whether the arrest relates to alleged acts 
performed in an "official" capacity or a "private" capacity. Furthermore, 
even the mere risk that, by travelling to or transiting another State a 
Minister for Foreign Affairs might be exposing himself or herself to legal 
proceedings could deter the Minister from travelling internationally when 
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Although broad in its substantive application, this type of immunity is limited both 
temporally and as to the category of office-holders to whom it may apply. Once the individual 
has left office, he or she ceases to be entitled to such immunity.
153
 
 In summarizing the general nature of this type of immunity, Dapo Akande and Sangeeta 
Shah state as follows:  
It is clear that senior officials who are accorded immunity ratione 
personae will be hindered in the exercise of their international functions if 
they are arrested and detained whilst in a foreign state. For this reason, this 
type of immunity, where applicable, is commonly regarded as prohibiting 
absolutely the exercise of criminal jurisdiction by states. The absolute 
nature of the immunity ratione personae means that it prohibits the 
exercise of criminal jurisdiction not only in cases involving the acts of 
these individuals in their official capacity but also in cases involving 
private acts. Also, the rationale for the immunity means that it applies 
whether or not the act in question was done at a time when the official was 
in office or before entry to office. What is important is not the nature of 
the alleged activity or when it was carried out, but rather whether the legal 
process invoked by the foreign state seeks to subject the official to a 
constraining act of authority at the time when the official was entitled to 
the immunity. Thus, attempts to arrest or prosecute these officials would 
be a violation of the immunity …. However, since this type of immunity is 
conferred … in order to permit free exercise by the official of his or her 






 2.7.2 Immunity Ratione Materiae (Functional Immunity) 
 Immunity ratione materiae or functional immunity, unlike immunity ratione personae, 
applies to a much broader class of persons but to a much more restricted category of acts. As a 
matter of customary international law, it may accrue to all state officials, irrespective of their 
hierarchy in the state.  Thus, this type of immunity can apply to bar foreign criminal prosecution 
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of the official acts of other cabinet ministers, as well as officials of other agencies and 
instrumentalities of a state. While personal immunity attaches to particular offices, functional 
immunity immunizes certain official acts.
155
 Functional immunity covers the official acts of all 
state officials (including heads of state) and is determined by reference to the nature of the acts in 
question rather than the particular office of the official who performed them.
156
  
 Functional immunity is derived from the traditional rules of international law, in which 
official actions are attributable to the state rather than the individuals that perform them.
157
 This 
conduct-based immunity may be relied on by former officials in respect of official acts 
performed while in office, as well as by serving state officials. It may also be relied on by 
persons or bodies that are not state officials or entities but have acted on behalf of the state.
158
 
 In Prosecutor v Blaskic
159
, the Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal 
for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) shed some light on the application of this type of immunity in 
the international criminal justice system. In the words of the Chamber: 
[State] officials are mere instruments of a State and their official action 
can only be attributed to the State. They cannot be the subject of sanctions 
or penalties for conduct that is not private but undertaken on behalf of the 
State. In other words, State officials cannot suffer the consequences of 
wrongful acts which are not attributable to them personally but to the State 
on whose behalf they act: they enjoy so-called „functional immunity‟. This 
is a well established rule of customary international law going back to the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, restated many times since. 
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 One condition precedent, however, to the applicability of this type of immunity is that the 
individual who performed the act sought to be immunized must at all relevant times be acting in 
an official capacity on behalf of the state. Thus, any act not performed on behalf of the state or 
not constituting an official act does not qualify for state immunity protection. In the words of 
Robert Currie and Joseph Rikhof, “In order for immunity ratione materiae to apply, the 
individual must be acting in an official capacity. In other words, the acts protected are acts 
performed on behalf of the state. This requirement of official capacity operates to exclude from 
protection those acts which were not performed on behalf of the state.”
160
   
  
2.8 Nature of State Immunity in International Law 
 Over the years, there has been controversy as to the true nature of the state immunity rule 
in international law, i.e., whether state immunity constitutes a procedural bar or a substantive 
defence. Some scholars argue that it constitutes both a procedural bar and a substantive 
defence.
161
 Others maintain that the rule only operates as a procedural bar to actions (civil and 
criminal) against a foreign state and its high-ranking officials.
162
  
 Those that contend that state immunity constitutes both a procedural bar and a 
substantive defence maintain that as a procedural plea, there is a closer identification of the 
official‟s immunity with that enjoyed by the state itself. However, they warn that this close 
identification may cause any exception to the state‟s immunity, such as that for commercial 
transactions, to apply equally to the official and to render the act performed by the official non-
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 These scholars further argue that to treat state immunity as a substantive defence 
automatically implies the imputability of the official‟s act to the state, and this might mistakenly 
merge two separate and distinct issues.
164
  
 According to Akande and Shah, two related policies underlie the conferment of immunity 
ratione materiae in international law. First, this type of immunity constitutes (or, perhaps more 
appropriately, gives effect to) a substantive defence, in that it indicates that the individual official 
is not to be held legally responsible for acts which are, in effect, those of the state. Such acts are 
imputable only to the state and immunity ratione materiae is a mechanism for diverting 
responsibility to the state.
165
   
 Secondly, Akande and Shah maintain that the immunity of state officials in foreign courts 
prevents the circumvention of the immunity of the state through proceedings brought against 
those who act on behalf of the state. In this sense, they argue that the immunity operates as a 
jurisdictional or procedural bar and prevents courts from indirectly exercising control over the 
acts of the foreign state through proceedings against the official who carried out the act.
166
  
On the other side of the divide, Currie and Rikhof, for example, argue that state 
immunity, whether functional or personal, is procedural in nature. For them, immunity does not 
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 It appears that relevant judicial decisions have endorsed the position that state immunity 
(both in civil and criminal proceedings) operates as a procedural bar and not a substantive 
defence. In the ICJ Arrest Warrant Case, for example, the ICJ states as follows: 
… immunity from jurisdiction enjoyed by incumbent Ministers for 
Foreign Affairs does not mean that they may enjoy impunity in respect of 
any crimes that they may have committed, irrespective of the gravity. 
Immunity from criminal jurisdiction and individual criminal responsibility 
are quite separate concepts. While jurisdictional immunity is procedural in 
nature, criminal responsibility is a question of substantive law. 
Jurisdictional immunity may well bar criminal prosecution for a certain 
period or for certain offences; it cannot exonerate the person to whom it 
applies from all criminal responsibility.
168
   
  
In similar and much clearer language, the European Court of Human Rights (EctHR) held 
in Al-Adsani v United Kingdom
169
 that “[t]he grant of [state] immunity is to be seen not as 
qualifying a substantive right but as a procedural bar on the national court‟s power to determine 
the right.” 
 Again, in Jones v Ministry of Interior of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
170
, the UK House 
of Lords maintained this position by holding, inter alia, that: 
State immunity is a procedural rule going to the jurisdiction of a national 
court. It does not go to substantive law
171
; it does not contradict a 
prohibition contained in a jus cogens norm but merely diverts any breach 
of it to a different method of settlement. Arguably then, there is no 
substantive content in the procedural plea of State immunity upon which a 
jus cogens mandate can bite.  
 
 It seems that the better view is that the state immunity rule operates as a procedural bar, 
and not as a substantive defence. This is because state immunity is raised to preclude a court 
seized of a case from entertaining the substance of the case, while a substantive defence is 
considered after the court‟s treatment of the substance of a case. Again, immunity is raised to 
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deny the court jurisdiction, while a substantive defence is pleaded to exonerate a party that has 
either admitted the commission of some alleged wrongdoing or been found guilty of same by the 
court. Thus, immunity operates to shield from trial or prosecution, while a substantive defence 
seeks to vindicate from guilt or mitigate sanctions. A strong support for this position can be 
found in a recent ICJ judgment. In the ICJ Jurisdictional Immunities Case
172
, the World Court 
addressed the issue as follows: “… the law of immunity is essentially procedural in nature …. It 
regulates the exercise of jurisdiction in respect of particular conduct and is thus entirely distinct 
from the substantive law which determines whether that conduct is lawful or unlawful ….”  
 Having discussed the nature of the state immunity rule under the present sub-heading, it 
becomes necessary to examine the possible grounds upon which the application of this rule could 
be justified. Thus, the next sub-heading deals with various rationales for state immunity in 
international law. 
 
2.9 Waiver of State Immunity 
 A state to which the benefit of immunity accrues can, nevertheless, waive the said 
immunity or that of its high-ranking official.  This waiver may be either express or implied.
173
 
 An express waiver may occur upon submission to the jurisdiction of a foreign court either 
by a prior written agreement or after a particular dispute has arisen. It could be by a clear and 
express language in a contract agreement.
174
 For an implied or deemed waiver, a state is deemed 
to have submitted to the jurisdiction of a foreign court where the state has instituted proceedings 
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or has intervened, or has taken steps in proceedings before such a court.
175
 A submission to 
proceedings is also deemed a submission to any counter-claim arising out of the same legal 
relationship or facts as the main claim.
176
 Furthermore, a state which has agreed in writing to 
submit a dispute to arbitration under the laws of a foreign state is not immune from proceedings 
in the courts of the foreign state in respect of the arbitration.
177
  
 In criminal proceedings, since the immunity enjoyed by a foreign state official before the 
municipal courts of the forum state belongs to the official‟s state and not to the official 
individually
178
, the official‟s state may decide to waive this immunity. If the immunity is so 
waived, the official cannot claim it on his own but is liable to face the proceedings before the 
forum state.
179
 However, waiver of immunity in criminal proceedings is a very rare occurrence. 
 It appears that if a state ratifies a treaty that provides for exercise of jurisdiction over an 
international crime by national courts, the municipal courts of other states parties may exercise 
jurisdiction over high-ranking officials of the ratifying state in disregard of the state immunity 





, a majority of the House of Lord viewed Chile‟s ratification of the Torture 
Convention
182
 as negating any claims to immunity ratione personae by Chilean officials. Lord 
Saville held that: 
                                                             
175  UK‟s State Immunity Act, supra, note 8, s 2(5); European Convention on State Immunity, supra, note 8, art 1; UN 
Jurisdictional Immunities Convention, supra, note 8, art 8.  
176  European Convention on State Immunity, supra, note 8, art 1.  
177  Ibid, art 12; UN Jurisdictional Immunities Convention, supra, note 8, art 17.  
178  ICJ Arrest Warrant Case, supra, note 45 at 21, para 53.  
179
 See, e.g., Franey, Elizabeth Helen, “Immunity, Individuals and International Law: Which Individuals are Immune 
from the Jurisdiction of National Courts?” (PhD Thesis, Department of Law, London School of Economics and 
Political Science, London, UK, June 2009) [unpublished] at 204.  
180 See Forcese, Craig, “De-immunizing Torture: Reconciling Human Rights and State Immunity” (2007) 52 McGill 
LJ 127 at 147. 
181  Supra, note 52 at 163-170. 





It is also said that any waiver by states of immunities must be express, or 
at least unequivocal. I would not dissent from this as a general proposition, 
but it seems to me that the express and unequivocal terms of the Torture 
Convention fulfill any such requirement. To my mind these terms 
demonstrate that the states who have become parties have clearly and 
unambiguously agreed that official torture should now be dealt with in a 





Specifically, it may be stated that if the home state of the official fails to notify the forum 
state of the official‟s immunity, this may constitute a waiver of such official‟s immunity before 
the municipal courts of the forum state. This position appears to follow from the ICJ‟s position in 
the Case Concerning Certain Questions of Mutual Judicial Assistance in Criminal Matters 
(Djibouti v France)
184
. In this case, the ICJ suggested that, in the case of functional immunity, it 
is for the official‟s home state to notify the state seeking to exercise jurisdiction and that the 
latter is not obliged to raise or consider the matter of its own accord. 
 
2.10 Conclusion 
By way of necessary background, the foregoing discussion has attempted an overview of 
the significance, history, nature, and rationales for the state immunity rule. It has also examined 
the entities entitled to its protection, as well as the types of state immunity available to state 
officials. Consequently, this thesis will proceed in the next chapter to an exposition of various 
problems arising from the application of this rule in the international criminal justice system.
                                                             
183  Pinochet case, supra, note 52 at 170. 






APPLICATION OF THE STATE IMMUNITY RULE IN THE INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: PROBLEMS ARISING 
3.1 Introduction 
 Chapter 2 of this thesis has, inter alia, examined the rationales advanced for the state 
immunity rule. Despite the commendable nature of these rationales, the rule‟s application in the 
international criminal justice system gives rise to a number of problems which substantially 
undermine its value. These problems, which range from impunity for flagrant violation of 
peremptory norms of international law to perpetuation of injustice, are examined below.  
 
3.2 Impunity for Flagrant Violation of Peremptory Norms of International Law 
 In contemporary international law, certain norms are so fundamental that they have 
attained the status of “peremptory norms” or “jus cogens”. These norms cannot, therefore, be 
derogated from by any entity – sovereign states, state officials, or private persons. The Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties
1
 defines a “peremptory norm” as follows: 
… a peremptory norm of general international law is a norm accepted 
and recognized by the international community of states as a whole as 
a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be 
modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law 




 Among these peremptory norms
3
 are the international prohibitions on the commission of 
some heinous international crimes. These crimes are prohibited both under customary 
                                                             
1   1969, 1155 UNTS 339, art 53.  
2
  See also Costello, Daniel G, “Political Constructivism and Reasoning about Peremptory Norms of International 
Law” (2011) 4:1 WUJR 1 at 2; Criddle, Evan J & Evan Fox-Dent, “A Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens” (2009) 34:2 
YJIL 331 at 331-332; Orakhelashvili, Alexander, Peremptory Norms in International Law (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2009); De Wet, Erika, “Jus Cogens and Obligations Erga Omnes”, in Shelton, Dinah (ed), The 
Oxford Handbook of International Human Rights Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013) 541 at 541-548.  
3  See further the Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co Ltd case (Belgium v Spain) (1970) ICJ Reps 32 





international law and international treaties.
4
 A jus cogens rule is widely accepted as having a 
superior status to other international law rules that have not attained a jus cogens quality. In the 
event of a conflict, it takes supremacy over these other rules as described here. First, when a rule 
of jus cogens is shown to be in conflict with a rule of ordinary international law relative to some 
specific case or state of affairs, the former shall prevail. Second, when a rule of jus cogens is 
shown to be in conflict with a treaty or a single treaty provision, the treaty or the single provision 
– if severable from the remainder of the treaty – shall be considered void. Third and more 
significantly, when a rule of jus cogens is shown to be in conflict with a rule of ordinary 
customary international law, the customary rule shall be considered void.
5
  
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
Press, 2005) at 202-203; Bianchi, Andrea, “Human Rights and the Magic of Jus Cogens” (2008) 19:3 EJIL 491 at 
493-494; Vidmar, Jure, “Norm Conflicts and Hierarchy in International Law: Towards a Vertical International 
Legal System?”, in De Wet, Erika  & Jure Vidmar (eds), Hierarchy in International Law: The Place of Human 
Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) 13 at 26 and 29. Caplan, Lee M, “State Immunity, Human Rights, 
and Jus Cogens: A Critique of the Normative Hierarchy Theory” (2003) 17:4 AJIL 741; McGregor, Lorna, “State 
Immunity and Jus Cogens” (2006) 55 ICLQ 437.  
4  These crimes include torture, genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, slavery and slave trade, and piracy. 
See the Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 1984, 1465 
UNTS 85 (“Torture Convention”); Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 1948, 
78 UNTS 277 (“Genocide Convention”); Convention against Slavery, 1926, 60 LNTS 253; UN Convention on the 
Law of the Sea, 1982, 1833 UNTS 3, art 105; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the 
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, 1949, 75 UNTS 31 (“Geneva Convention I”); Geneva Convention 
for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of the Armed Forces at Sea, 
1949, 75 UNTS 85 (“Geneva Convention II”); Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 
1949, 75 UNTS 135 (“Geneva Convention III”); Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons 
in Time of War, 1949, 75 UNTS 287 (“Geneva Convention IV”); Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 
12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, 1977, 1125 UNTS 3 
(“Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions”); Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and 
relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, 1977, 1125 UNTS 609 (“Protocol II to 
the Geneva Conventions”); Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes 
Against Humanity, 1968, UN Doc A/7218. Other peremptory norms include the inviolability of the territorial 
integrity and political independence of a sovereign state and the prohibition on commission of the crime of 
apartheid. See the Charter of the United Nations, 1945, 1 UNTS XVI (“UN Charter”), art 2(4) and the International 
Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, 1973, 1015 UNTS 243 (“Apartheid 
Convention”), respectively. 
5 See, e.g., Thirlway, Hugh, The Sources of International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014) at 155; 
“Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising From the Diversification and Expansion of International 
Law”, Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission, Chaired by Martti Koskenniemi, Report of 
the International Law Commission on the Work of Its 58th Session, 1 May – 9 June and 3 July – 11 August 2006, 
A/CN.4/L.682 at 149, 155-156; Linderfalk, Ulf, “The Effect of Jus Cogens Norms: Whoever Opens Pandora‟s Box, 





 Of special note is the fact that the rule of state immunity in international law has not 
attained jus cogens status. In fact, it is universally accepted that the state immunity rule is 
inferior to jus cogens rules in the hierarchy of international law norms.
6
 According to the 
normative hierarchy theory, international law norms are of different hierarchies, depending on 
how fundamental their nature may be. Thus, when a higher international legal norm (jus cogens) 
conflicts with a lower norm, the higher norm prevails.
7
 On this ground, it would logically follow 
that where there is a conflict between the state immunity rule and the jus cogens constituted by 
the prohibition on any of the foregoing international crimes, the state immunity rule should give 
way. It could, therefore, be argued in this regard that, at least, the courts of various states should 




 However, the reality today is that under international law, foreign state immunity with 
respect to acts committed in the exercise of official powers seems to remain the rule, even when 
these acts are committed in violation of a norm which has the character of jus cogens.
9
 In the ICJ 
Jurisdictional Immunities Case
10
, for example, Italy argued, inter alia, that the massacres carried 
out by German armed forces in Greece amounted to breaches of international humanitarian law 
                                                             
6 Knuchel, Sevrine, “State Immunity and the Promise of Jus Cogens” (2011) 9:2 NJIHR 149 at 153; Orakhelashvili, 
Alexander, Peremptory Norms in International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008) at 320-358; Caplan, 
Lee M, “State Immunity, Human Rights, and Jus Cogens: A Critique of the Normative Hierarchy Theory”, op cit, 
note 3; McGregor, Lorna, “State Immunity and Jus Cogens”, op cit, note 3.  
7 See Shelton, Dinah, “Normative Hierarchy in International Law” (2006) 100:2 AJIL 291; Linderfalk, Ulf, 
“Normative Conflicts and the Fuzziness of the International Jus Cogens Regime” (2009) 69 ZaoRV 961; Vidmar, 
Jure, op cit, note 3.   
8 Johnson, Thora A, “A Violation of Jus Cogens Norms as an Implicit Waiver of Immunity under the Federal 
Sovereign Immunities Act” (1995) 19:4 Maryland JIL 259 at 260-261. 
9  See Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April, 2000 (Democratic Republic of Congo v Belgium) (2002) ICJ 
Reps 3 (“ICJ Arrest Warrant Case”); Jurisdictional Immunities of the State Case (Germany v Italy: Greece 
intervening) (2012) ICJ Reps 99 (“ICJ Jurisdictional Immunities Case”); Krajewski, Markus and Christopher 
Singer, “Should Judges be Front-Runners?: The ICJ, State Immunity and the Protection of Fundamental Human 
Rights” (2012) 16 Max Planck UNYB I at 22; Knuchel, Sevrine, op cit, note 12 at 154; Potesta, Michele, “State 
Immunity and Jus Cogens Violations: The Alien Tort Statute Against the Backdrop of the Latest Developments in the 
„Law of Nations‟” (2010) 28:2 Berkeley JIL 571 at 576. 





and, therefore, violations of jus cogens. For Italy, these violations displaced the applicability of 
any rule of immunity for Germany before Italian and other foreign courts. However, the ICJ 
rejected this argument, holding that even if the acts of the German armed forces involved 
violations of jus cogens rules, the applicability of the customary international law on state 
immunity was not affected.
11
   
 The implication of this practice in the international criminal justice system is the creation 
of a culture of impunity in high-ranking state officials as regards the violation of these 
peremptory norms.
12
 Even the UN official definition of the word “impunity” shows that state 
immunity is the principal cause of impunity among perpetrators of international crimes. For 
example, the preamble to the UN Economic and Social Council‟s Set of Principles for the 




“Impunity” means the impossibility, de jure or de facto, of bringing the 
perpetrators of violations to account - whether in criminal, civil, 
administrative or disciplinary proceedings - since they are not subject to 
any inquiry that might lead to their being accused, arrested, tried and, if 
found guilty, sentenced to appropriate penalties, and to making 
reparations to their victims.
14
 
 According to principle 1 of these Principles, 
Impunity arises from a failure by States to meet their obligations to 
investigate violations; to take appropriate measures in respect of the 
perpetrators, particularly in the area of justice, by ensuring that those 
suspected of criminal responsibility are prosecuted, tried and duly 
punished; to provide victims with effective remedies and to ensure that 
they receive reparation for the injuries suffered; to ensure the inalienable 
right to know the truth about violations; and to take other necessary steps 
to prevent a recurrence of violations.  
                                                             
11  Ibid at 142, para 97. 
12  See, e.g., The Redress Trust, Immunity v. Accountability: Considering the Relationship between State Immunity 
and Accountability for Torture and Other Serious International Crimes (London: The Redress Trust, 2005) at 44.    
13  E/CN.4/2005/102/Add.1, preamble.  






  The various forms of violations of jus cogens norms arising from the application of the 
state immunity rule in the international criminal justice system are discussed below. 
 
 3.2.1 Systematic Commission of International Crimes 
 In international law, certain acts are outlawed as crimes against the international 
community as a whole. These, as referred to above, include genocide, war crimes, crimes against 
humanity, torture, and the crime of aggression.
15
 Consequently, universal international treaties 
have been concluded that expressly prohibit and punish these crimes. States have, over the years, 
universally accepted prohibitions on the commission of these crimes without objection. By virtue 
of this universal state practice and opinio juris
16
, these crimes are outlawed under customary 
international law binding on all states and individuals. Also, because of their non-derogable 
nature, the prohibition on these crimes has attained the status of jus cogens.
17
  
 Perpetrators of these crimes are regarded under customary international law as “hostes 
humani generis” (enemies of all humankind), whom all states have an obligation erga omnes 
(owed to the whole world community) to bring to justice.
18
 Consequently, the principle of 
universal jurisdiction was developed in international criminal law. By virtue of this principle, all 
states have jurisdiction to prosecute these international crimes. This jurisdiction is exercised 
                                                             
15  See note 4, supra. 
16  Opinio juris sive necessitatis (shortened as “opinio juris”) means the belief that a certain practice or behaviour 
observed by states constitutes law. It is the psychological element which, together with state practice, forms a rule of 
customary international law. See, e.g., Shaw, Malcolm N, International Law, 6th ed (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2008) at 84.  
17  See Bassiouni, M Cherif, “International Crimes, Jus Cogens and Obligation Erga Omnes” (1996) 59:4 Law and 
Contemporary Problems 63 at 65; De Hoogh, Andre, Obligations Erga Omnes and International Crimes: A 
Theoretical Inquiry into the Implementation and Enforcement of the International Responsibility of States (The 
Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1996) at 45-63. 
18  Gaja, Giorgio, “Obligations Erga Omnes, International Crimes and Jus Cogens: A Tentative Analysis of Three 
Related Concepts”, in Weiler, Joseph et al (eds), International Crimes of State: A Critical Analysis of the ILC‟s 
Draft Article 19 on State Responsibility (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co, 1988) 151; Sriram, Chandra L, 





irrespective of whether the crimes are committed in the prosecuting state‟s territory, and 
regardless of the accused person‟s nationality, state of residence, or any other relationship with 
the prosecuting state.
19
 Under this principle, the prosecuting state justifies its claim to 
jurisdiction on the grounds that these crimes are committed against all and against the very 
foundation of the international community and are, therefore, too serious to tolerate.
20
 This 
universal jurisdiction under customary international law is complemented by multilateral treaties 







 Despite the international prohibition and the conferment of universal jurisdiction on the 
courts of all states to try and punish the perpetrators, state immunity still continues to bar trials of 
high-ranking state officials for these crimes before foreign national courts. For example, in the 
Application for Arrest Warrant against Robert Mugabe
24
 (“Re Mugabe”), a UK High Court held 
that a warrant could not be issued in the UK for the arrest of Mr. Robert Mugabe (the 
Zimbabwean President) on charges of international crimes. This decision, according to the court, 
was based on the grounds that he was a serving head of state at the time the proceedings were 
brought. A similar decision was reached by a UK Magistrate‟s Court in the Application for 
Arrest Warrant against General Shaul Mofaz
25
 (“Re Mofaz”). Here, the court rejected, on 
grounds of state immunity, an application for a warrant for the arrest of General Mofaz (then 
                                                             
19 Hesenov, Rahim, “Universal Jurisdiction for International Crimes – A Case Study” (2013) 93:3 Eur J Crim Policy 
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Israel LR 301 at 302-303; Amnesty International‟s Universal Jurisdiction: 14 Principles on the Effective Exercise of 
Universal Jurisdiction, Amnesty International May 1999AI Index: IOR 53/01/99 at 1. 
21  See the Genocide Convention, supra, note 4. 
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Israeli defence minister) in relation to allegations of torture and war crimes. In Re Gaddafi
26
, the 
former Libyan head of state (Muammar Gaddafi) was charged in France with multiple murder 
for his complicity in a terrorist action (in circumstances that also amounted to crimes against 
humanity). The French Cour de‟ Cassation, however, declined jurisdiction and dismissed the 
case on the basis of the state immunity rule.
27
   
 Also, in Re Sharon & Yaron
28
, a number of survivors of the 1982 massacre in Sabra and 
Shatila Palestinian refugee camps (Lebanon) lodged a criminal complaint with a Belgian court. 
The complaint was against Ariel Sharon (Israeli defence minister at the time of the massacre and 
Prime Minister at the time of the complaint) and Amos Yaron (commander of an Israeli army 
unit at the gates of the refugee camps). The complaint accused the two Israeli officials of 
genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. However, the Belgian Cour de Cassation 
dismissed the complaint against Sharon on grounds of immunity.
29
  
 As well, in the Re Castro
30
, the Spanish Audiencia Nacional dismissed, on grounds of 
state immunity, international criminal proceedings against Fidel Castro (former Cuban President) 
in Spain. Also, in Re Kagame
31
, the same Spanish Audiencia Nacional dismissed, on grounds of 
state immunity, criminal charges leveled against Paul Kagame (the incumbent Rwandan Prime 
Minister) for genocide and other species of international crimes.   
                                                             
26  Arrêt no. 1414, (2001) 125 ILR 456. 
27 This decision has been criticized in many quarters due, inter alia, to the court‟s inability to draw a clear distinction 
between immunity ratione personae and immunity ratione materiae. See, e.g., Zappala, Salvatore, “Do Heads of 
State in Office Enjoy Immunity from Jurisdiction for International Crimes: The Gaddafi Case Before the French 
Cour de Cassation” (2001) 12:3 EJIL 595; Cassese, Antonio et al, International Criminal Law: Cases and 
Commentary (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011) at 91.   
28  (2003) 42 ILM 596 (Judgment of 12 February 2003). 
29  See further details of the court‟s decision in Cassese, Antonio et al, op cit, note 27 at 92-93.  
30 Cited in Harrington, Joanna et al (eds), Bringing Power to Justice? The Prospects of the International Criminal 
Court (Montreal, Canada: McGill-Queen‟s University Press, 2006) at 79.  





 The decision of the ICJ in the ICJ Arrest Warrant Case
32
 essentially encourages this 
culture of impunity. Here, the ICJ held that serving heads of state, heads of government and 
foreign ministers enjoy a broad personal immunity from the jurisdiction of foreign domestic 
courts, including immunity from prosecution for international crimes. The court made it clear 
that such immunity subsists even where it is alleged that an international crime has been 
committed.
33
 It should be noted that many of the national courts that dismissed the foregoing 
cases against heads of state and heads of government
34
 on grounds of state immunity actually did 
so in the footsteps of this ICJ decision, i.e., on the grounds that immunity ratione personae 
absolutely bars foreign criminal proceedings.
35
 The ICJ may be right in this case, in view of its 




 However, one of the major problems arising from the application of the state immunity 
rule in such circumstances is that state officials perpetrating or intent on perpetrating these 
crimes are emboldened to do so. Some of them are shielded from criminal prosecutions in their 
states‟ domestic courts by the executive immunity provisions of their states‟ municipal 
constitutions and amnesty laws.
37
 Even in states where there are no such municipal constitutional 
immunity and/or amnesty laws, the fact that these officials are in control of the government 
apparatuses of their states makes it extremely difficult for charges of international crimes to be 
                                                             
32  Supra, note 9. 
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Assistance in Criminal Matters (Djibouti v France) (2008) ICJ Reps 177. 
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36  Statute of the International Court of Justice, 1945, 3 Bevans 1179; 59 Stat. 1031; T.S. 993; (1945) 39 AJIL Supp 
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pressed against them domestically.
38
 A further exemption of these officials from international 
criminal proceedings before foreign courts by the state immunity rule, therefore, produces no 
deterrence and defeats the ends of the international criminal justice system. To this extent, I 
agree with Antonio Cassese when he states that: 
It is state officials . . . that commit international crimes . . . . They order, 
plan, instigate, organize, aid and abet, or culpably tolerate or acquiesce, or 
willingly or negligently fail to prevent or punish international crimes . . . . 
To allow these state agents go scot-free only because they acted in an 
official capacity . . . would mean to bow to traditional concerns of the 
international community (chiefly, respect for state sovereignty). In the 
present international community respect for human rights and the demand 
that justice be done whenever human rights have been seriously and 
massively put in jeopardy, override the traditional principle of respect for 
state sovereignty. The new thrust towards the protection of human dignity 




Consequent upon the above judicial practice, these crimes continue to be committed 
without any fear of punishment, at least from foreign courts‟ exercise of jurisdiction. In the 
words of Osita Nnamani Ogbu, “the doctrine of sovereign immunity gave rise to sovereign 
impunity as it shields sovereigns from being answerable for their crimes in international law.”
40
 
No doubt, the rule is one of the norms that sustains mutual respect and cordial relations among 
states and thus maintains relative peace and balance of power in the international society. 
However, the high level of impunity it induces in state officials regarding commission of these 
crimes undermines its positive roles.  
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 How this immunity-induced impunity, and the sense of security that goes with it, 
manifests regarding a number of international crimes is set out below. The specific crimes 
discussed seriatim are torture, genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity. 
 
  3.2.1.1 Torture  
 As noted earlier, torture is an international crime prohibited by the Torture Convention
 41
. 
Articles 5 to 7 of the Convention provide for some limited form of universal jurisdiction by 
conferring on the contracting states jurisdiction to prosecute or extradite to another state an 
alleged torturer found within their respective territories. These provisions supplement the 
established position that torture has become a crime under customary international law and is, 
therefore, susceptible to universal jurisdiction by the domestic courts of all states. In R v Bow 
Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrates, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No. 3)
42
 (“Pinochet 
case”) for example, counsel for the appellants maintained that systematic torture is to be 
considered a violation of jus cogens. For the counsel
43
: 
In showing an international intention to prohibit an express practice, such 
as torture, it is not necessary that each country prohibits it in the same 
way, nor is it necessary that each state‟s law prohibits torture wherever it 
occurs. The various laws of states considered in the light of the fact that 
every recent human rights treaty has prohibited torture provide evidence 
that customary international law prohibited torture before the Torture 
Convention and that, under customary international law, torture was an 
international crime if committed by a public official. There was no head of 
state exception and states other than the state where the offence took place 
were entitled to exercise jurisdiction.
44
 The Torture Convention codified 
existing customary law norms prohibiting torture, but added a duty to 
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exercise the jurisdiction which existed under customary international law. 
No signatory to that Convention can object to the exercise of the 
jurisdiction by another state as being an interference with the signatory‟s 
internal affairs. Accordingly, either the Torture Convention establishes 
that the applicant can have no immunity from prosecution for acts of 
torture or alternatively the prohibition against torture has the status of jus 
cogens and he can be prosecuted under customary international law….
45
 
If it is necessary to show that torture was a crime under international law 
in 1973 when the acts occurred that requirement is satisfied because it was 
a crime under customary international law at that time…. 
 
   In the American case of Siderman de Blake v Republic of Argentina
46
, the US Federal 
Court held that alleged acts of official torture committed in 1976 before the conclusion of the 
Torture Convention violated international law because the prohibition of official torture had 
attained the status of jus cogens.   
 Notwithstanding this elevated status of the international legal norm against torture, some 
domestic and international judicial bodies and other relevant authorities still uphold the 
supremacy of state immunity over this peremptory norm prohibiting torture. In Re Rumsfeld
47
, 
the General Prosecutor of Paris, for example, dismissed a criminal complaint filed in France 
against Donald Rumsfeld (a former US Defence Secretary). The complaint accused Rumsfeld of 
torture and authorizing interrogation techniques that led to serious human rights abuses. The 
grounds for the complaint were allegations by Iraqi prisoners at the Abu Ghraib Jail in Iraq, and 
by prisoners at the US detention camp in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, of physical abuse and sexual 
humiliation by US soldiers under Rumsfeld‟s command. This complaint was filed during 
Rumsfeld‟s visit to France. Despite the severity of these allegations, the Paris Prosecutors‟ 
Office dismissed the action, ruling that Rumsfeld benefitted from a “customary” immunity from 
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prosecution granted to heads of state and government and foreign ministers, even after they had 
left office. An appeal to the General Prosecutor of Paris was dismissed on the same grounds, 
despite the fact that Rumsfeld was no longer in office as Defence Secretary.
48
 It could be argued 
that these rulings appear misleading. They fail to clearly state the type of immunity to which 
Rumsfeld was entitled in the circumstance. If the French authorities meant immunity ratione 
personae, he was no more a sitting state official and should, therefore, not have been entitled to 
it. If they meant immunity ratione materiae, the position had already emerged that torture does 




 Even in the Pinochet case
50
, the UK House of Lords, while unprecedentedly disregarding 
the immunity of a former head of state for serious international crimes, nevertheless held that a 
head of state is still protected while in office by immunity even in respect of serious international 
crimes. According to the Law Lords, a serving head of state can still claim immunity ratione 
personae if charged for torture. For the House of Lords, the nature of the charge is irrelevant: the 
official‟s immunity is personal and absolute.
51
 No doubt, this is a correct statement of the 
customary international law position. However, the problems that could emanate from it and 
similar decisions in other cases are subsequently discussed. 
 In the ICJ Arrest Warrant Case
52
, Belgium had passed a law conferring on its courts 
universal jurisdiction over international crimes committed by anyone anywhere (even if the 
perpetrator was not present in Belgium) and denying all immunities for such crimes. Pursuant to 
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this law, on April 11, 2000, a Belgian judge issued an international arrest warrant against Mr. 
Abdulaye Yerodia Ndombasi, who was at the time serving as the foreign affairs minister of the 
DRC. The warrant was, inter alia, on charges of torture, war crimes and crimes against humanity. 
Consequently, the DRC initiated judicial proceedings against Belgium in the ICJ. The DRC 
argued that Belgium‟s non-recognition of the immunity of a serving foreign affairs minister was 
a violation of international law.  
By 13 votes to 3, the ICJ ruled that Belgium had violated a legal obligation toward the 
DRC. The court vehemently rejected Belgium‟s contention that, having regard to developments 
in contemporary international law, a serving foreign minister is not entitled to claim immunity 
before national courts on charges of international crimes. For the ICJ, immunity before national 
courts was not affected by the existence of treaties such as the Torture Convention. The court 
finally held that Belgium had failed to respect the immunity from criminal jurisdiction and the 
inviolability which the incumbent DRC foreign minister enjoyed under international law.
53




The Court has carefully examined State practice, including national 
legislation and those few decisions of national higher courts, such as the 
House of Lords or the French Court of Cassation. It has been unable to 
deduce from this practice that there exists under customary international 
law any form of exception to the rule according immunity from criminal 
jurisdiction and inviolability to incumbent Ministers for Foreign Affairs, 
where they are suspected of having committed war crimes or crimes 
against humanity….
55
 It should further be noted that the rules governing 
the jurisdiction of national courts must be carefully distinguished from 
those governing jurisdictional immunities: jurisdiction does not imply 
absence of immunity, while absence of immunity does not imply 
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jurisdiction. Thus, although various international conventions on the 
prevention and punishment of certain serious crimes impose on States 
obligations of prosecution or extradition, thereby requiring them to extend 
their criminal jurisdiction, such extension of jurisdiction in no way affects 
immunities under customary international law, including those of 
Ministers for Foreign Affairs. These remain opposable before the courts of 





 With a view to justifying this legal position, the ICJ gave reasons why the absolute 
immunity and inviolability of a foreign minister for international crimes before national courts 
should not be seen as leading to impunity:   
The Court emphasizes, however, that the immunity from jurisdiction 
enjoyed by incumbent Ministers for Foreign Affairs does not mean that 
they enjoy impunity in respect of any crimes they might have committed, 
irrespective of their gravity.
57
 Immunity from criminal jurisdiction and 
individual criminal responsibility are quite separate concepts. While 
jurisdictional immunity is procedural in nature, criminal responsibility is a 
question of substantive law. Jurisdictional immunity may well bar 
prosecution for a certain period or for certain offences; it cannot exonerate 
the person to whom it applies from al1 criminal responsibility. 
Accordingly, the immunities enjoyed under international law by an 
incumbent or former Minister for Foreign Affairs do not represent a bar to 
criminal prosecution in certain circumstances.  
 First, such persons enjoy no criminal immunity under international law 
in their own countries, and may thus be tried by those countries' courts in 
accordance with the relevant rules of domestic law. 
 Secondly, they will cease to enjoy immunity from foreign jurisdiction 
if the State which they represent or have represented decides to waive that 
immunity.  
  Thirdly, after a person ceases to hold the office of Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, he or she will no longer enjoy al1 of the immunities accorded by 
international law in other States. Provided that it has jurisdiction under 
international law, a court of one State may try a former Minister for 
Foreign Affairs of another State in respect of acts committed prior or 
subsequent to his or her period of office, as wel1 as in respect of acts 
committed during that period of office in a private capacity.  
 Fourthly, an incumbent or former Minister for Foreign Affairs may be 
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subject to criminal proceedings before certain international criminal 




 However interesting the ICJ‟s reasons may seem on their face, these reasons, in reality, 
appear unsound and unconvincing and have the potential to lead to the impunity the court is 
trying to avoid. Regarding the first and second reasons, it is obvious that in some states, these 
state officials are in absolute control of government apparatuses. Besides, international crimes 
are often committed by state officials as part of state policy, and so governments do not routinely 
prosecute their own officials engaged in the implementation of such policies.
59
 Consequently, the 
idea of their prosecution for these international crimes in their home courts is far-fetched, as no 
one would incriminate or punish himself. Besides, it should be noted that in many states, there 
exist domestic constitutional immunities, amnesties and allied laws barring criminal prosecution 
of sitting high-ranking state officials.
60
  Similarly, the option of waiver of immunity in such a 
circumstance would amount to the officials deliberately handing themselves over to foreign 
states for international criminal prosecution. This, again, amounts to expecting the impossible.  
 In respect of the ICJ‟s third reason (where officials cease holding office), it is obvious 
that in many states, some high-ranking officials to whom immunity ratione personae attaches 
could legitimately or illegitimately hold office for life.
61
 This is especially the case with many 
heads of state. For example, Queen Elizabeth II has been the UK head of state since 1952 and 
                                                             
58  ICJ Arrest Warrant Case, supra, note 9 at 25, paras 60-61.  
59  See Akande, Dapo & Sangeeta Shah, “Immunities of State Officials, International Crimes, and Foreign Domestic 
Courts” (2010) 21:4 EJIL 815 at 816. 
60  Examples are Nigeria‟s Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, op cit, note 37, s 308; South 
Africa‟s Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act [No 34, 1995] – G16579; also online: < 
http://www.saflii.org/za/legis/num_act/ponuara1995477/>.  
61 See, e.g., Hassig, Ralph & Kongdan Oh, The Hidden People of North Korea: Everyday Life in the Hermit 
Kingdom (Maryland, USA: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2009) at 17; Yom, Sean L & F Gregory Gause III, 
“Resilient Loyals: How Arab Monarchies Hang On” (2012) 23 Journal of Democracy 74; Brownlee, Jason et al, 
“Why the Modest Harvest”, in Diammond, Larry & Marc F Plattner (eds), Democratization and Authoritarianism in 
the Arab World (Maryland, USA: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2014) 127 at 139; Svolik, Milan W, The Politics 





will most likely remain so for life.
62
 Robert Mugabe‟s presidency in Zimbabwe since 1980 has 
no end in sight, just like Yoweri Museveni‟s in Uganda since 1986, Paul Biya‟s in Cameroon 
since 1982, Jose Eduardo Dos Santos‟ in Angola since 1979, and Teodoro Obiang Nguema‟s in 
Equatorial Guinea since 1979.
63
 Another example is Kim Jong-Un who, in 2011, succeeded his 
father Kim Jong-Il and his grandfather Kim Il-Sung (both of whom died in office). As head of 
state of the Democratic Republic of Korea, Kim Jong-Un is meant to remain in this position for 
life.
64
 Bashar al-Assad, in 2000, also succeeded his father, Hafez al-Assad, as the President of 
Syria and has no plan to quit, despite national and international pressure to do so.
65
 There are 
also many other examples, past and present.
66
  According to Joanne Foakes, “It is notable that 
not all republics have heads of State who are elected. Some have Presidents who hold office „for 
life‟ and, in some cases, even where some form of constitutional election or appointment is 
ostensibly applied, it is clear that there is a degree of de facto inheritance or dynastic continuity 
in the succession of one head of state to another.”
 67
 
 Finally, on the ICJ‟s fourth reason (prosecution before international criminal courts), 
contemporary realities show that due to the interplay of political, economic, logistic, and 
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jurisdictional factors, international criminal courts may, in many cases, not be effective in trying 
high-ranking state officials, especially those of  powerful states.
68
   
 The reasons given by the ICJ in the ICJ Arrest Warrant Case in relation to the crime of 
torture generate the following questions: (1) Can the ICJ find this approach in custom or 
convention? (2) If immunity ratione personae should continue to shield state officials from 
prosecution for this crime, who, then, should be held responsible for the crime, when it is clear 
that the Torture Convention‟s definition of “torture” envisages its commission by state officials? 
(3) What effect and respect would the peremptory norm against the commission of this 
international crime then command and how would it achieve its objective(s)? (4) How would the 
protection of the dignity of human beings, which is one of the principal aims of the United 
Nations, be accomplished? (5) Finally, what would serve as a deterrent to other high-ranking 
state officials intending to commit this crime in the future, when previous culprits were not 
subjected to any form of accountability? How safe are men and women all over the world in the 
hands of repressive state regimes and high-ranking officials?  
 It is, therefore, clear that if immunity ratione personae of high-ranking state officials 
from prosecutions for torture remains absolute even against international instruments that confer 
universal jurisdiction on torture and disregard immunity, the implication is that impunity over 
this crime would endlessly thrive. On this count, Judge Al-Khasawneh‟s dissenting opinion in 
the ICJ Arrest Warrant Case
69
 is relevant. For this Judge
70
: 
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 A more fundamental question is whether high State officials are entitled 
to benefit from immunity even when they are accused of having committed 
exceptionally grave crimes recognized as such by the international 
community. In other words, should immunity become de facto impunity for 
criminal conduct as long as it was in pursuance of State policy?
71
 The 
Judgment sought to circumvent this morally embarrassing issue by 
recourse to an existing but artificially drawn distinction between immunity 
as a substantive defence on the one hand and immunity as a procedural 
defence on the other…. The effective combating of grave crimes has 
arguably assumed a jus cogens character reflecting recognition by the 
international community of the vital community interests and values it 
seeks to protect and enhance. Therefore when this hierarchically higher 
norm comes into conflict with the rules on immunity, it should prevail.
72
 
Even if we are to speak in terms of reconciliation of the two sets of rules, 
this would suggest to me a much more restrictive interpretation of the 
immunities of high-ranking officials than the Judgment portrays. 
Incidentally, such a restrictive approach would be much more in 
consonance with the now firmly established move towards a restrictive 
concept of State immunity, a move that has removed the bar regarding the 
submission of States to jurisdiction of other States often expressed in the 
maxim par in parem non habet imperium. It is difficult to see why States 
would accept that their conduct with regard to important areas of their 
development be open to foreign judicial proceedings but not the criminal 




 Although this dissenting opinion may not accord with the law, it, arguably, accords much 
more with the ends of justice, the individual accountability mission of the international criminal 
justice system, and the fight against impunity in the system.  The dissenting judgments of some 
of the UK House of Lords members in the earlier Pinochet case
74
 also support this position. 
According to Lord Millet, for instance: 
The definition of torture … is in my opinion entirely inconsistent with the 
existence of a plea of immunity ratione materiae. The offence can be 
committed only by or at the instigation of or with the consent or 
acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official 
capacity. The official or governmental nature of the act, which forms the 
basis of the immunity, is an essential ingredient of the offence. No rational 
system of criminal justice can allow an immunity which is coextensive 
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with the offence…. The international community had created an offence 
for which immunity ratione materiae could not possibly be available. 
International law cannot be supposed to have established a crime having 
the character of a jus cogens and at the same time to have provided an 
immunity which is coextensive with the obligation it seeks to impose. 
 Obviously, Lord Millet‟s statement relates to immunity ratione materiae. However, it is 
arguable that the same position should be adopted regarding immunity ratione personae, 
especially in the light of the extreme impunity that this type of immunity creates in high-ranking 
state officials entitled to it. No doubt, this will be difficult to do, in view of states‟ tenacious 
desire to preserve the dignity of their incumbent high-ranking officials and to ensure continuity 
of their national governance.  
However, stronger reasons exist against this position maintained by states. First, 
international crimes shock the conscience of all humanity and affect the very foundation of the 
international community as a whole. Thus, the dignity of a single culpable state official should 
not take supremacy over the welfare of all humanity and the peace and safety of the whole 
international community. Second, it may be possible in some states for high-ranking state 
officials to step down from their offices when charged with national crimes. Thus, there is no 
justification for such officials not to do so, at least temporarily, when charged with international 
crimes that shock all humanity and threaten the safety of the whole international community. 
  
  3.2.1.2 Genocide 
 From inception, the crime of genocide has always been recognized as of heinous 
magnitude in international law.
75
 Francis Deng describes it as “one of the most heinous of 
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 Right from the end of the Second World War and the advent of the UN, relevant 
international legal instruments have expressly prohibited genocide and made it a serious crime 
with individual responsibility. These treaties include the Genocide Convention
77
 and, recently, 
the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court
78
 (the “Rome Statute”). Besides, before the 
adoption of these treaties, the UN General Assembly, in 1946, had already affirmed that 
genocide is a crime bearing individual responsibility under customary international law.
79
 
 Nowadays, it is universally accepted that the prohibition on genocide has not only 
become a rule of customary international law, but has also attained the status of jus cogens. In 
Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (New Application: 2002) (Democratic Republic 
of the Congo v Rwanda), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment
80
, the ICJ clearly affirmed this 
position. In its words: 
The Court will begin by reaffirming that the principles underlying the 
[Genocide] Convention are principles which are recognized by civilized 
nations as binding on States, even without any conventional obligation and 
that a consequence of that conception is the universal character both of the 
condemnation of genocide and of the co-operation required „in order to 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
for Crimes Committed under Apartheid” (1999) 11 AJICL (Pt. 4) 619 at 631-635; Prevent Genocide International, 
“The Crime of „Genocide‟ Defined in International Law”, online: < http://www.preventgenocide.org/genocide/offici 
altext.htm>.  
76 Quoted in UN Office of the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide, “Genocide: The Deliberate ansd 
Systematic Extermination of an Ethnic, Racial, Religious or National Group”, online: < http://www.un.org/en/preve 
ntgenocide/adviser/pdf/osapg_booklet_eng.pdf>; See also Gaeta, Paola, “On What Conditions Can a State be Held 
Responsible for Genocide” (2007) 18:4 EJIL 631 at 642. 
77  Supra, note 4.  
78  1998, UN Doc A/CONF 183/9 (1998), 2187 UNTS 90, art 5.  
79  UN General Assembly Resolution on the Crime of Genocide, A/RES/96(1) of 11 December 1946.  
80
  (2006) ICJ Reps 6 at 31-32, para 64. See also Gaeta, Paola, op cit, note 76 at 2; Ventura, Manuel J & Dapo 
Akande, “Mothers of Srebrenica: The Obligation to Prevent Genocide and Jus Coges – Implications for 
Humanitarian Intervention”, EJIL: Takl!, September 6, 2013, online: < http://www.ejiltalk.org/ignoring-the-
elephant-in-the-room-in-mothers-of-srebrenica-is-the-obligation-to-prevent-genocide-jus-cogens/>; Van Den Herik, 
Larissa, “The Schism Between the Legal and the social Concept of Genocide in Light of the Responsibility to 
Protect”, in Henham, Ralph & Paul Behrens (eds), The Criminal Law of Genocide: International, Comparative and 





liberate mankind from such an odious scourge‟.
81
    
 
  In its advisory opinion on the Reservations to the Genocide Convention case
82
, the ICJ 
emphasized that the crime of genocide “shocks the conscience of mankind, results in great losses 
to humanity … and is contrary to moral law and the spirit and aims of the United Nations.” In the 
Case Concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime 
of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro))
83
, the ICJ further 
emphasized that the rights and obligations contained in the Genocide Convention are rights and 
obligations erga omnes. Accordingly, the crime is susceptible to universal jurisdiction. Thus, it is 
argued that the state immunity rule should not be a bar to prosecution in foreign courts of 
culpable high-ranking state officials.
84
    
 Irrespective of the gravity of this crime in international law and the strength of the 
peremptory norm against its commission, there have been many instances of perpetration of the 
crime by high-ranking state officials since the later part of the twentieth century.
85
 These include 
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the genocide in Yugoslavia
86
 and those that occurred in Rwanda and Burundi
87
. Other examples 
are the genocides in Darfur, Sudan
88
, and in Tibet in northern China
89
.    
 To worsen this situation, criminal proceedings against culpable high-ranking state 
officials before the judicial tribunals of other states are stifled by the state immunity rule. For 
example, on January 11, 2006, it was reported that the Spanish High Court would investigate 
whether seven former Chinese state officials, including the former President, Jiang Zemin, and 
former Premier, Li Peng, participated in genocide in Tibet. This proposed investigation followed 
the Spanish Constitutional Court‟s ruling that Spanish courts have universal jurisdiction to try 
genocide cases. The proceedings in this investigation were opened by the Spanish Judge on June 
6, 2006. On the same day, China denounced the Spanish court‟s investigation into the claims of 
genocide in Tibet as an interference in China‟s internal affairs. Eventually, the case was 
dismissed on grounds of state immunity.
90
 In Re Sharon & Yaron
91
, charges of genocide leveled 
against Ariel Sharon (then Israeli Prime Minister) before the Belgian court was dismissed on 
grounds of state immunity. In the Re Kagame
92
, the Spanish Audiencia Nacional also dismissed, 
on grounds of state immunity, criminal charges commenced against Paul Kagame (the incumbent 
Rwandan Prime Minister) for genocide and allied international crimes.    
 It is not out of place to state that in the event of total absence of immunity ratione 
personae for some sitting state officials, some overzealous domestic courts would misuse and 
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abuse this jurisdiction to try and “rule the world”.
93
 However, it is obvious that the absolute and 
indiscriminate bar it constitutes would, most likely, continue to set free high-ranking state 
officials charged for this crime, even when there is clear and irresistible evidence of their 
culpability. Inferences of this likelihood could be drawn from the ratios of relevant judicial 
decisions regarding the general effect of state immunity on international criminal proceedings 
before foreign national courts. In the ICJ Arrest Warrant Case
94
, for example, Belgium argued, 
inter alia, that while foreign ministers in office enjoy immunity from foreign criminal 
jurisdiction, such immunity applies to acts carried out in their official capacity and cannot protect 
them in respect of private acts (including international crimes).
95
 Belgium also argued that the 
DRC foreign minister was not acting in an official capacity at the time he committed the alleged 
international crimes. However, the ICJ held thus: 
… the functions of a Minister for Foreign Affairs are such that, throughout 
the duration of his or her  office, he or she when abroad enjoys full 
immunity from criminal jurisdiction and inviolability. That immunity and 
that inviolability protect the individual concerned against any act of 
authority of another state …. In this respect, no distinction can be drawn 
between acts performed by a Minister for Foreign Affairs in an "official" 
capacity, and those claimed to have been performed in a "private” 
capacity, or, for that matter, between acts performed before the person 
concerned assumed office as Minister for Foreign Affairs and acts 
committed during the period of office…. The Court has … been unable to 
deduce … that there exists under customary international law any form of 
exception to the rule according immunity from criminal jurisdiction and 
inviolability to incumbent Ministers of Foreign Affairs ….
96
   
It is arguable that, although this may be the current legal position, this judicial trend 
could encourage high-ranking state officials to continue committing genocide with endless 
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impunity. These officials know that it is almost impossible to prosecute them in the national 
courts of their home states for this crime. Consequently, according them indiscriminate immunity 
before foreign courts vested with universal jurisdiction amounts to giving them a sense of 
perpetual freedom from accountability for this crime. Obviously, this does not only perpetuate 
danger to prospective victims of this crime; it also undermines the ends of justice which 
international legal regulation must uphold. This is so, although there is some possibility of abuse 




  3.2.1.3 War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity 
 From early times, war crimes have been viewed as very serious, and have, as such, been 
strictly prohibited in international law, including under various treaties.
98
 These treaties include 
the Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg (the “Nuremberg Charter”)
99
, the 
four Geneva “Red Cross” Conventions
100
 and their Additional Protocols
101
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 Crimes against humanity have been prohibited by the Nuremberg Charter
103
 and the 
Rome Statute
104
. These crimes are defined under these treaties.
105
 The treaties also provide for 
individual criminal responsibility and removal of immunity in the prosecution of those guilty of 
this crime, irrespective of their official status.
106
 
 Article 6 of the Nuremberg Charter
107
, which deals with the prohibition of „war crimes‟, 
„crimes against peace‟ and „crimes against humanity‟, has been confirmed by the UN General 
Assembly as representing customary international law.
108
 One of the effects of this confirmation 
is that the courts of all states posses unlimited universal jurisdiction to try perpetrators of these 
crimes, despite their nationalities, official statuses and the places of violation. Thus, state 
immunity should not avail them in such trials, even if their home states are/were not parties to 
the prohibiting treaties. This is because by article 38 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties
109
, “Nothing … precludes a rule set out in a treaty from becoming binding upon a third 
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state as a rule of customary international law recognized as such.”  Writing on „crimes against 
humanity‟, Neil Boister and Richard Churchill
110
 comment that: 
Customary international law provides that crimes against humanity give 
rise to the application of universal jurisdiction, avoiding the many 
problems associated with limited jurisdiction over treaty crimes and the 
application of treaties to the nationals of non-states parties … 
Furthermore, a crime against humanity is uncontroversially international 




 Despite this established position of international law on the two crimes, high-ranking 
state officials are still granted immunity from prosecution for them before the courts of other 
member states of the international community. In Belhas v Ya‟alon
112
, the US Court of Appeal 
affirmed dismissal of criminal charges for, inter alia, war crimes and crimes against humanity 
leveled against General Moshe Ya‟alon, the retired Head of Intelligence of the Israeli Defence 
Forces (IDF). The charges stemmed from Ya‟alon‟s alleged involvement in the IDF‟s April 1996 
shelling of a UN peacekeepers‟ compound in Qana in South Lebanon. Several hundred Lebanese 
civilians were seeking shelter in the compound. The shelling killed over a hundred civilians and 
injured many others, including four Fijian peacekeepers. The complainants alleged that Israeli 
helicopters observed civilians in the UN compound; that their reports put General Ya‟alon on 
actual notice of the civilians‟ presence; and that he failed to act to prevent the shelling. They 
contended that this failure violated principles of international law and, inter alia, constituted war 
crimes, extra-judicial killing and crimes against humanity, in that General Ya‟alon bore 
command responsibility for the shelling. However, the District Court dismissed these charges on 
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grounds of state immunity of General Ya‟lon. In upholding this dismissal, the Court of Appeal 
held thus: 
… It is not necessary for this court to reach the issue of whether the acts 
alleged by the appellants constitute violations of jus cogens norms because 
the FISA [Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act] contains no enumerated 
exceptions for violations of jus cogens norms. In Princz v. Federal 
Republic of Germany, we rejected this precise argument… This Court held 
that “it is doubtful that any state has ever violated jus cogens norms on a 
scale rivaling that of the Third Reich”, even violations of that magnitude 
do not create an exception to the FISA where Congress has created none… 
Although Appellants put a new twist on the argument that jus cogens 
violations can never be authorized by a foreign state and so can never 
cloak foreign officials in immunity – the same prohibition on creating new 




 In the ICJ Arrest Warrant Case
114
, the ICJ further held that the criminal immunity from 
prosecution in foreign courts enjoyed by a foreign affairs minister under international law could 




 In the light of this line of judicial decisions, one may argue that men and women in many 
states of the world are not safe and secure in the hands of high-ranking state officials, no thanks 
to state immunity. Again, the essence of the entrenchment of peremptory norms in the 
international legal order and the prohibition of their violation may be undermined. The safety of 
the international community itself is also not guaranteed, and the eradication of impunity for the 
commission of these crimes by high-ranking state officials is far from near. In the end, it can 
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only be said that the grant of state immunity in charges involving these crimes aggravates the 
impunity with which governments and high-ranking state officials violate the peremptory norms 
prohibiting their commission. 
 
 3.2.2 Violation of Other States‟ Territorial Integrity and Political Independence 
 Another peremptory norm that governs international relations is that of the sovereign 
equality of all states (big and small, mighty and weak). This is enshrined in the UN Charter
116
.  
Under article 2(4) of the Charter, one of the principal manifestations of this norm is that: “All 
members [states] shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force 
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner 
inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.”
117
 
 According to Malcolm Shaw, “The rules governing resort to force form a central element 
within international law and, together with other principles such as territorial sovereignty and the 
independence and equality of states, provide the framework for international order.”
118
  
 Article 2(4) of the UN Charter is now regarded as a peremptory norm of customary 
international law and, as such, is binding upon all states.
119
 Consequently, the UN General 
Assembly has adopted many resolutions against states resorting to use of force against one 
another and, condemning any breach of this peremptory norm by any state.  The Assembly‟s 
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1965 Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and 
Protection of their Independence and Sovereignty
120
 provides, inter alia, that: 
No state has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason 
whatsoever, in the internal or external affairs of any other state. 
Consequently, armed intervention and all other forms of interference 
or attempted threats against the personality of the state or against its 
political, economic and cultural elements are condemned. 
 
 Furthermore, the Assembly, in its 1970 Declaration on the Principles of International 
Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the 
Charter of the United Nations
121
, re-affirmed the “duty of states to refrain from military, 
political, economic or any other form of coercion aimed against the political independence or 
territorial integrity of any state.” In similar terms, the UN General Assembly‟s Definition of 
Aggression
122
, annexed to the General Assembly‟s Resolution on the “Definition of 
Aggression”
123
, confirms acts of aggression as a violation of the UN Charter. The Definition of 
Aggression characterizes acts of aggression “the sending by or on behalf of a state of armed 
bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against another 
state.” Judicially, the ICJ has long upheld the existence of this peremptory norm in its judgment 
in the Corfu Channels case (Albania v UK)
124
 and in its advisory opinion in the Legality of the 
Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons case
125
, respectively. 
 A violation of this norm amounts to committing the crime of aggression, which the 
Review Conference on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court recently defined 
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along the lines of the UN General Assembly‟s Definition of Aggression
126
. Notwithstanding this 
peremptory norm, high-ranking state officials still plead state immunity to bar real or impending 
charges for this crime or for other crimes arising from their acts of aggression. For example, in 
February 2005, the then Lebanese Prime Minister, Rafiq Al-Hariri, was allegedly assassinated by 
foreign elements from Syria, an act that arguably amounts to aggression. The UN Independent 
Investigation set up to investigate this incident found evidence of the Syrian President‟s 
involvement in the assassination.
127
 However, the Syrian President, Bashar Al-Assad, denied the 
allegation. He suggested in an interview that he would not allow UN investigators to interrogate 
him on the assassination, since he was shielded by state immunity in respect of any judicial 
process arising from the said assassination.
128
 
  In the light of the jus cogens nature of this crime, states should be favourably disposed to 
exercising universal jurisdiction over international crimes arising from circumstances of 
aggression, most especially now that there has been an actual definition of aggression under the 
Rome Statute.
129
 This would go a long way to bring under check the impunity with which high-
ranking state officials commit this internationally destructive crime.
130
 As pointed out by 
Patrycja Grzebyk:   
Theoretically, there is … the option of bringing perpetrators of the crime 
of aggression to trial in a court of a third state. It could be assumed that the 
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crime of aggression belongs to a group of crimes that are generally 
condemned under international law, and the states are allowed to invoke 
the principle of universal jurisdiction towards the perpetrators of the 
crime. This type of jurisdiction is contingent on the nature of the crime: 
for the exercise of the jurisdiction, the place where the crime was 
committed, the citizenship of the victim and the connection to the state 




 One concern, however, that could arise from the unlimited exercise of this universal 
jurisdiction over this crime is that the third state could be the victim state. In this case, the 
situation may become very problematic. This is because the crime of aggression is essentially a 
crime against a state. Thus, allowing the court of the victim state to try the perpetrators may raise 
the question of the state trying to be a judge over its own cause – nemo judex in causa sua. 
 According to Grzebyk
132
, the proponents of the universal jurisdiction approach usually 
cite the ICJ‟s judgment in the Barcelona Traction case
133
, which states as follows: 
In particular, an essential distinction should be drawn between the 
obligations of a State towards the international community as a whole, and 
those arising vis-à-vis another State in the field of diplomatic protection. 
By their very nature the former are the concern of all States. In view of the 
importance of the rights involved, all States can be held to have a legal 
interest in their protection; they are obligations erga omnes.   
 
However, recent national court decisions on this subject do not really offer any ideas on 
how to confront the impunity with which high-ranking state officials violate this peremptory 
norm. Some national courts are still in favour of granting immunity to state officials in 
circumstances which raise involvement in this crime. In McElhinney v Williams
134
, for example, 
the Supreme Court of Ireland held that international law required that a foreign state be accorded 
immunity in respect of acts jure imperii carried out by members of its armed forces, even when 
in the territory of the forum state without the forum state‟s permission. In Margellos & Ors v 
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Federal Republic of Germany
135
, the Greek Special Supreme Court (Anotato Eidiko Dikastirio) 
stated: 
… it appears that a foreign state continues to enjoy sovereign immunity in 
respect of proceedings relating to a tort committed in the forum state in 
which its armed forces participated, without distinction as to whether the 
action at  issue violated jus cogens or whether the armed forces were 
participating in an armed conflict. Article 31 of the Basle Convention 
[immunity in respect of acts of armed forces] is formulated in absolute 
terms without any exceptions. This rule is justified by the necessity to 
respect the sovereignty of foreign states. One of the main expressions of 
that sovereignty is found in actions of their armed forces and such respect 
is the foundation of the equality of states and the international legal order, 
which the principal rules of international law are intended to serve.
136
     
 
 Decisions of international judicial tribunals have also followed this approach. In 
McElhinney v Ireland
137
, for example, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human 
Rights later held that the Irish Supreme Court‟s decision in McElhinney v Williams
138
 reflected a 
widely held view of international law.
139
 
Although these decisions are not directly concerned with the specific crime of aggression 
and violation of other states‟ territorial sovereignty as discussed under the present sub-heading, 
the decisions suggest that a state is entitled to immunity regarding these nefarious acts. As 
argued earlier, this judicial position potentially increases the impunity and false sense of security 
on the part of governments and high-ranking state officials who are intent on violating this norm. 
Since culpable officials are protected by the state immunity rule, future violators may not be 
deterred. Also, it is arguable that continued affirmation of state immunity in such circumstances 
seriously undermines, if not absolutely defeats, the whole essence of the principles of 
sovereignty/sovereign equality, territorial integrity, and non-interference in the internal affairs of 
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states, upon which the international community and the international legal order are founded.
140
 
This practice adversely affects international peace and security, since officials of a stronger state 
can, at any time, baselessly invade or destroy a weaker one and go free of legal responsibility.
141
  
 As explained earlier, the US has been invading and carrying on wars on Iraq, Afghanistan 
and other states.
142
 In Re Rumsfeld
143
, criminal charges against Donald Rumsfeld (a former US 
Defence Secretary) in the French courts for international crimes committed in the course of these 
invasions were dismissed by the Paris Prosecutors‟ Office on grounds of state immunity. Other 
incidents of aggression, such as the Israeli military invasion and massive destruction of Lebanon 
in 2006
144
, the 2008 Russian invasion of Georgia
145
, and Syria‟s recent bombing of some parts of 
neighbouring Turkey
146
 in the course of the ongoing Syrian civil war, also need special attention.    
Unlike other types of international crimes
147
, there is no specific international legal 
instrument expressly authorizing national courts to assume universal jurisdiction over the crime 
of aggression.
148
 One implication of this is that much of the norm prohibiting aggression has 
been left to the law of state responsibility. Individual culpability, e.g., for aggressive war as at 
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Nuremberg, is very rare. This situation would have contributed to the seeming reluctance on the 
part of these courts to exercise universal jurisdiction over this crime. It must have also 
substantially given rise to these courts‟ ever-readiness to grant immunity to perpetrators of the 
crime. However, it could be argued that the jus cogens nature of this crime, its extreme gravity, 
and the fact that it has been condemned without exception by many instruments for many 
decades since World War II, should have been enough to persuade all states to enact laws 
conferring universal jurisdiction on their national courts to prosecute alleged offenders.  
It is encouraging that five states (Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, and 
Estonia) have already enacted such laws.
149
 Eighteen other states have statutes giving their courts 
universal jurisdiction generically over “offences against international law” under international 
treaties and under customary international law.
150
 Since aggression is universally accepted as a 
serious crime under international law, the courts of these eighteen states should exercise 
universal jurisdiction over it. Hopefully more states would follow these leaders to assert such 
jurisdiction over aggression as an international crime. However, there is no doubt that the high-
level politics over this crime and many (especially the powerful) states‟ inclination to state 
responsibility rather than individual accountability for it may continue to promote immunity for 
state officials over the crime. Again, the likelihood of want of fair trial when the courts of the 
victim state are to try the culpable state officials may pose another challenge. 
The next sub-section considers systematic violation of human rights as another problem 
emanating from the application of the state immunity rule in the international criminal justice 
system.   
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3.3 Systematic Violation of Human Rights 
  In contemporary international law, human rights, especially those relating to physical 
integrity, e.g., right to life, freedom from torture, genocide, and forced disappearance, are 
universally protected. Though the exact degree of protection afforded other human rights may be 
the subject of controversy
151
, there is widespread agreement that rights to physical integrity merit 
special protection. Such rights are non-derogable, even in times of war or national emergency.
152
 
The norms protecting these rights are widely considered peremptory norms and their violations 
are considered serious wrongs to humanity and to the international community.
153
 
 State-initiated and condoned killings, torture and disappearances, for example, violate 
specific human rights defined and protected under universally or widely accepted international 
instruments. Such instruments include the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (the 
“UDHR”)
154
, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
155
, the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
156
, the American 
Convention on Human Rights
157
 and, the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights
158
. 
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 as violations of customary international law, 
all point to clear prohibitions of state killing, torture, or forcibly causing the disappearance of 
citizens and foreign nationals. The rights not to be subjected to torture, summary execution or 
disappearance emanate from customary international law and, therefore, give rise to obligations 
owed by each state to the international community as a whole.
163
 
 Another significant problem of the application of the state immunity rule in the 
international criminal justice system is that the impunity it induces in high-ranking state officials 
also leads them to massive violations of these human rights. This is basically because 
international criminal law and international human rights law are intertwined. Thus, the 
commission of each of the core international crimes (genocide, war crimes, crimes against 
humanity, torture, and the crime of aggression) almost always implicates violations of the human 
rights of individuals and groups. Consequently, where high-ranking state officials commit these 
crimes, internationally protected human rights are invariably abused. This situation is made 
worse by the fact that the same state immunity rule that bars foreign criminal proceedings against 
state officials that perpetrate these crimes also shields them from civil actions in foreign courts 
for violation of these rights.
164
 Examples of this abound.  
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 In Al-Adsani v Government of Kuwait
165
, the appellant (a British and Kuwaiti dual 
national) brought an action in the UK High Court against Kuwait (respondent) for the 
enforcement of his right to freedom from torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment. The facts of this case were that in 1991, Al-Adsani travelled from the UK to Kuwait to 
help repel Saddam Hussein‟s invasion of Kuwait during the Gulf War. There in Kuwait, he was 
accused of releasing into general circulation sexual video tapes of Sheikh Jaber Al-Sabah Al-
Saud Al-Sabah, a close relative of the Emir of Kuwait. After the war, the Sheikh, with the aid of 
Kuwaiti government troops, exacted his revenge by breaking into Al-Adsani‟s house, beating 
him up and transporting him to the Kuwaiti state prison, where his beatings continued for days. 
Al-Adsani was subsequently taken at gunpoint in a government car to the palace of the Sheikh, 
where his ordeal intensified. According to Al-Adsani, his head was repeatedly submerged in a 
swimming pool filled with corpses, and his body was badly burned when he was forced into a 
small room where the Sheikh set fire to gasoline-soaked mattresses. 
 Upon his return to the UK, Al-Adsani brought this suit, seeking damages for the physical 
and psychological injuries that had resulted from his alleged ordeal in Kuwait. The High Court 
dismissed the suit for lack of jurisdiction, holding that Kuwait was entitled to foreign state 
immunity. His appeal to the UK Court of Appeal was dismissed on same grounds of state 
immunity.
166
 The Court of Appeal held that the UK‟s State Immunity Act
167
, which provides 
immunity for states and their officials, do not include torture as an exception. For the Court, 
there is no room for implied exceptions to the general rule, even where the violation of a jus 
cogens norm (such as the prohibition of torture) is involved. The Court rejected the appellant‟s 
                                                             
165  (1995) 103 ILR 420.  
166  Al-Adsani v. Government of Kuwait (1996) 107 ILR 536.  





argument that the term „immunity‟ means immunity from sovereign acts that were in accordance 
with international law and excludes torture for which immunity could not be claimed.
168
 
 After the UK House of Lords refused Al-Adsani leave to appeal against the judgment of 
the Court of Appeal, he filed an application with the ECHR
169
, arguing principally that the UK 
had failed to protect his right not to be tortured under the European Convention on Human 
Rights
170
. Again, he lost on grounds of state immunity. In its judgment, the ECHR, though 
recognizing that the prohibition of torture possesses a „special character‟ in international law, 
still rejected Al-Adsani‟s view that violation of such a fundamental norm compels denial of state 
immunity in civil suits.
171
 In the words of the court: 
While noting the growing recognition of the overriding importance of 
the prohibition of torture, it is not established that there is yet 
acceptance in international law of the proposition that states are not 
entitled to immunity in respect of civil claims for damages for alleged 




 The (ECHR) further stated that it could not see from the relevant instruments “any firm 
basis for concluding that as a matter of international law, a state no longer enjoys immunity from 
civil suits in the courts of another state where acts of torture are alleged.”
173
 
 In Saudi Arabia v Nelson
174
, the respondent sued Saudi Arabia in a US court, alleging 
that he was wrongfully arrested, imprisoned and tortured by the Saudi police on the orders of the 
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Saudi government. His action was barred on account of the Saudi government‟s immunity. On 
appeal, the US Supreme Court, while upholding the Saudi government‟s immunity, held that 
although the alleged wrongful arrest, imprisonment and torture by the Saudi government would 
amount to abuse of its police powers, “a foreign state‟s exercise of the power of its police has 
long been understood … as peculiarly sovereign”.
175
 
 Similarly, the Superior Court of Justice of Ontario, Canada, was of the view, in Bouzari v 
Islamic Republic of Iran
176
, that “…regardless of the state‟s ultimate purpose, exercises of the 
police, law enforcement and other security powers are inherently exercises of government 
authority and sovereign”. The Court concluded that a customary norm existed to the effect that 
there was an ongoing rule providing state immunity for acts of torture committed outside the 
forum state. It, therefore, dismissed the plaintiff‟s argument that the Convention against Torture, 
1984, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966, impose an obligation 
on states to create civil remedies with regard to acts of torture committed abroad, or that such an 
obligation existed as a rule of jus cogens.
177
 There was a similar decision by the UK House of 
Lords in Holland v Lampen-Wolfe
178




 In Princz v Federal Republic of Germany
180
, the US Court of Appeals for the DC Circuit 
dismissed, on grounds of state immunity, a case of flagrant violations of human rights against the 
Federal Republic of Germany. The Court held thus: 
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We think that something more clearly express is wanted before we 
impute to the Congress an intention that the federal courts assume 
jurisdiction over the countless human rights cases that might well be 
brought by the victims of all the ruthless military juntas, presidents-
for-life, and murderous dictators of the world, from Idi Amin to Mao 
Zedong. Such an expansive reading of section 1605(a)(1) [of the US 
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 1976] would likely place an 
enormous strain not only upon our courts but, more to the immediate 
point, upon our country‟s diplomatic relations with any number of 
foreign nations.  
 
 The ICJ‟s decision in the ICJ Jurisdictional Immunities Case
181
 re-confirmed this entire 
line of cases. 
 It could be argued that the indiscriminate application of the state immunity rule in the 
international criminal justice system that impliedly results in impunity for the violation of these 
rights consequently leads to an indirect breach of one of the aims of the United Nations. This 
aim, as contained in the UN Charter
182
 to which most (if not all) sovereign states are parties, says 
that the peoples of the United Nations are determined: 
… to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and 
worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women … 
and to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the 
obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law 
can be maintained, and to promote social progress and better standards 
of life in larger freedom…
183
 
 The UN Charter also provides that one of the purposes of the United Nations is: “To 
achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of an economic, social, 
cultural or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights 
and for fundamental freedom for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.”
184
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 Consequently, as long as high-ranking state officials continue to enjoy immunity for 
international crimes, these officials will continue to violate internationally protected rights of 
individuals and groups. This having been stated the next problem stemming from the application 
of the state immunity rule in the international criminal justice system is examined below. This is 
the problem of deliberate and indiscriminate violation of other states‟ municipal laws.  
 
3.4 Deliberate and Indiscriminate Violation of Other States‟ Municipal Laws 
 One other consequence of the indiscriminate application of the state immunity rule in the 
international criminal justice system is that it engenders in high-ranking state officials a special 
sense of impunity and freedom to violate the municipal laws of other states. It gives rise to 
situations where the officials of one state would enter into the territory of another state and 
deliberately violate the national laws of the latter and hope to get away without any legal 
responsibility. Since there is immunity for foreign high-ranking state officials for international 
and national crimes before the forum state‟s courts, the natural tendency is that they would 




 In US v Sampol
186
, for instance, Chilean government officials went into the US and, 
against the US penal law, ordered the assassination of Orlando Letelier, former Chilean 
ambassador to the US. During their prosecution in the US courts, Chile argued, in defence, that 
even if its officials‟ act violated US penal law, such an act should not be the subject of discussion 
in the US courts. According to Chile, the orders to commit this act had been given in Chile and 
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the accused officials were, therefore, covered by Chile‟s state immunity. This argument was 
upheld by the US Court of Appeal. 
 The decision of the UK High Court in Alamieyeseigha v The Crown Prosecution 
Service
187
 is also relevant in this context. In this case, a governor of Bayelsa State of Nigeria was 
arrested in London, UK, and charged before the UK court for money laundering, a serious crime 
under the UK‟s Proceeds of Crime Act
188
. This followed the discovery by the London 
Metropolitan Police in the governor‟s house in London of a cash sum of £1,800,000 stolen from 
the Bayelsa State treasury. The only defence put up by the governor was a plea of state 
immunity. However, the UK court rejected this plea on the ground that he did not qualify as a 
head of a sovereign state under international law. The decision in this case clearly suggests that if 
the accused person were to qualify as a high-ranking state official, the state immunity rule would 
have shielded him from prosecution for money laundering and allied crimes. This would have 
been so, even though his alleged acts clearly violated the provisions of the UK law. 
 Consequent upon this problem of deliberate and indiscriminate violation of other states‟ 
laws, it is argued that in applying the state immunity rule, reasonable equilibrium should be 
maintained between two conflicting interests. These interests are those of respect for the 
sovereignty of the foreign state via grant of state immunity, on the one hand, and the preservation 
of the sovereignty of the forum state via respect for its municipal laws, on the other hand. 
Otherwise, the concepts of equality of states in international law and respect for the territorial 
integrity and political independence of other states would become meaningless. This is because 
the practical advantage of these concepts in this circumstance becomes unilateral, tilting only in 
favour of the foreign state and always against the forum state. Thus, high-ranking officials of one 
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sovereign state who have genuine cause to be within the territory of another sovereign state 
should not by any means see state immunity as a license for deliberate violation of the municipal 
laws of their host state. While commenting on similar abuse of diplomatic immunities by some 
of its beneficiaries in circumstances that would apply mutatis mutandis to state immunity, 
Richard Gardiner pertinently affirms that: 
The idea behind … immunities is not that these foreigners …, who are 
present as „guests‟ within a host state, should be allowed to violate the 
local law with impunity, but that they need to be protected from 
interference by the police, judicial or other state action if their role is not 
to be impeded, particularly at crucial moments. In exchange for this 
exemption from local coercive action, international law imposes 
requirements on such protected individuals to respect local laws…
189
 
 This position should apply mutatis mutandis to all high-ranking state officials that benefit 
from the state immunity rule. Although the host state may expel the culpable foreign state 
official, it is argued that this, on most occasions, is not a sufficient alternative to justice, 
especially when the wrongful act is a serious crime of which individuals are victims. At this 
juncture, the thesis examines the next problem caused by state immunity in the international 
criminal justice system: perpetuation of injustice. 
   
3.5 Perpetuation of Injustice 
 It is trite that one of the primary functions of law is the administration of justice for all 
and sundry without discrimination.
190
 In the area of criminal law, one of the basic rationales for 
the criminal justice system, international or national, is to give redress and justice to victims of 
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crimes by sanctioning the offenders.
191
 In its judgment in Prosecutor v Obrenovic
192
, the Trial 
Chamber of the ICTY stated that: 
Punishment must … reflect both the calls for justice from the persons who 
have been victims or suffered because of the crimes, as well as respond to 
the call from the international community to end impunity for human 
rights violations and crimes …. Individual accountability for the crimes 
committed and commensurate punishment is the aim of criminal 
proceedings involving such grave crimes.  
 
 For the International Federation of Human Rights (IFHR)
193
:  
A key issue in any discussion about how to end impunity for human rights 
crimes is the victim‟s right to, and need for, justice. It is, in fact, unusual, 
if not exceptionally rare, for victims of human rights crimes to obtain 
justice. Many victims find it extremely difficult even to obtain any official 
acknowledgment of what was done to them. For survivors of torture and 
organised violence, obtaining some form of acknowledgement … is 
particularly important therapeutically. Acknowledgement generally aids 
the healing process and can be key to the experience of a sense of closure. 
By way of example, the response of Chilean victims to the arrest of 
General Pinochet in London demonstrates the importance of justice for 
victims. Even though, in that particular case, justice continues to be 
denied, many Chilean torture survivors nevertheless derived great comfort 
and hope that so seemingly invulnerable a criminal was brought within 
the reach of the law. The extraterritorial proceedings against Pinochet 
drew important public attention to the crimes he is alleged to have 




 In line with this position, the international criminal justice system, in relevant treaties 
mentioned above and under international custom, prohibits international crimes and urges states 
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to exercise jurisdiction to try and punish the perpetrators. An objective of this is surely to give 
redress and justice to the victims of such crimes. 
 However, today, application of the state immunity rule in the international criminal 
justice system often renders this laudable objective meaningless in relation to the victims of these 
crimes when they are committed by foreign high-ranking state officials. In international criminal 
proceedings before foreign national courts in which state immunity is applied as a jurisdictional 
bar, it is obvious that victims are denied justice. Consequently, while victims are subjected to 
perpetual injustice in an international legal regime of avowed criminal justice, their malefactors 





Re Sharon and Yaron
197
, and Re Rumsfeld
198
, as well as the ICJ Arrest Warrant Case
199
, are 
typical examples of this reality. Again, the fact that the state immunity rule also bars victims‟ 
actions for civil remedies against the officials and their states makes the victims‟ situation more 
pitiable. The plight of these victims is substantially captured in the words of the International 
Federation of Human Rights as follows: 
Immunity is an expression of the principle of sovereign equality of States. 
Sovereign equality, however, can come into conflict with other principles 
of international law and fundamental norms of human dignity, such as 
States‟ obligations to repress “international crimes.”  Immunity has arisen 
as a potential obstacle in numerous cases based on extraterritorial 
jurisdiction. …   certain … courts have ruled that immunity may prevail 




 The need for redress and justice for victims of international crimes committed by high-
ranking state officials drives the argument that the continued applicability of the state immunity 
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rule in international criminal proceedings before national courts requires re-consideration. This 
concern is also carried forward when the observation of the state immunity rule creates the 
problem of unfair social dichotomy and inequality. This latter problem is discussed next. 
 
3.6 Creation of Unfair Social Dichotomy and Inequality 
 In the contemporary world, the “rule of law” is one of the few social concepts that enjoy 
near universal acceptance.
201
 In fact, no government stands out against it and none would hate to 
be associated with it.
202
  The rule of law concept, in its most basic form, means that no one is 
above the law.
203
 One of the fundamental facets of this concept that runs through both 
international and municipal legal systems is the principle of „equality before the law‟
204
. By this 
principle, all men and women are equal before the law and have equal rights and obligations 
under the law, notwithstanding differences in socio-political status. Thus, no one is above the 
law.
205
 Given its near universal popularity, it could be argued that the concept of the rule of law, 
together with the principle of equality before the law, belongs to the genre of “the general 
principles of law recognized by civilized nations” as one of the sources of international law 
applied by the ICJ under the ICJ Statute
206
. 
 The renowned jurists, AV Dicey and Ivor Jennings, have given pertinent clues to the 
implications of the principle of „equality before the law‟. For Dicey, this principle means that: 
… not only that … no man is above the law, but … that … every man, 
whatever be his rank or condition, is subject to the ordinary law of the 
realm and amenable to the jurisdiction of the ordinary tribunals … every 
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official, from the Prime Minister down to a constable or a collector of 
taxes, is under the same responsibility for every act done without legal 





, equality before the law must be distinguished from economic and 
political equality, for it only: 
assumes that amongst equals, the law should be equal and should be 
equally administered, that likes should be treated alike. The right to sue 
and be sued, to prosecute and be prosecuted, for the same kind of action 
should be the same for all persons of full age and understanding, and 
without distinction of … social status or political influence. 
 
 As esteemed as the principle of equality before the law is, the state immunity rule 
substantially undermines it in the international criminal justice system. Consequently, there is 
practically no equality between ordinary individuals, on the one hand, and high-ranking state 
officials, on the other, as regards legal accountability for international crimes.  
 The state immunity rule‟s application in the system brings about a special form of social 
discrimination, inequality, and dichotomy among individuals. It creates two different classes of 
persons in the society. On the one hand, it makes high-ranking state officials untouchable “sacred 
cows” that can hardly ever be held legally accountable for their international crimes (no matter 
how atrocious and universally devastating the crimes may be). On the other hand, it makes 
ordinary individuals exemplary “scapegoats” that must bear full accountability, suffer full 
punishments and make the necessary reparations for their own international crimes before 
foreign judicial tribunals. A practical example of this situation is the policy of non-cooperation 
and resistance towards the ICC which the AU currently maintains.
209
 It should be noted that 
recently, the AU obligated its member states to ensure that none of them implements the 
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warrants of arrest issued by the ICC against some sitting African high-ranking state officials.
210
 
No doubt, the alleged grounds for this policy, which include the ICC‟s selective justice against 
African state officials and the suspicion that the ICC mechanism is a developed states‟ agent of 
neo-colonialism against Africa, have some merit.211 However, by this policy, the AU is trying to 
accord these officials immunity from international criminal prosecution.  
 All this practice obviously runs contrary to the wishes of the founders of the international 
criminal justice system, who had intended that all individuals be accountable for international 
crimes, notwithstanding differences in political and allied statuses. When the institutionalization 
of international criminal law began, it was debated whether holding a specific office should 
exempt an individual from trial for an international crime.
212
 Disgusted, however, at the nature of 
weapons used and the horrors of the First World War, the Commission on the Responsibility of 
the Authors of the War and on Enforcement of Penalties maintained that there should be no such 
exemption. According to the Commission: “… in the hierarchy of persons in authority, there is 
no reason why rank, however exalted, should in any circumstances protect the holder of it from 
responsibility when that responsibility has been established before a properly constituted 
tribunal. This extends even to the case of heads of states.”
213
 
 Consequently, there should be no protection under any circumstance if great outrages 
against the laws and customs of war and the laws of humanity had occurred, because inability to 
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investigate and try such outrages “would shock the conscience of civilized mankind”.
214




… the vindication of the principles of the laws and customs of war and the 
laws of humanity which have been violated would be incomplete if he 
[head of state] were not brought to trial and if other offenders less highly 
placed were punished; moreover, the trial of the offenders might be 
seriously prejudiced if they attempted and were able to plead the superior 





 The Commission concluded that “All persons belonging to enemy countries, however 
high their positions may have been, without distinction of rank, including Chiefs of States, who 




 Clearly, the Commission‟s position accords with the demands of justice. It should be 
followed in contemporary international criminal proceedings before national courts. This 
position affirms the inherent equality of all human beings.
218
 There is no justification for holding 
some human beings accountable for international crimes while others are exempted on the basis 
of their political status.  
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 The next problem arising from the application of the state immunity rule in the 
international criminal justice system is that of political self-perpetuation. This is examined next. 
 
3.7 Political Self-perpetuation 
 Some recent judicial decisions have begun to indicate that with regard to international 
crimes, a high-ranking state official benefiting from immunity ratione personae stands to lose 
that immunity once he leaves office. For instance, in the landmark decision in the Pinochet 
case
219
, the UK House of Lords, while upholding the immunity of a serving head of state, held 
that the moment the head of state leaves office, he or she is liable to prosecution for international 
crimes committed before or after his or her term of office, or committed in a personal capacity 
while in office. 






, and the ICJ Arrest Warrant 
Case
223
, also made reference to the immunity of “serving” heads of state and other high-ranking 
state officials. These decisions confirm the emerging trend to not extend immunity protection to 
former high-ranking state officials except for their purely official acts. In this regard, Malcolm 
Shaw states that “… the immunity of a former head of state differs [from that of a serving head 
of state] in that it may be seen as moving from a status immunity (ratione personae) to a 
functional immunity (ratione materiae), so that immunity will only exist for official acts done 
while in office …”
224
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 The laudable innovation introduced by this line of decisions notwithstanding, the 
distinction drawn between serving and former officials could, on its own, create another social 
problem for the international criminal justice system. The balance of this distinction tilts in 
favour of serving officials. Consequently, the desire to enjoy international criminal immunity 
forever would induce serving officials to do everything possible to remain in power for life. 
Since stepping out of political power means losing immunity, while remaining in power in 
perpetuity implies immunity for life, these officials would prefer to devise every imaginable 
means to hang on to political power for their lifetime. An instance of this situation is provided by 




 It is, therefore, argued that the habit among some high-ranking officials in some states of 
not wanting to relinquish political power, even when they have become unpopular, may not be 
unconnected to the desire to enjoy state immunity for life. For example, as noted under Chapter 
One, Augusto Pinochet  made himself a “Senator-for-life” with perpetual immunity from 
criminal prosecution or civil action for any of his misdeeds committed before, while in power, 
and after exit from power as Chilean President.
226
 Robert Mugabe remains, without the slightest 
thought of exit, the President of Zimbabwe, as he has been since that state‟s independence in 
1980.
227
 These and other examples show that in some states, democratic governance is a mere 
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fiction, as these perpetual-immunity-hungry officials manipulate the political processes of their 
states to remain in power. 
 The foregoing problem is complemented by official corruption and bad governance, 
which are next discussed.      
 
3.8 Conclusion 
 As has been argued here, application of the state immunity rule gives rise to many 
problems in the international criminal justice system. These problems, as discussed in this 
chapter include: impunity for flagrant violation of peremptory international legal norms, 
systematic violation of human rights, deliberate and indiscriminate violation of other states‟ 
municipal laws, and perpetuation of injustice. Others are: creation of unfair social dichotomy and 
inequality, and political self-perpetuation. These problems lead to a substantial erosion of the 
basic aims and objectives of the international criminal justice system and, therefore, call for an 
effective solution. 
 To this end, the international community has adopted some legal mechanisms to respond 






MECHANISMS OF LEGAL RESPONSE TO THE PROBLEMS OF THE STATE 
IMMUNTY RULE IN THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 It is trite that there are two elements of a crime: the “mens rea” (mental element) and the 
“actus reus” (physical element). As a general rule, these two elements must coincide for a 
particular act or omission of a person to constitute a crime.
1
  Under international criminal law, it 
is established that these two elements of a crime can only be completed by individuals, not by 
states. Consequently, international criminal law, unlike general international law, emphasizes 
individual criminal responsibility, as opposed to state responsibility (although an international 
crime may sometimes necessarily implicate the responsibility of the state).
2
 Thus, according to 
the Nuremberg Tribunal, “Crimes against international law are committed by men, not by 
abstract entities, and only by punishing individuals who commit such crimes can the provisions 
of international law be enforced.”
3
 
 The fact remains that the most heinous international crimes are more likely to be 
committed by high-ranking state officials who would, most probably, hide behind state immunity 
to avoid personal accountability. Consequently, the international community has adopted certain 
mechanisms of response, which are intended to abolish or disregard such immunity in 
appropriate cases and to hold personally accountable individual state officials who commit these 
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crimes. These mechanisms principally involve the creation of international/internationalized 
criminal tribunals to try individuals accused of such crimes and inserting state-immunity-
stripping provisions in the enabling legal instruments of these tribunals. The operations and 
jurisprudence of these tribunals have established the legal position that, unlike in national courts, 
there is no immunity before international/internationalized criminal tribunals. Another 
mechanism involves the popularization of the universal criminal jurisdiction principle under both 
customary international law and some international treaties. 
 By virtue of these mechanisms, the duties and obligations imposed by international 
criminal law thus bind individuals directly, regardless of their political/official statuses or the 
provisions of their states‟ internal laws. These mechanisms have seen some success in holding 
high-ranking state officials legally responsible for their international crimes and in reducing the 
impunity with which the officials commit these crimes. 
 The response mechanisms are discussed in the following order: The Old Ad hoc 
International Criminal Tribunal, the Universal Criminal Jurisdiction, the Modern Ad hoc 
International Criminal Tribunal, the Hybrid Criminal Tribunal, and the Permanent International 
Criminal Court Mechanisms. 
 
4.2 The Old Ad hoc International Criminal Tribunal Mechanism 
 At various times in history, urgent needs arose to contain adverse security situations in 
some regions or states and to forestall further breaches of international peace and security. In 
response, the international community, by means of relevant instruments, established or 
recommended the establishment of some ad hoc international criminal tribunals
4
 to try persons 
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responsible for serious violations of international criminal law in those regions or states.
5
 The 
enabling legal instruments of these tribunals stipulate the international crimes over which the 
tribunals could exercise jurisdiction. Most relevantly, these instruments provide, in express 
terms, for the removal of the immunity of any head of state or other high-ranking state officials 
charged with crimes within the jurisdictions of the tribunals.  The legal regimes under this 
response mechanism are as discussed below. 
 
 4.2.1 The Pre-Treaty-of-Versailles Legal Regime
6
 
 What looks like the first successful international attempt to remove the immunity of a 
high-ranking state official and hold him personally accountable for his international crimes was 
in recorded in the year 1474. This was done when some then European city states (who formed 
the “League of Constance”) set up an ad hoc international criminal tribunal that tried Sir Peter 
Von Hagenbach in the city of Breisach for atrocities he committed while serving the Duke of 
Burgundy.
7
 Hagenbach was tried by the tribunal for crimes in violation of the “laws of God and 
man” which he committed during his reign as the governor of the Duke‟s Alsatian territories 
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Transnational Justice”, JAD-PbP Working Paper Series, No 1, May 2009 at 15-19, also online: < http://www4.lu.se 
/upload/LUPDF/Samhallsvetenskap/Just_and_Durable_Peace/Workingpaper1.pdf>; Turns, D, “War Crimes Without 
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from 1469 to 1474.
8
 Despite his high-ranking official position in the Duke‟s government, his trial 
took place. He was found guilty, sentenced to death, and executed.
9
 
 However, for a couple of centuries after the Hagenbach trial, the crusade to subject to 
justice high-ranking state officials who committed international crimes suffered some decreased 
tempo. This might have been caused by an increased consciousness on the part of states to 
jealously guard their domestic affairs and national integrity.
10
  
 The attempt to humanize the jus ad bellum (the law of wars) after the Battle of Solferino
11
 
in the second half of the nineteenth century gave birth to the International Committee of the Red 
Cross (ICRC)
12
 and the Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the 
Wounded in Armies in the Field.
13
 A further attempt to create an international criminal court to 
prosecute all persons violating this Convention, however, failed.
14
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 4.2.2 The Treaty of Versailles Regime 
 The international community‟s anti-state-immunity response in the international criminal 
justice system was rekindled in the first quarter of the twentieth century, i.e., after the First 
World War.
15
 Disgusted at the nature of weapons used, as well as the horrors of this war, the 
Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on Enforcement of Penalties, 
recommended the trial and punishment of all individuals from the enemy countries that 
committed international crimes during the war. For the Commission, “…there is no reason why 
rank, however exalted, should in any circumstances protect the holder of it from responsibility 
when that responsibility has been established before a properly constituted tribunal. This extends 
even to the case of heads of states.” 
16
 In conclusion, it stated that: “All persons belonging to 
enemy countries, however high their position may have been, without distinction of rank, 
including Chiefs of States, who have been guilty of offences against the laws and customs of war 
or the laws of humanity, are liable to criminal prosecution.”
17
 
  The Paris Peace Conference that constituted the Commission on 25 January 1919
18
 also 
adopted the Treaty of Versailles
19
 (one of the peace treaties adopted at the end of the war 
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between the Allied Powers
20
 and the Central Powers
21
, especially Germany). Article 227 of this 
treaty, inter alia, provided for the creation of a special international criminal tribunal to try then 
German Emperor, Kaiser Wilhelm II “for a supreme offence against international morality and 
the sanctity of treaties”.
22
 The Emperor was proposed to be tried, notwithstanding his official 
capacity as a sovereign head of state at all times relevant to the commission of his alleged 
crimes. Thus, his state immunity protection was disregarded in favour of his individual 
accountability for international crimes.
23
  
 In addition, the treaty provided for the right of the Allied and associated Powers to bring 
before international military tribunals persons (from the enemy states) accused of having 
committed acts in violation of the laws and customs of war.
24
 This tribunal could not eventually 
be set up, as the Netherlands granted asylum to the Emperor and refused to hand him over to the 
Allied Powers for trial until he died in 1941.
25
 However, the anti-state immunity position of this 
legal regime must have laid some foundation in this regard for the legal regimes of subsequent ad 
hoc tribunals, especially the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals, which are examined next. 
 While summarizing the contributions of this treaty to the development of the international 
criminal justice system, Alexandre Guerreiro is of the view that
26
: 
The Versailles Treaty also broke ground in International Law when it (i) 
combined the principle of self-determination of peoples to the concept of 
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world peace …; (ii) inspired the tendency to abandon the notion that the 
actions performed by the Head of State are acts of the State, leading to the 
individual possibly being charged by his actions no matter his position in 
government
27
; and (iii) reinforced the need to create international courts to 
address violations of International Humanitarian Law, since questions 
arose [as] to the ability and will of national courts to handle these matters. 
The biggest contributions to International Humanitarian Law, by the 
Versailles Treaty, is that it demonstrated the possibility of breaching the 
primacy of state sovereignty, since it established the possibility of political 
interventions in the domestic affairs of a state with the goal of protecting 
human rights. It also reinforced the emergence of the individual as a 
subject of international law, not only an object left to be handled on lay as 




 The anti-state immunity position of this regime must have laid some foundation in this 
regard for the legal regimes of subsequent ad hoc tribunals, especially the Nuremberg and Tokyo 
Tribunals, which are examined next. 
 
 4.2.3 The Nuremberg Charter Regime 
 It was not until after the World War II that the first effective anti-state-immunity 
breakthrough occurred. After the war, the victorious Allied Powers
29
 commenced negotiations on 
the establishment of an international tribunal for the trial and punishment of the German Nazis 
and their allies that committed international crimes during the war.
30
 In order to accomplish this 
mission, part of the position advanced by these Allied Powers was that the state immunity rule 
should not act as a barrier to such trials and punishments. This is clearly stated in the report to 
the US President by Justice Jackson (the US representative to the International Conference on 
Military Trials) on June 6, 1945. According to Jackson:   
                                                             
27  Emphasis supplied. 
28
  Emphasis supplied.    
29  These Allied Powers included France, UK, US, USSR and China. 
30  See Sadat, Leila N, “The International Criminal Court” (May 1, 2014), Washington University in St Louis Legal 
Studies Research Paper No 14-05-02, online: <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2437441>; Hale, 
Christopher Kip, “Does the Evolution of International Criminal Law End With the ICC? The „Roaming ICC‟: A 
Model International Criminal Court for a State-centric World of International Law” (2008) 35:3/4 Denv J Int‟l L & 





… an inescapable responsibility rests upon this country to conduct an 
inquiry … in association with others … into the culpability of those whom 
there is probable cause to accuse of atrocities and other crimes…. To free 
them without a trial would mock the dead and make cynics of the living…. 
The only other course is to determine the innocence or guilt of the accused 
after a hearing as dispassionate as the times and horrors we deal with will 
permit…. Nor should such a defense be recognized as the obsolete doctrine 
that a head of state is immune from legal liability.… this idea is a relic of 
the doctrine of the divine right of kings.… We do not accept the paradox 
that legal responsibility should be the least where power is the greatest…. 
With the doctrine of immunity of a head of state ... nobody is responsible. 
Society as modernly organized cannot tolerate so broad an area of official 
irresponsibility…. We will accuse a large number of individuals and 




 Accordingly, in 1945, the Allied Powers adopted the London Agreement for the 
Prosecution and Punishment of Major War Criminals of the European Axis (London 
Agreement)
32
. Annexed to the London Agreement was the Charter of the International Military 
Tribunal (Nuremberg)
33
 (the “IMT Charter”, the “Nuremberg Charter”, or the “Tribunal”). The 
IMT Charter created the International Military Tribunal
34
 at Nuremberg, Germany (the “IMT” or 
the “Nuremberg Tribunal”). The Nuremberg Tribunal was set up to try high-ranking Nazi 
German officials for the following crimes committed during the War II: war crimes, crimes 
against peace (now called crime of aggression), and crimes against humanity.
35
 The Charter 
empowered the IMT to impose the death penalty or any other punishment it should deem just.
36
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One of the landmark innovations of the Charter was its abolition of the protection of state 
immunity in trials for the crimes under the Charter.
37
 Under article 7 of the Nuremberg Charter, 
“The official position of defendants, whether as Heads of State or responsible officials in 




 On the strength of this and other relevant provisions of the Charter, the Tribunal was able 
to try, convict, and sentence to various forms of punishment many high-ranking state officials of 
the Nazi regime in circumstances that would have readily attracted state immunity before 
national courts. For example, Karl Donitz (successor to Adolf Hitler and President of Germany 
after Hitler‟s death) was sentenced to ten years‟ imprisonment. Rudolf Hess (Hitler‟s former 
deputy) was sentenced to life imprisonment, and Joachim Ribbentrop (Nazi Germany‟s Minister 
of Foreign Affairs) was sentenced to death.
39
 Thus, if Adolf Hitler (German leader of the Nazi 
regime) were to be alive upon the creation of this Tribunal, state immunity could not have 
protected him from trial before this Tribunal for the international crimes committed by the Nazi 
regime under his leadership. 
 The contribution of the Nuremberg Tribunal‟s jurisprudence to the efforts at abolishing or 
disregarding state immunity in the international criminal justice system cannot be 
overemphasized. In fact, the Tribunal has the credit of making the first unambiguous judicial 
pronouncement on the non-applicability of the state immunity rule in international criminal 
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proceedings, a pronouncement that is cited as a locus classicus today. In the trials before the 
Tribunal, the accused persons argued that international law was concerned with the actions of 
sovereign states, and provides no punishment for individuals. They further argued that where the 
act in question is an act of the state, those who carry it out are not personally responsible, but are 
protected by the doctrine of the sovereignty of the state and, therefore, the state immunity rule.
 40
 
In rejecting these arguments, the Tribunal held as follows
41
: 
That international law imposes duties and liabilities upon individuals as 
well as upon states has long been recognized…. Crimes against 
international law are committed by men, not by abstract entities, and only 
by punishing individuals who commit such crimes can the provisions of 
international law be enforced…. The principle of international law, which 
under certain circumstances, protects the representatives of a state, cannot 
be applied to acts which are condemned as criminal by international law. 
The authors of these acts cannot shelter themselves behind their official 
position in order to be freed from punishment in appropriate 
proceedings…. The very essence of the Charter is that individuals have 
international duties which transcend the national obligations of obedience 
imposed by the individual state. He who violates the laws of war cannot 
obtain immunity while acting in pursuance of the authority of the state if 





 In sum, the Nuremberg regime established that the state immunity rule could no longer be 
pleaded to bar the trial and punishment of high-ranking state officials for international crimes in 
international tribunals, at least. This position was reaffirmed in the legal regime of the Tokyo 
Tribunal, as discussed next. It is also noteworthy that the UN General Assembly has 
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unanimously adopted the principles of the Nuremberg Charter as forming part of customary 
international law.
43
     
 
 4.2.4   The Tokyo Charter Regime 
 One year after creating the Nuremberg Tribunal, the Allied Powers also set up the 
International Military Tribunal for the Far East (the “Tokyo Tribunal” or the “Khabarovsk War 
Crimes Trial”). This was done through the adoption of the Charter of the International Military 
Tribunal for the Far East
44
 (“Tokyo Charter”). Like the Nuremberg Charter, the Tokyo Charter 
was adopted to try and punish the Far Eastern (mainly Japanese) war criminals for the same 
crimes for which the Nazis were tried, namely: crimes against peace, war crimes, and crimes 
against humanity.
45
 The Tokyo Charter was, therefore patterned along the lines of the 
Nuremberg Charter. 
 With regard to the immunity of persons charged before the Tokyo Tribunal, article 6 of 
the Tokyo Charter provided thus: 
Neither the official position, at any time, of an accused, nor the fact that an 
accused acted pursuant to order of his government or of a superior shall, of 
itself, be sufficient to free such accused from responsibility for any crime 
with which he is charged, but such circumstances may be considered in 
mitigation of punishment if the Tribunal determines that justice so 
requires. 
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On the strength of this and other provisions of the Charter, the Tokyo Tribunal was able 
to try and punish some high-ranking Japanese state officials, who would have otherwise been 




 4.2.5 The Legacy of the Old Ad hoc International Criminal Tribunal Mechanism 
 One significant legacy of this mechanism is that it demystified the state immunity rule 
and sought to eradicate the culture of criminal impunity among high-ranking state officials. For 
once, these officials were made to understand that they were not above the law and could be 
made personally accountable for their international crimes like ordinary individuals. The 
jurisprudence of the tribunals under this mechanism, therefore, laid some good foundation for the 
success of the efforts against state immunity. However, due, mainly, to the temporary nature of 
this mechanism, the need arose for a more permanent mechanism to carry on this legacy. This 
led to the re-invigoration of the universal criminal jurisdiction mechanism, which is examined 
next.    
 
4.3 The Universal Criminal Jurisdiction Mechanism 
 When the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals wound up, there were no other tribunals to 
administer international criminal justice on the international plane and to hold high-ranking state 
officials individually accountable for their international crimes by disregarding their immunity.
47
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In order partly to avoid the resultant proliferation of impunity among the officials for the 
commission of these crimes, the international community resorted to popularizing the universal 




 Universal criminal jurisdiction is the adjudicatory competence of national judicial 
authorities of a state (as opposed to an international judicial body) with respect to international 
crimes occurring outside the territory of the state and with which the state has no connection.
49
 
By virtue of the universal jurisdiction mechanism, all states have jurisdiction to prosecute 
particular international crimes. This jurisdiction can be exercised whether the crimes are 
committed within or without the prosecuting state‟s territory and regardless of the accused 
person‟s nationality, state of residence, or any other relationship with the prosecuting state.
50
  
This mechanism may also apply to non-core international crimes like piracy and slavery.  
 The popularization of this mechanism at this time was done through the adoption of some 
instruments by the UN. The instruments affirm that the prohibitions on certain international 
crimes have attained the status of international custom and, therefore, make the crimes 
susceptible to the jurisdiction of the courts of all states. A leading instrument in this regard was 
the UN General Assembly Resolution 95(1) of 1946
51
. This resolution affirmed that the 
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principles of international law recognized in the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal
52
 are 
international custom. It should be recalled that the principles recognized in this Charter included 
the prohibitions on war crimes, crimes against humanity, crimes against peace (aggression), as 
well as the abolition of the immunity rule in the trials of these crimes. This invariably implies 
that pursuant to the universal jurisdiction mechanism, the state immunity rule should not bar the 
prosecution of a high-ranking state official for any of these crimes before a competent national 
court of another state. Another relevant instrument here is the UN General Assembly Resolution 
on the Crime of Genocide
53
. This resolution affirms that the prohibition on the crime of genocide 
has also attained international customary law status and thus renders the crime susceptible to 
universal jurisdiction. 
 In addition to the general and unlimited form of universal jurisdiction that exists under 
customary international law, some international treaties also provide for some limited universal 
over specific international crimes. This treaty-based universal jurisdiction is limited because it is 
only effective as between the states parties to the respective treaties. Examples of these treaties 
are the Torture Convention
54
 and the four Geneva Conventions
55
. In order to actualize their 
universal jurisdiction goals, these treaties impose on contracting states an aut dedire aut punire 
obligation, i.e., subject to prosecutorial discretion, to prosecute or extradite an alleged offender to 
                                                             
52  Supra, note 33. 
53  GA Res 96(1), 1946 (of 11 December, 1946).  
54 1984, 1465 UNTS 85, art 5(2). See also the ICTY in Prosecutor v Furundzija, Case No IT-95-17/1-T10, Trial 
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Persons in Time of War, 1949, 75 UNTS 287 (“Geneva Convention IV”), art 146, para 2. See also O‟Keefe, Roger, 





another state party which will prosecute him.
56
 Following the universal jurisdiction trend, some 
states have also enacted national instruments that confer universal jurisdiction over some core 




 4.3.1 Theoretical Foundation and Importance of the Universal Criminal   
  Jurisdiction Mechanism in the Response against State Immunity 
 
 As already described in Chapter Three above, the theoretical foundation for universal 
jurisdiction is that the relevant crimes have attained the status of jus cogens and every state, 
therefore, has an entitlement erga omnes to bring their perpetrators to justice. Under this 
mechanism, the prosecuting state justifies its claim to jurisdiction on the grounds that the crimes 
are committed against all humanity and against the international community as a whole and are, 
therefore, too grave to tolerate.
58
 The individual that commits the crimes is deemed “hostis 
humani generis” (enemy of all humankind) and every state has the jurisdiction to punish the 
crimes. According to Kenneth Randall
59
: 
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“Report of the Secretary-General Prepared on the Basis of Comments and Observations of Governments: The Scope 
and Application of the Principle of Universal Jurisdiction”, U.N. Doc. A/65/181 (July 29, 2010) at 29. 
58 D‟ Aspremont, Jean, “Multilateral versus Universal Exercises of Universal Criminal Jurisdiction” (2010) 43 
Israel LR 301 at 302-303;  Amnesty International‟s 14 Principles on the Effective Exercise of Universal Jurisdiction, 
Amnesty International May 1999AI Index: IOR 53/01/99 at 1. 
59  Randall, Kenneth C, “Universal Jurisdiction under International Law” (1988) 66 Texas LR 785 at 831. See also 
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Violations of obligations erga omnes and jus cogens norms offend all 
States, whether committed by state actors or individuals. Indeed, domestic 
jurisdiction over those violations may draw support from the Barcelona 
Traction case dictum, which, although not without ambiguity, may support 
a type of actio popularis, enabling any state to vindicate rights common to 
all…. In this way, the erga omnes and jus cogens doctrines may buttress 




This mechanism is a crucial tool for bringing justice to victims, deterring state officials 
from committing international crimes, and establishing a minimum international rule of law by 
substantially closing the “impunity gap” for international crimes.
61
 One virtue of this mechanism 
is that it advocates disregard for the immunity of state officials who commit international 
crimes.
62
 The International Council on Human Rights Policy stresses this as follows
63
: 
Universal jurisdiction prosecutions illustrate effectively the basic principle 
that serious human rights violations are the concern of everyone, not just 
the people in the country where they were committed. When a foreign 
country decides to prosecute crimes that occurred in another land, 
regardless of whether its own nationals were victims, it demonstrates the 
international dimension to basic human rights. The very fact that these 
prosecutions challenge traditional attributes of sovereignty and the 
immunity of leaders to commit grave abuses within their own national 




 The mechanism‟s importance is also recognized in Amnesty International‟s document 
titled “Universal Jurisdiction: 14 Principles on the Effective Exercise of Universal 
Jurisdiction”
65
. In particular, Principle 2 reflects the anti-immunity position of the universal 
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criminal jurisdiction mechanism, and is headed “No immunity for persons in official capacity.”
66
 
Its paragraph 1 states that “National legislatures should ensure that their national courts can 
exercise jurisdiction over anyone suspected or accused of grave crimes under international law, 
whatever the official capacity of the suspect or accused at the time of the alleged crime or any 
time thereafter.” Under paragraph 2, “Any national law authorizing the prosecution of grave 
crimes under international law should apply equally to all persons irrespective of any official or 
former official capacity, be it head of state, head or member of government … or other elected or 
governmental capacity.”  
 Similarly, Principle 5 of the Princeton Principles on Universal Jurisdiction
67
 provides as 
follows: “With respect to serious crimes under international law …, the official position of any 
accused person, whether as head of state or government or as a responsible government official, 
shall not relieve such person of criminal responsibility nor mitigate punishment.”  
 Pursuant to this mechanism, some former high-ranking state officials have been denied 
immunity before foreign courts for international crimes they committed while in office. For 
example, in Attorney-General of the Government of Israel v Eichmann
68
, Israel invoked this 
mechanism and tried Adolf Eichmann, an ex-Nazi high-ranking official. Eichmann was the head 
of the Jewish office of the Nazi Gestapo. He was the administrator in charge of “the Final 
Solution” – the Nazi policy that led to the extermination of about 4,600,000 Jews in Europe. He 
was tried for war crimes, crimes against the Jewish people, and crimes against humanity, the 
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definitions of which were based on the Nuremberg principles. He was convicted, sentenced to 
death, and executed, notwithstanding his official capacity when he committed his crimes.
69
 
More recently, in the Pinochet case
70
 earlier referred to, Augusto Pinochet was arrested in 
the UK on the based on warrants issued by the Spanish courts and a Spanish extradition request.
 
The warrants and request arose from his prosecution in Spain for torture and other international 
crimes he committed in his position as Chilean President between 1973 and 1990. He filed 
applications before the UK courts to quash the warrants, arguing that as a former head of state he 
was protected by the state immunity rule from foreign criminal prosecutions for acts done by him 
in his official capacity as head of state. Part of the counter-arguments of the appellants‟ counsel 
(Alun Jones, QC) on this position is instructive
71
:  
The various laws of states considered in the light of the fact that every 
recent human rights treaty has prohibited torture provide evidence that 
customary international law prohibited torture before the Torture 
Convention and that, under customary international law, torture was an 
international crime if committed by a public official. There was no head of 
state exception and states other than the state where the offence took place 
were entitled to exercise jurisdiction…. Accordingly, either the Torture 
Convention establishes that the applicant can have no immunity from 
prosecution for acts of torture or alternatively the prohibition against 
torture has the status of jus cogens and he can be prosecuted under 
customary international law….  
 
 In a landmark judgment, the UK House of Lords held that the commission of torture 
could not be regarded as an official act for which a head of state should enjoy immunity under 
international law. The Court also said that such immunity was lost when Chile ratified the 
Torture Convention on 30
th
 October 1988. For the Law Lords, the moment Pinochet stepped 
                                                             
69
 See also Mulisch, Harry, Criminal Case 40/61, The Trial of Adolf Eichmann: An Eye Witness Account 
(Pennsylvania, USA: University of Pennsylvania, 2005) at 1-16; Scharf, Michael P, “Joint Criminal Enterprise, the 
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down as Chilean head of state, he lost his immunity from foreign prosecution for his 
international crimes, including torture, committed while in office.
 72
 
 From the judgment in the Pinochet case, it is clear that the disregard of the state 
immunity rule under the universal criminal jurisdiction mechanism only applies to immunity 
ratione materiae. Thus, immunity ratione personae of sitting high-ranking state officials from 
prosecutions for international crimes is not abolished under this mechanism. Notwithstanding 
this, the judgment went a long way in inducing public confidence in universal criminal 
jurisdiction as a mechanism for responding to the problems arising from the application of the 
state immunity rule in the international criminal justice system. For once, the mechanism that 
had remained ineffective was given some practical effect. This would show sitting state officials 
entitled to immunity ratione personae that they are not eternally free from individual 
accountability for their international crimes before foreign courts. Their charges may be waiting 
for their exit from office. According to Naomi Roht-Arriaza:   
The Pinochet cases established the legitimacy of transnational 
prosecutions based on universal … jurisdiction, at least under some 
circumstances. They showed that the existing universal jurisdiction laws 
could actually be used, and touched off a new willingness by advocates 
and court to use them. They made clear that there are some limits on the 
immunity of government officials when hauled before national courts 
accused of international crimes. … They strengthened the idea that proper 
accountability for such crimes is the business of justice everywhere, and 
that domestic laws enshrining unfair trials or shielding perpetrators are 
subject to outside scrutiny and cannot per se bind foreign courts. They 
yielded landmark jurisprudence in the highest national courts of a handful 
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of countries, jurisprudence that both draws from international courts and 




Despite the recent popularization of this mechanism, it has always invariably remained 
ineffective. This is due to such factors as fear of deterioration in inter-state relations and the 
uncertain scopes and limits of the mechanism‟s immunity-removing regime. In order, partly, to 
avoid these shortcomings and the potential abuse in remitting these matters to national courts of 
dubious impartiality
74
, the international community re-invented the ad hoc international criminal 
tribunal mechanism. This is the modern ad hoc international criminal tribunal mechanism, and is 
examined next. 
  
4.4 The Modern Ad hoc International Criminal Tribunal Mechanism 
 On account, inter alia, of political unwillingness by states to try high-ranking officials of 
other states, the universal criminal jurisdiction mechanism was ineffective until recently, 
becoming more so now. For decades, most high-ranking state officials who committed heinous 
international crimes around the world escaped justice, and these crimes continued to flourish 
with impunity among these officials. As Alexandre Guerreiro states: 
Despite the acceleration in legislative activity that followed the creation of the 
Tribunals at Nuremberg and Tokyo, realpolitik still loomed large over the 
protection of Human Rights, in such a manner that the world witnessed, for 
the first three decades of the Cold War, individuals acting blatantly against 




In order partly to address this trend, the last decades of the twentieth century saw the 
establishment by the UN Security Council of two ad hoc international criminal tribunals. This 
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marked a revival of the ad hoc tribunal mechanism of international criminal justice 
administration. These two tribunals were the ICTY
76
 and the ICTR
77
. Their anti-immunity 
regimes are considered below. 
 
 4.4.1  The ICTY Statute Regime 
 The ICTY (“Tribunal”) was created by the UN Security Council in May 1993 pursuant to 
Security Council Resolution 827
78
. This was done in direct reaction to the systematic atrocities 
being committed by all sides in the vicious conflict that was raging in the territory of the former 
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) since 1991.
79
 The atrocities involved 
widespread violations of international humanitarian law and human rights in the SFRY, 
including the existence of concentration camps and the practice of “ethnic cleansing”
80
. The 
ICTY is regulated by the ICTY Statute
81
  annexed to Security Council Resolution 827. It has 
jurisdiction to try and punish grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions (violations of the 
laws and customs of war), genocide, and crimes against humanity that took place within the 
territory of the SFRY since 1991.
82
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 By article 7(2) of the ICTY Statute, “The official position of any accused person, whether 
as Head of State or Government or as a responsible Government official, shall not relieve such 
person of criminal responsibility nor mitigate punishment.”
83
 Pursuant to this provision, the 
ICTY was able to successfully indict, prosecute, convict and sentence, many high-ranking state 
officials of the former Yugoslavia. In Prosecutor v Milosevic
84
, Slobodan Milosevic (who served 
severally as President of the Socialist Republic of Serbia, Republic of Serbia, and the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia) was indicted on May 27, 1999 (while in office as President of the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia). His indictment was for genocide, crimes against humanity, 
grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions
85
 of 1949, and other violations of the laws and 
customs of war. He, however, died in custody while standing trial.  
 The case of Prosecutor v Milutinovic & Ors
86
 was a high-profile case involving the 
indictment and joint trial of five high-ranking officials of the former Yugoslavia. The accused 
persons were: Milan Milutinovic (ex President of Serbia) and Sainovic Nikola (a former Deputy 
Prime Minister of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia – Serbia and Montenegro). Others were 
Dragoljub Ojdanic (ex-Chief of General Staff of the Yugoslav Army and Minister of Defence of 
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia – Serbia and Montenegro) and three others. They were tried 
for various crimes against humanity and for violations of the laws and customs of war allegedly 
committed by them while in office. Milutinovic was acquitted by the Trial Chamber, Nikola was 
convicted and sentenced to twenty-two years‟ imprisonment, while Ojdanic was also convicted 
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but sentenced to fifteen years‟ imprisonment. The convicted persons‟ appeal is pending before 
the Appeals Chamber of the Tribunal.
87
 
 In Prosecutor v Karadzic
88
, Radovan Karadzic, who was at all material times the 
President of Bosnia, is at the time of writing being tried for war crimes and crimes against 
humanity.  Karadzic was accused of presiding over the worst massacre in Europe since the Nazi-
orchestrated Holocaust. He allegedly presided over the Srebrenica genocide of 1996 in which 
Bosnian Serb forces slaughtered more than seven thousand, five hundred Muslim men and boys. 
The Trial Chamber of the Tribunal acquitted him on one genocide charge for lack of sufficient 




 In addition to these cases, the Tribunal has indicted and tried many other high-ranking 
officials of the former Yugoslavia for international crimes committed while they were in office. 
In these other cases, some of the officials have been convicted and sentenced to prison, while 




 4.4.2 The ICTR Statute Regime 
 After the Rwandan genocide of 1994, the UN Security Council adopted the United 
Nations Security Council Resolution 955 Establishing the International Criminal Tribunal for 
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 (“UNSC Resolution 955”). This Resolution established the ICTR or (the “Tribunal”).
92
 
The Resolution was, inter alia, adopted in recognition of the shocking degree of genocide and 
other serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in Rwanda from January 1, 
1994 to December 31, 1994.
93
 The purpose of the Tribunal‟s establishment was the prosecution 
of persons responsible for genocide and other serious violations of international humanitarian 
law committed in the territory of Rwanda between January 1 and December 31, 1994.
94
 The 
Tribunal is also empowered to try Rwandan citizens responsible for such violations in the 
territories of neighbouring states.
95
 
  The Tribunal is governed by the ICTR Statute
96
 annexed to UNSC Resolution 955. The 
Statute confers the ICTR with jurisdiction over genocide; crimes against humanity; and 
violations of article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and of the Additional 
Protocol II thereto, committed within the territories of Rwanda and its neighbouring states within 
the period under review.
97
  
 Like in the ICTY Statute
98
, article 6(2) of the ICTR Statute expressly removes immunity 
for high-ranking state officials. According to this provision, “The official status of any accused 
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person, whether as Head of State or Government or as a responsible Government official, shall 
not relieve such person of criminal responsibility nor mitigate punishment.”
99
   
 Based on these and other relevant provisions of the Statute, the ICTR has been able 
indict, issue warrants of arrest against, try, convict, and sentence many high-ranking state 
officials, despite their official statuses at the time of commission of their alleged crimes. These 
indictments, arrest warrants, trials, convictions and sentences, it should be noted, would have 
most likely been impossible before foreign judicial tribunals due to the state immunity rule, at 
least while they were still sitting officials. 
 In Prosecutor v Kambanda
100
, the Tribunal indicted Jean Kambanda (former Rwandan 
Prime Minister) on charges of genocide and crimes against humanity. He pleaded guilty and was 
sentenced to life imprisonment. In Kambanda v Prosecutor
101
, his appeal against conviction and 
sentence to the Tribunal‟s Appeals Chamber was dismissed. He currently serves his sentence. 
 In Prosecutor v Bizimungu & 3 Ors
102
, the 1st accused, Casmir Bizimungu, was the 
Rwandan Minister of Health, while the 3
rd
 accused, Jerome Bicamumpaka, was the Rwandan 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, when their alleged crimes were committed. They were indicted and 
tried, inter alia, for genocide, crimes against humanity and, war crimes. The Trial Chamber 
found Bizimungu guilty, but acquitted Bicamumpaka.   




 accused person (Augustin Bizimungu) 
was the Rwandan Chief of Army Staff at the time the alleged crimes were committed. He and the 
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other three accused persons were charged, inter alia, for genocide, crimes against humanity and 
war crimes. The Trial Chamber found them guilty and convicted and sentenced them to various 
terms of imprisonment. In particular, Bizimungu was sentenced to thirty years‟ imprisonment. 
An appeal
104
 is still pending before the Appeals Chamber.
105
  
 These trials, convictions and sentences serve as a warning to other high-ranking state 
officials around the world that the days of immunity from individual accountability for 
international crimes are gradually coming to an end. Official state positions may, therefore, no 
longer cloak them from accountability. Thus, the era of state-immunity-induced impunity, at 
least for international crimes under the ad hoc tribunals‟ jurisdiction is gradually passing by.  
 However, the weaknesses associated with the ad hoc international criminal tribunal 
mechanism, such as limited geographical/temporal jurisdictions and, at least as regards the 
ICTR, alleged lack of independence and impartiality
106
 (which is an even bigger issue with 
respect to national tribunals), led the international community to a search for other response 
mechanisms.
107
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Case No ICTR-96-14-T; Prosecutor v Nyiramasuhuko & Ors, Case No ICTR-98-42-T; Prosecutor v Karemera & 
Anor, Case No ICTR-98-44T;  Prosecutor v Kamuhanda, Case No ICTR-95-54A-T; Prosecutor v Ndindabahizi, 
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International Justice at Home and Abroad (Oxford: Routledge, 2009) at 121; Hauschildt, Thomas, “The 
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4.5      The Hybrid Criminal Tribunal Mechanism 
 More recently, a new species of criminal tribunals was ushered in. These are hybrid 
tribunals established by particular states or by the international community for particular 
states.
108
 They are hybrid or internationalized because their enabling legal instruments empower 
them to exercise both international and domestic criminal jurisdictions and also to administer 
both international criminal law and the domestic criminal law of the state concerned.
109
 They are, 
most often, staffed by both international and domestic judges and, in some cases, jointly 
administered by both the international community and the government of the state concerned.
110
 
One remarkable and commendable feature of most of their enabling legal instruments is that they 
expressly abolish state immunity protection for high-ranking state officials. The details of their 
regimes against state immunity are set out below. 
 
 4.5.1 The Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone 
The UN Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) was established in January 2002, 
pursuant to the Agreement between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone on 
the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone
111
 (“SCSL Agreement”). The Statute of the 
Special Court for Sierra Leone
112
 (“SCSL Statute”), which governs the operation of this Court, is 
                                                             
108  See, e.g., Costi, Alberto, “Hybrid Tribunals as a Valid Alternative to International Tribunals for the Prosecution 
of International Crimes”, online: < https://www.victoria.ac.nz/law/centres/nzcpl/publications/human-rights-research 
-journal/publications/vol-3/Costi.pdf> at 1-2. 
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IRRC 49 at 49-50; Dickinson, LA, “The Promise of Hybrid Courts” (2003)97 AJIL 259; Rapoza, P, “Hybrid 
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111 2002, 2178 UNTS 138; UN Doc. S/2002/246, appendix II. See also DiBella, Amy E, “Witnessing History: 
Protective measures at the Special Court for Sierra Leone”, in Jalloh, Charles Chernor, The Sierra Leone Special 
Court and Its Legacy: The Impact for Africa and International Criminal Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2014) 423 at 424-425.  





annexed to the SCSL Agreement.  The SCSL was created to try persons bearing the greatest 
responsibility for serious violations of international humanitarian law and Sierra Leonean law 
committed in the territory of Sierra Leone during Sierra Leone‟s gruesome ten-year civil war.
113
 
Article 6(1) of the SCSL Statute entrenches individual responsibility. Under article 6(2), 
immunity for high-ranking state officials is abolished. According to this paragraph, “The official 
position of any accused persons, whether as Head of State or Government, or as a responsible 
government official, shall not relieve such person of criminal responsibility nor mitigate 
punishment.”
114
 This provision has enabled the SCSL to try and punish state officials that would 
otherwise have been shielded by the state immunity rule. In Prosecutor v Taylor
115
, the Appeals 
Chamber of the SCSL held that then Liberian President, Charles Taylor, could not invoke his 
head of state immunity to resist the charges against him before the Court, even though he was an 
incumbent head of state at the time of his indictment on March 7, 2003. Thus, Taylor was 
prosecuted, inter alia, for war crimes and crimes against humanity before the Trial Chamber of 
the SCSL. He was convicted on April 26, 2012.
116
 The Appeals Chamber dismissed his appeal 
on September 26, 2013.
117
 He currently serves a fifty-year jail term in the British prisons.
118
 
Also in Prosecutor v Norman & Ors
119
, Samuel Hinga Norman (a then Sierra Leonean 
Deputy Defence Minister and serving Interior Minister at the time of indictment) was tried by the 
SCSL for crimes against humanity and war crimes. However, he died before delivery of 
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114  Emphasis supplied. 
115
  Case No SCSL-03-01-A, Appeal Chamber, May 31, 2004.  
116  Prosecutor v Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-T.  
117  See judgment of the Appeals Chamber of the SCSL in Prosecutor v Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-A (delivered 
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judgment in his case, which was thus terminated.
120
 In Prosecutor v Koroma
121
, Jonny Paul 
Koroma (a former Sierra Leonean head of state) was indicted for crimes against humanity and 
war crimes and the SCSL issued a warrant for his arrest. However, the accused fled Sierra Leone 




 4.5.2 The Statute of the Iraqi Special Tribunal / Law of the Iraqi Higher Criminal  
       Court 
 
The Iraqi Special Tribunal (the “IST” or the “Tribunal”) was established in 2003 pursuant 
to the Statute of the Iraqi Special Tribunal
123
 (“IST Statute”). The IST was established through 
the UN influence in order to put an end to the Ba‟ath Party‟s regime in Iraq.
124
 
 The IST has jurisdiction over Iraqi nationals and Iraqi residents accused of genocide, 
crimes against humanity, and war crimes.
125
 The Tribunal also has jurisdiction over the 
following Iraqi national crimes:  wastage of natural resources, manipulation of the judiciary, and 
abuse of policies leading to war against Iraq‟s neighbours. The Tribunal‟s temporal and 
geographical jurisdictions extend to the aforementioned crimes committed since July 17, 1968, 
and up until May 1, 2003, in the territory of Iraq or elsewhere, including crimes committed in 
connection with Iraq‟s wars against Iran and Kuwait.
126
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Article 15(a) of the IST Statute establishes the individual responsibility of accused 
persons. Under article 15(c): 
The official position of any accused person, whether as president, 
prime minister, member of the cabinet, chairman or a member of the 
Revolutionary Command Council, a member of the Arab Socialist 
Ba‟ath Party Regional Command or Government (or an 
instrumentality of either) or as a responsible Iraqi Government official 
or member of the Ba‟ath Party or in any other capacity, shall not 
relieve such person of criminal responsibility nor mitigate punishment. 




In August 2005, the Iraqi Government changed the name of this Tribunal to the Iraqi 
Higher Criminal Court (also known as the Iraqi Higher Tribunal - IHT) via the Law of the Iraqi 
Higher Criminal Court
128
 (“IHT Law”). The IHT Law repealed the IST Statute but saves all 
decisions made pursuant to the IST Statute.
129
 The IHT Law virtually reproduces the content of 
the IST Statute, including jurisdiction. It only adds that pardons issued prior to the enforcement 
of the IHT Law do not apply to the accused in any of the crimes stipulated in the IHT Law.
130
 
Consequently, the IHT tried, convicted and sentenced many high-ranking Iraqi state 
officials who were in power at the time of the commission of their alleged crimes.
131
 In 
Prosecutor v Hussein et al
132
 (“Al Dujail case”), the accused persons included Saddam Hussein 
(ex Iraqi President) and Taha Yassin Ramadan (ex Iraqi Vice President and former General 
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Commander of the Iraqi Popular Army). They were charged before the IHT for various crimes 
against humanity, war crimes and genocide, found guilty, and sentenced to death. The IHT 
Appeals Chamber dismissed their appeal and confirmed their conviction and sentence.
133
 They 
have since been executed. 
Before the Appeals Chamber, one of Saddam Hussein‟s arguments against his conviction 
and sentence by the Trial Chamber was that the acts constituting his alleged crimes were 
performed in his official capacity as a head of state and were, therefore, protected by immunity 
in international law.  The Chamber rejected this argument and held that immunity does not 
prevent the Court from exercising its jurisdiction. The Chamber‟s reasoning is as follows
134
: 
1) The law allows the trial of any person accused of committing a crime, regardless of his 
official capacity, even if he was a president or a member of government or of its council. 
His capacity does not excuse him from penalty and does not constitute extenuating 
circumstances. Immunity is the practical immunity which is related to the position held. 
Therefore, no one who committed crimes can claim that his acts are outside the law. 
2) Immunity is not given to serve the interests of the person who holds the official position, 
but for the welfare of society, and should not violate international penal law. 
3) If immunity constitutes a protective framework against prosecution, this principle was no 
longer recognized after World War II, and immunity has lost its effect since then. The 
establishment of criminal courts to try international crimes is an indication of the end of 
the immunity principle. 
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4) Immunity should be a reason for increasing the penalty rather than its mitigation, for a 
person who enjoys it usually exercises power which enables him to affect a large number 
of people, which intensifies the damages and losses resulting from commission of crimes. 
5) The president of the state has international responsibility for the crimes he commits 
against the international community, since it is not logical and just to punish subordinates 
who execute illegal orders issued by the president and his aides, and to excuse the 
president who ordered and schemed for the commission of those crimes. 
One interesting issue about this and similar cases is the fact that Hussein was in Iraq at 
the time of his trial, which means that state immunity as an international rule would not 
necessarily have been relevant. But because of the hybrid nature of the tribunal and the fact that 
it is not purely an Iraqi domestic court, the rule was relevant in the circumstance. Also, in 
Prosecutor v Al-Majid et al
135
, the IHT tried Sultan Hashim Ahmed (Iraqi Defence Minister at all 
material times) for genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity, found him guilty and 





 4.5.3 The Law on the Establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers in the   
     Courts of Cambodia 
 
The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (the “Cambodia Tribunal”, or 
the “ECCC”, or the “Khmer Rouge Tribunal”) is established pursuant to the Agreement between 
the United Nations and the Royal Government of Cambodia Concerning the Prosecution under 
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Cambodian Law of Crimes Committed During the period of Democratic Kampuchea
137 (“UN-Cambodia 
Agreement”). It was created to try the surviving most senior members of the Khmer Rouge
138
 
regime and other persons most responsible for violations of Cambodian and international penal 
law committed in Cambodia throughout this regime (between 17 April, 1975 and 6 January, 
1979) and to provide justice to Cambodian victims of such violations.
139
 
The UN-Cambodia Agreement is implemented in Cambodia through the Law on the 
Establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia for the Prosecution of 
Crimes Committed During the Period of Democratic Kampuchea
140
 (“ECCC Law”). The ECCC 
Law provides the ECCC with subject-matter jurisdiction over violations of Cambodian penal 
law, international humanitarian law and custom, and international conventions recognized by 




By article 9 of the UN-Cambodia Agreement
142
, the ECCC can, inter alia, try the 
following crimes: genocide
143
, crimes against humanity
144
 and grave breaches of the 1949 
Geneva Conventions.
145
 In article 29, the ECCC Law establishes the individual criminal 
                                                             
137  6 June, 2003, online: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/4ba8e 2ea 9dc.html>. 
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142  See also the ECCC Law, supra, note 140, arts 3-8. 
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responsibility of any suspect or accused person charged before the ECCC. It also establishes 
command responsibility.
146
 The second paragraph of the same article 29 provides that “The 
position or rank of any suspect shall not relieve such person of criminal responsibility or 
mitigate punishment.”
147
    
Consequently, the ECCC has tried a number of high-ranking state officials of the former 
Khmer Rouge regime.
148
 In Prosecutor v Eav
149
, Kaing Guek Eav (also called “Kang Kek Iew”), 
who at all material times acted as the head of the Khmer Rouge internal security, was convicted 
and sentenced to imprisonment for thirty-five years. His trial was for various crimes against 
humanity and grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949. On February 3, 2012, the 
Supreme Court Chamber of the ECCC, in dismissing his appeal against conviction and sentence, 
not only confirmed his conviction but also increased his sentence to life imprisonment. 
   Prosecutor v Sary & Ors
150
 deals with the trial of the following very high-ranking 
officials of the former Khmer Rouge regime: Ieng Sary (a Deputy Prime Minister), Khieu 
Samphan (a former President), and Noun Chea (chief ideologist of the Khmer Rouge and second 
in command to the former Khmer Rouge leader, Pol Pot). They are accused of committing 
crimes against humanity, grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, and genocide. 
These are based on the part they played in “the killing fields” – the mass slaughter of their own 
people when this regime ruled. Ieng Sary died before his conviction and sentence, and so on 
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March 14, 2013, his trial was terminated by the Trial Chamber of the ECCC.
151
 Khieu Samphan 
and Noun Chea continue to stand trial for these crimes before the ECCC. 
 
 4.5.4 The International Crimes (Tribunal) Act in Bangladesh 
The International Crimes Tribunal (the “ICT” or the “Bangladesh Tribunal”) is a hybrid 
criminal tribunal in Bangladesh. It was set up in 2009 to investigate and prosecute suspects in the 
genocide committed in Bangladesh in 1971 by the Pakistani Army and their Bangladeshi 
collaborators during the Bangladeshi war of liberation.
152
 The instrument that authorized its 
establishment has been in force since July 20, 1973
153
. However, it remained dormant, as no 
tribunal was set up and no trial was conducted pursuant to it, until it was amended and 
reintroduced by an Act of the Bangladeshi Parliament in 2009.
154
  Today, the operations of the 
Tribunal are governed by the International Crimes (Tribunal) Act
155
, as amended (the “ICT 
Amended Act” or the “Amended Act”) after it was eventually established on March 25, 2010.
156
  
Although the ICT is a domestic tribunal, it deals exclusively with international crimes 
and in accordance with international law. The long title of the Act states its purpose as follows: 
“An Act to provide for the detention, prosecution and punishment of persons for genocide, 
crimes against humanity, war crimes and other crimes under international law”. 
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By article 3(1) of the ICT Amended Act, the Tribunal has power to try any individual or 
group of individuals of any nationality, who commits or has committed in Bangladesh, whether 
before or after the commencement of the ICT Amended Act, any of listed international crimes. 
These crimes include: crimes against humanity, genocide, war crimes, violation of any 
humanitarian rules applicable in armed conflicts as laid down by the Geneva Conventions of 
1949
157
, and any other crimes under international law.
158
   
Article 4 affirms the individual criminal responsibility of every person charged before the 
Tribunal. It also establishes command responsibility. Most interestingly, article 5(1) of the 
Amended Act provides that “The official position, at any time, of an accused person shall not be 
considered freeing him from responsibility or mitigating punishment.”
159
 
Although the Tribunal has conducted a couple of trials and handed down some 
convictions and sentences
160
, so far there have been no trials and convictions of high-ranking 
state officials whose official status at the material times would have qualified them for state 
immunity. However, it is possible that such trials and sentences will come along, especially 
given the wide powers of the Tribunal under the ICT Amended Act. Again, the rule would not 
ordinarily have applied in these cases before Bangladeshi domestic courts if not for the hybrid 
status of the tribunal. 
One of the major innovations introduced by the ICT Amended Act in the hybrid criminal 
tribunal mechanism is the expansion of the ICT‟s substantive jurisdiction by including in the 
Act‟s article 3(2)(f) a general power for the ICT to try “any other crimes under international 
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. This is unlike most other hybrid tribunals whose jurisdictions are restricted to the core 
international crimes, i.e., genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity (and aggression, in 
some cases). It is a commendable step that a hybrid tribunal has such unlimited substantive 
international criminal jurisdiction, implying that a high-ranking state official charged before it 
for any international crime beyond the core ones could still be stripped of immunity and 
subjected to full individual accountability. 
 
 4.5.5 The UNTAET Regulation on the Special Panels in East Timor 
 Upon the withdrawal of the Indonesian military forces in September 1999 from the 
occupation of East Timor, the UN set up the United Nations Transitional Authority (the 
“UNTAET”) to administer East Timor pending its independence in 2002.
162
 established an 
Investigative Commission (the “Commission”).
163
 On 6 June 2000, the UNTAET established 
the Special Panels for Serious Crimes (SPSC) in East Timor. This was done through the 
adoption of the UNTAET Regulation 2000/15 on the Establishment of Panels with Exclusive 
Jurisdiction over Serious Criminal Offences
164
 (“UNTAET Regulation 2000/15” or “SPSC 
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Regulation”). The SPSC has two sets of panels of judges: the trial Panels
165
 and the appellate 
Panels
166
.  The Panels are composed of international and East Timorese judges.
167
 
The SPSC Regulation confers on the SPSC substantive jurisdiction over the following 
“serious offences” (crimes): genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, murder, sexual 
offences, and torture.
168
 Section 14 establishes individual criminal responsibility, and section 
15 totally abolishes the immunity rule in the following terms: 
1. The present regulation shall apply equally to all persons without any 
distinction based on official capacity. In particular, official capacity 
as a Head of State or Government, a member of a Government or 
parliament, an elected representative or a government official shall in 
no case exempt a person from criminal responsibility under the 




2. Immunities or special procedural rules which may attach to the official 
capacity of a person, whether under national or international law, shall 
not bar the panels from exercising its jurisdiction over such a person.  
 
 Although the Special Panels have recorded some convictions
170
, no high-ranking state 
officials that would have benefitted from the immunity rule have so far been tried by the 
Panels.
171
 In any case, should they be brought to trial, it is clear in the provisions of the 
Regulation that they would not enjoy immunity. These provisions of the SPSC Regulation are, 
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 4.5.6 The Statute of the Extraordinary African Chambers in the Courts of Senegal 
 The Extraordinary African Chambers within the Courts of Senegal (“African Chambers” 
or the “Chambers”) is a hybrid criminal tribunal established within the national courts of 
Senegal.
172
 It is set up pursuant to the Statute of the Extraordinary African Chambers within the 
Courts of Senegal
173
 (“African Chambers Statute”). The purpose of its creation is to try persons 
most responsible for serious international crimes committed in the Republic of Chad between 7 
June 1982 and 1 December 1990.
174
 It was principally established at the behest of the AU in 
order to bring to international criminal justice Hissene Habre, who was the Chadian President 
during the relevant period). Habre is accused of responsibility for the deaths of more than 40,000 
people and torture of more than 20,000 during his eight-year rule of Chad from 1982 to 1990.
175
 
The Chambers were opened on February 8, 2013.
176
 
 The Chambers, which have jurisdiction over the international crimes of genocide, crimes 
against humanity, war crimes, and torture
177
, are composed of Senegalese and non-Senegalese 
judges appointed by the Senegalese government and the AU.
178
 They are empowered to apply 
both the Statute and Senegalese law.
179
 Article 10 of the African Chambers Statute affirms the 
individual criminal responsibility of accused persons, establishes the command responsibility of 
superiors, and abolishes immunity and the defence of superior orders. Particularly, article 10(3) 
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states regarding immunity that “The official position of an accused, whether as Head of State or 
Government, or as a responsible government official, shall not relieve him or her of criminal 




 These provisions have made possible the indictment and commencement of the trial of 
Hissene Habre for crimes against humanity, torture, and war crimes before the Chambers. Habre, 
who is also wanted by Belgium on similar charges pursuant to the universal jurisdiction 




 4.5.7 The Legal Instruments of Other Hybrid Tribunals 
Other tribunals under the hybrid criminal tribunal mechanism include the War Crimes 
Chambers in the Courts of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the War Crimes Chambers in the Courts of 
Croatia, and the War Crimes Chambers in the Courts of Serbia.
182
 However, the enabling legal 
instruments of these tribunals (all established in the breakaway republics of the former 
Yugoslavia) do not have express provisions on the abolition or disregard of the immunity rule.
183
  
The reason for this gap/omission may not be far-fetched. These War Crimes Chambers were 
established to help relieve the ICTY of its case load by trying some mid- and lower-ranking 
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accused persons that could not be tried by the ICTY, and to help continue the work of the ICTY 
beyond the end of its temporal mandate in 2010.
184
 Thus, since the mid- and lower-ranking 
persons were not entitled to immunity in the first place, there is, therefore, no immunity to 
disregard. 
 However, this argument could still be faulted on the ground that it was not all the high-
ranking officials indicted by the ICTY that could be tried before the ICTY completed its 
temporal mandate. Some are still at large.
185
 Thus, whenever they are caught and charged before 
any of the War Crimes Chambers, the state immunity rule could be pleaded as a bar. 
Consequently, the omission should be quickly filled in.
186
 
   
 4.5.8 Overview 
The foregoing examination shows that, like the ad hoc international criminal tribunal 
mechanism, the hybrid criminal tribunal mechanism is capable of abolishing the state immunity 
rule by holding individually accountable for international crimes culpable high-ranking state 
officials who would have otherwise been shielded by the rule. The trials conducted by most of 
the hybrid tribunals reaffirm the position that the state immunity rule has seriously lost its 
strength in the international criminal justice system.  Most of the accused persons, who were 
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once in absolute control of their state, are today being tried for atrocities they had committed 
many decades ago when they felt they would remain perpetually untouchable. This position 
shows that there is no more hiding place for persons who commit international crimes under the 
cover of official capacity. If they go free today, the nets of the international criminal justice 
system are likely to catch them tomorrow. 
The next response mechanism is the Permanent International Criminal Court Mechanism. 
This is examined next. 
 
4.6 The Permanent International Criminal Court Mechanism 
On July 17, 1998, the Rome Statute
187
 (“ICC Statute” or the “Statute”) which establishes 
the International Criminal Court (“ICC” or the “Court”) was adopted by the UN Diplomatic 
Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court.
188
 The 
ICC Statute came into force on July 1, 2002.
189
     
Article 5 of the Statute vests the ICC with jurisdiction over persons responsible for “the 
most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole”
190
. It lists these 
crimes as: genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the crime of aggression.  Article 
27 expressly abolishes immunity for any high-ranking state official charged before the Court. 
According to this article: 
(1) This Statute shall apply equally to all persons without any distinction 
based on official capacity. In particular, official capacity as Head of 
State or Government, a member of a Government or parliament, an 
elected representative or a government official shall in no case exempt 
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a person from criminal responsibility under this Statute, nor shall it, in 




(2) Immunities or special procedural rules which may attach to the 
capacity of a person, whether under national or international law, 




  Consequently, a head of state/government or any other high-ranking state official loses 
his immunity (ratione personae and ratione materiae) when indicted by or charged before the 
ICC. This has been described as clear confirmation of the new international law rule that 
individuals (no matter how highly placed) can no longer be absolved of international criminal 
responsibility (at least for the so-called “core international crimes”) by the state immunity rule. 
Fred Nkusi reiterates this outcome as follows
193
: 
Clearly, the provision [article 27 of the Rome Statute] generally eliminates 
both immunity ratione personae and immunity ratione materiae attached 
to state officials irrespective of their capacity in respect of international 
crimes. The ICC Statute removes expressly immunities of State officials 
including Heads of State or Government. Article 27 has become standard 
in the founding legal framework of international tribunals. Paragraph (1) 
of the provision does not address the issue of immunity accorded by 
international law to state officials, rather it addresses the substantive 
responsibility of state officials with respect to international crimes. 
Paragraph (2) explicitly waives international and national immunity. On 
this point, it can be underlined that immunities accorded to state officials, 
whether under national or international law, shall not bar the court from 
exercising its jurisdiction over such a person. Truly speaking, immunities 
of state officials who are state parties to the ICC Statute are subject to the 
jurisdiction of the ICC and the provision contains an automatic waiver of 




 The prohibitions contained in article 27 against state immunity are complemented by 
those of articles 59 and 89 of the same Rome Statute. Under article 59, a state party which has 
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received a request for provisional arrest or for arrest and surrender shall immediately take steps 
to arrest the person in question in accordance, inter alia, with its laws, and shall deliver him to 
the ICC once he is ordered to be surrendered. By article 89, the ICC may transmit a request for 
the arrest and surrender of an accused person to any state on the territory of which the person 
may be found, and states parties are required to co-operate by complying with the requests. By 
the combined effect of the two latter articles, a state party whose national is indicted by the ICC 
or on whose territory any person so indicted is found is obligated to arrest and surrender him to 
the ICC for prosecution at the ICC‟s request, notwithstanding his rank or political status.  These 
articles clearly constitute a commendable innovation that the ICC Statute has introduced in the 
anti-state-immunity crusade of the international criminal justice system. As discussed in detail in 
the next chapter, however, the value of these and other commendable provisions of the Statute is 
currently affected by some adverse factors, including selective justice and external political and 
allied influences. 
 On the strength of the provisions of its Statute, the ICC has succeeded in indicting and 
commencing the prosecution of high-ranking officials from many states.
195
 For example, in 
Prosecutor v Al Bashir
196
, the ICC indicted Omar Hassan Al-Bashir (the incumbent President of 
Sudan) for war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide, and issued a warrant for his 
arrest. His charges are still pending before the ICC.
197
 Meanwhile, by virtue of the indictment, 
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the ICC asks all states to arrest and extradite Al-Bashir to the Court for trial.
198
 New charges 
have also been leveled against him.
199
  
Also in Prosecutor v Gombo
200
, the ICC indicted and issued an arrest warrant against 
Jean Pierre Bemba Gombo, a former Vice President of the DRC, for crimes against humanity 
and war crimes he committed in the Central African Republic. He was consequently arrested by 
the Belgian authorities on May 24, 2008, and handed over to the ICC. He is currently standing 
trial at the Court for these crimes.  
The situation in Kenya is not different. In Prosecutor v Ruto & Anor
201
, the incumbent 
Kenyan Vice President, William Ruto, was charged with crimes against humanity committed 
during Kenya‟s post-presidential election violence of 2007. His trial is pending. Furthermore, in 
Prosecutor v Kenyatta
202
, the Court, on March 8, 2011, issued summons to Uhuru Kenyatta, 
former Deputy Prime Minister and current President of Kenya, to appear before the Court for 
trial for crimes against humanity leveled against him. Kenyatta has submitted to the Court‟s 
jurisdiction and his trial is scheduled to proceed on 7 October 2014.
203
 
In Prosecutor v Gaddafi & Ors
204
, the Court, inter alia, issued a warrant for the arrest 
and prosecution of the following high-ranking officials of Libya: Muammar Gaddafi (then 
Libyan head of state) and Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi (Libyan de facto Prime Minister). Their charges 
included crimes against humanity allegedly committed against the people of Libya between 15
th
 
and, at least, 28
th
 February, 2011 (during the recent “Arab Spring”) with the use of the Libyan 
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state apparatus and security forces. The case against Muammar Gaddafi was, however, 
terminated on November 22, 2011, following his death.
205
  
On November 23, 2011, the ICC, in Prosecutor v Laurent Gbagbo
206
, issued a warrant of 
arrest against Laurent Gbagbo (former Prime Minister of Cote d‟Ivoire) for four counts of crimes 
against humanity committed in the context of the post-electoral violence in Cote d‟Ivoire 
between December 16, 2010 and April 12, 2011. According to the charges against him, Gbagbo 
bears individual criminal responsibility, as an indirect co-perpetrator, for these crimes. He was 
subsequently transferred to the ICC detention at the Hague by the Ivorian authorities and is now 
standing trial for these crimes.
207
 There are also a couple of similar cases pending before the 
Court against other high-ranking state officials.
208
  
 These cases show that the ICC mechanism‟s position against state immunity applies to 
both former and sitting high-ranking state officials. For example, although Jean Pierre Gombo 
and Laurent Gbagbo were charged as former officials, Muammar Gaddafi, Uhuru Kenyatta, and 
Omar al Bashir, were all sitting heads of state at the time of their respective charges. The charges 
against William Ruto were also brought against him as a sitting Vice President. This position 
leads to a re-visit of the raging controversy, which mainly arose from Al Bashir‟s indictment, as 
to whether article 27 of the Rome Statute actually ends the immunity ratione personae of state 
officials.
209
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 For the following reasons, this thesis argues that the article ends this class of immunity 
before the ICC. First, starting with the Nuremberg Tribunal era, it has been made clear that 
commission of international crimes does not qualify as an official act, and that there is no 
immunity, including ratione personae, before an international criminal tribunal. Second, part of 
the principal essence of the immunity ratione personae of a state official, as expressed in the 
Latin maxim: “par in parem non habet imperium”, is to preserve the dignity of his state by 
ensuring that its incumbent alter ego is not impleaded in the national courts of its equal.
210
 
However, it should be noted that the ICC is not a national court, but an international tribunal 
created to administer global criminal justice. Thus, the issue of preservation of state equality and 
dignity does not apply. Third, international crimes, at least the core ones, shock the whole world. 
Therefore, the exemption of a single culpable state official from accountability by immunity 
ratione personae should not take pre-eminence over the welfare, peace and security of the 
international community as a whole.           
 
4.7 Conclusion 
 The various legal mechanisms adopted by the international community to respond to the 
problems of the application of the state immunity rule in the international criminal justice system 
have produced some positive results. They all denounce state immunity, and have succeeded in 
establishing that immunity should no longer shield a high-ranking state official from legal 
accountability for international crimes. Consequently, many high-ranking state officials, who 
would have, hitherto, escaped justice for their international crimes, have been, and can be 
subjected to the full wrath of international criminal law. For the future of the international 
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criminal justice system, this means that the state immunity rule has lost its strength, and all its 
vestiges will soon be obliterated, at least, before the ICC and the ad hoc/hybrid tribunals, 
although immunity ratione personae still continues before national courts.  
 However, each of these mechanisms has some shortcomings that render it substantially 
ineffective. Again, the efforts on the abolition/disregard of state immunity in the international 
criminal justice system have some general shortcomings that make their objectives difficult to 






WEAKNESSES OF THE MECHANISMS OF LEGAL RESPONSE TO THE PROBLEMS 
OF STATE IMMUNITY IN THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 Each of the mechanisms through which the international community has responded to the 
problems arising from the application of the state immunity rule in the international criminal 
justice system has made a positive impact in the system. In differing ways, each mechanism has 
attempted to ensure the individual criminal accountability of high-ranking state officials by the 
removal of the state immunity rule in its proceedings. The mechanisms have established the 
position that high-ranking state officials cannot hide under the cloak of state immunity to avoid 
international criminal responsibility today. However, these mechanisms also manifest some 
weaknesses, which hamper their effectiveness. The weaknesses include: selective justice; 
amenability to political and allied influences; limited geographical, temporal and substantive 
jurisdictional coverage; and lopsided focus on high-ranking officials of developing states.  These 
weaknesses, which cumulatively undermine the goals of the anti-state-immunity efforts of the 
international criminal justice system, are examined in this chapter.  
 
5.2 Weaknesses of the Ad hoc International Criminal Tribunal Mechanisms 
 As discussed in Chapter Four, the tribunals under this mechanism are: the International 
Military Tribunal (Nuremberg) (the “Nuremberg Tribunal”), the International Military Tribunal 
for the Far East (the “Tokyo Tribunal”), the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia (the “ICTY” or the “Yugoslavia Tribunal”), and the International Criminal Tribunal 





The positions taken against state immunity by the legal regimes of these tribunals have, 
without a doubt, gone a long way in curbing international criminal impunity among high-ranking 
state officials, since they enable the tribunals to try and punish these officials who would have 
otherwise been shielded from personal accountability by the state immunity rule. They have also 
provided justice for victims of international crimes committed by these officials within the 
tribunals‟ respective geographical areas of operation.
1
    
These achievements notwithstanding, the ad hoc international criminal tribunal 
mechanism has some patent and latent shortcomings that substantially undermine its response to 
the problems of state immunity. One of these shortcomings is that only a few states (mainly the 
world powers of each relevant time) have participated in the creation of the tribunals. Thus, the 
tribunals could be said to represent the parochial wishes of these few states at the given time, and 
not the general and democratic intention of the international community of states to bring to 
justice the international crimes of high-ranking state officials. For example, the special tribunal 
proposed to try Emperor Wilhelm II (ex-German Emperor) after World War I (the “Wilhelm 
Tribunal”) was to be set up by the Allied and Associated Powers to try the head of state of the 
leading Axis Power, Germany.  The Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals were set up by the 
victorious Allied Powers after the Second World War.
2
 The Yugoslavia Tribunal was created by 
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the UN Security Council (with the influence of the five permanent members, namely, China, 
France, Russia, UK and US), and is a subsidiary organ of the Council.
3




 As well, the creation of the tribunals was dependent, at all times, on the political 
disposition of the international community (highly influenced by the interests of the world 
powers). Thus, in some cases, the international community deems it necessary to act. In others, it 
is silent. Consequently, the ability of the tribunals to respond to the problems of the state 
immunity rule and punish culpable high-ranking state officials so as to deter future perpetrators, 
is limited to situations where international power politics favour creating such tribunals. 
Therefore, when the international community does not deem it necessary to act, the crimes of 
other officials go unpunished, and their ultimate victims receive no justice.
5
  
Furthermore, these tribunals and their enabling legal instruments are created and adopted, 
respectively, after the situations they are meant to address. The instruments empower the 
tribunals to try and punish crimes committed in the past.
6
 The tribunals apply ex post facto (after-
the-fact/event) laws, and their operation could, consequently, be seen as violating the 
fundamental international human rights law principle of non-retroactivity of penal legislation, 
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i.e., the nullum crimen nulla poena sine lege principle that has become part of the customary 
international law of criminal prosecution.
7
 This principle requires that a person should be tried 
and punished only for a crime that existed at the time of its alleged commission. In other words, 
the events brought before a criminal tribunal must constitute clearly defined crimes established 
in a previous law that precedes the tribunal, and the punishments for such crimes must also be 
stipulated in that preceding law.
8
 A typical instance of this violation relates to the controversy 
surrounding the jurisdiction exercised by the Nuremberg Tribunal over “crimes against 
humanity” committed by the Nazis before the adoption of the Tribunal‟s legal instrument – 
ahead of crimes that was then unknown in international law.
9
 The danger in this practice is that 
the powers establishing these tribunals may indirectly use them to target high-ranking officials of 
some of their enemy states for punishment in respect of acts done in the remote past.  
The allegation of retroactive criminal justice is countered on the ground that the crimes 
the tribunals punish(ed) are/were already existing under customary international law, except that 
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there were no international courts to punish them before the tribunals were created.
10
 For the 
modern ad hoc tribunals, this position is convincing. However, this could not be said with all 
certainty in relation to crimes against humanity for which the Nazi leaders and their Japanese 
allies were stripped of their immunity and tried and punished by the Nuremberg and Tokyo 
Tribunals.
11
          
 Another major weakness of the ad hoc international criminal tribunal mechanism is that 
the tribunals‟ geographical jurisdictions are restricted to specific states or regions of the world. 
Consequently, even the heinous international crimes that they try, if they are committed outside 
the specified states or regions, do not come before them.
12
 They are never meant to dispense 
universal and uniform international criminal justice. Thus, in states or regions outside their 
geographical jurisdictions, high-ranking state officials may continue committing international 
crimes in perpetuum and hiding under the veil of state immunity.  
Similarly, their temporal jurisdictions are limited to given timeframes. For example, the 
Wilhelm Tribunal was intended to try Emperor Wilhelm II for international crimes committed 
during World War I.
13
  The Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals were created to try international 
crimes committed during the period of the Second World War - 1939 to 1945 - and no more.
14
 
The ICTY was set up to prosecute persons most responsible for the serious international crimes 
committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991
15
, i.e., throughout the period of 
                                                             
10 See, ICCPR, supra, note 8, art 15(2); Nsereko, Daniel D Ntanda, “The Evolution of International Criminal and the 
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39 at 43.  
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  See Currie & Rikhof, op cit, note 9; Cassese, Antonio, International Criminal Law, 2
nd
 ed (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2008) at 106. 
12   See, e.g., the ICTY Statute, supra, note 6, art 8, and the ICTR Statute, supra, note 6, art 1. 
13  The Treaty of Versailles, supra, note 6, preamble.  
14  See Nuremberg Charter, supra, note 2, art 1 and Tokyo Charter, supra, note 2, art 1, respectively. 
15  ICTY Statute, supra, note 6, preamble and art 1. See also ICTY, “Mandate and Crimes under ICTY Jurisdiction”, 





the Balkans war. It was required to complete all investigations by the end of 2004, all first 
instance trials by the end of 2008, and all work in 2010
16
, although the timelines were later 
extended.
17
  The ICTR was specifically established to try persons responsible for genocide and 
other heinous international crimes committed in Rwanda, and Rwandan citizens responsible for 
such crimes in neighbouring states, between 1 January 1994 and 31 December 1994.
18
  
Consequently, even during a tribunal‟s lifetime, crimes within the tribunal‟s substantive 
and geographical jurisdictions that are committed by high-ranking state officials outside its 
temporal mandate are no business of the tribunal. With regard to such crimes, the immunity and 
impunity of such officials continue to thrive. All these mean that the tribunals do not possess the 
feature of continuity and permanence. They are invented to attend to certain exigencies within 
given timeframes, and their ad hoc nature renders them fugacious institutions unsuitable for a 
universal and global development of international criminal law.
19
  
 Another weakness of the mechanism is that the substantive jurisdictions of these tribunals 
were dictated by the peculiar historical exigencies and circumstances of each one‟s creation and 
its creators‟ mindsets at the particular point in time. Thus, substantive international crimes tried 
by one tribunal may not be within another‟s jurisdiction. For example, while the Nuremberg and 
Tokyo Tribunals had jurisdiction over crimes against peace
20
 (aggression), the ICTY and ICTR 
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lack such jurisdiction. On the other hand, the ICTY and ICTR could try the crime of genocide
21
, 
which had not been formulated when their Nuremberg and Tokyo counterparts were established.
 Finally, most of the ad hoc tribunals are alleged to administer “victor‟s justice”. In other 
words, they were/are post-conflict institutions set up by the winning parties to conflicts to try and 
punish individuals of the losing parties. The tribunals were/are, therefore, enmeshed in partiality 
and selective justice. As a result, the trial and punishment of high-ranking state officials do not 
involve, or involve insufficiently, the victorious parties, no matter the enormity of their own 
crimes.
22
 For example, the Wilhelm Tribunal was proposed by the Allied and Associated Powers 
specifically to try the German Emperor, the head of the vanquished Axis Powers, who was even 
identified by his personal name in the enabling legal instrument of the proposed tribunal.
23
 No 
provision was made in this instrument for the trial of high-ranking officials of member states of 
the Allied and Associated Powers, who must have also committed their own crimes in the course 
of the war. The Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals were created by the victorious Allied Powers
24
 
after World War II, exclusively and expressly to try and punish individuals (high-ranking 
officials) belonging to the defeated Axis Powers
25
. High-ranking officials of the Allied and 
Associated Powers (who committed terrible crimes during the war) were never brought to 
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 Speaking of the Nuremberg trials, for instance, Burcu Baytemir
27
 highlighted this 
problem as follows: 
… while considering the criticisms of “victor‟s justice”, it was reminded 
that the judges were all nationals of the conquering nations. Moreover, the 
governing law in the Chamber has not been equally applied. The standard 
of guilt has been applied only to the defeated nations. For instance, the 
Russians were not forced to defend their operations in Finland or Poland. 
Like the Russians, the Americans were not required to justify Hiroshima. 
This inequality … is the product of a primitive international order. The 




    
  Allegations also abound that high-ranking officials and soldiers of the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO) member states committed war crimes during the Yugoslavian war 
that resulted in the ICTY‟s creation.
29
 However, none of these NATO officials or soldiers was 
ever charged by the ICTY. Only high-ranking officials of Yugoslavia were stripped of their 
immunity before the Tribunal and tried and punished.
30
 Also, allegations exist to the effect that 
some high-ranking officials of France and the UK were involved in the Rwandan genocide that 
gave rise to the creation of the ICTR.
31
 Yet, none of them has ever been indicted before the 
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ICTR. Again, it is only high-ranking Rwandan officials who have been stripped of their 
immunity by the Tribunal and tried and sentenced to various forms of punishment.
32
 
 Besides, even among culpable officials of the losing parties, there is still selectivity as to 
whom to try and punish. In some instances, a tribunal will only proceed against a party‟s official 
when none of the victorious powers is interested in protecting him. Where any of the powers has 
some political, economic, or allied interests in protecting him or her, he or she would be 
exempted from the tribunal‟s state-immunity-removing regime and from personal accountability 
for his or her alleged international crimes. For example, during World War II, Emperor Hirohito 
of Japan (then Japanese head of state and Supreme Commander) was alleged to have personally 
approved all his country‟s barbaric military ventures.
33
 However, the Allied Powers decided to 
exempt him from trial before the Tokyo Tribunal due to the interests of some members of this 





 captures the scenario of this exemption as follows: 
… The element that has chiefly triggered the ambivalence of historians 
toward the Tokyo war crimes trials is the extent to which the commitment 
to justice was compromised by the double standard of the political and 
strategic considerations of the Allied Powers…. The Chief prosecutor of 
the IMTFE … made the most important decision of the Tokyo trial 
process. That decision – a deliberate and political, rather than judicial one 
– was to exempt Hirohito, the emperor of Japan, from prosecution for war 
crimes even as the country‟s military, the political leadership, and even 
Hirohito‟s royal household faced trial. Britain supported the U.S. position, 
but the Soviet Union insisted on a trial of the emperor. In Tokyo, even far 
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more than at Nuremberg, America was the dominant ally and its position 
naturally prevailed.
36
       
 
 A similar weakness is that some of the tribunals were/are influenced by external political 
manipulation by the creating parties, so that they lack judicial independence.
37
 This is seen in the 
fact that the judges of the earlier tribunals were selected from among nationals of the victorious 
powers and their allies, specifically the Wilhelm, Nuremberg, and Tokyo Tribunals. The 
Wilhelm Tribunal was to be composed of five judges, one appointed by each of the allied and 
associated powers, namely, the US, UK, France, Italy and Japan.
38
 The Nuremberg Tribunal 
consisted of four members (judges), each with an alternate. One member and one alternate was 
appointed by each of the signatories
39
 (allied powers) to the Tribunal‟s legal instrument.
40
  
It is defensible to argue that the appointing powers would only appoint judges who would 
act their script and do the bidding of the appointing Powers. Thus, the independence and 
impartiality of these tribunals was not guaranteed. Worse, the Nuremberg Charter, for example, 
makes the Nuremberg Tribunal unquestionable by providing that “Neither the tribunal, its 
members nor their alternates can be challenged by the prosecution, or by the Defendants or their 
counsel.”
41
 This practice clearly breaches the fair trial rule of natural justice, in particular, the 
principle of “nemo judex in causa sua” (no person can judge a case in which he or she is a party 
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or in which he or she has an interest).
42
 By establishing these Tribunals and appointing their 
nationals as the judges to try those they defeated in conflicts, the appointing states have become 
judges in their own causes. Overall, one could argue that the anti-state-immunity efforts made 
through some of these tribunals, by the victors, were not done in good faith.  
 Like the ad hoc international criminal tribunal mechanism, the universal criminal 
jurisdiction mechanism also has its peculiar weaknesses, which will be examined next.  
 
5.3  Weaknesses of the Universal Criminal Jurisdiction Mechanism 
 There is no gainsaying that the universal criminal jurisdiction mechanism could be the 
best response to the problems of state immunity in the international criminal justice system. This 
is because it offers the advantage of multiple jurisdictional choices for bringing to justice state 
officials who commit international crimes. Ideally, the national courts of most states could 
compete to subject culpable officials to justice: if the judicial system of one state is not ready or 
able to try the officials in question, the courts of other states may be ready and able to do so.
43
 
This is one reason supporters of universal jurisdiction maintain that such jurisdiction is needed 
despite the creation of other international criminal law enforcement mechanisms. These 
supporters see the ad hoc international criminal tribunals created by the UN Security Council and 
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the ICC as able to try only a handful of participants in international crimes owing to the expense 
of their proceedings and their limited territorial, temporal and personal jurisdictions.
44
 
 Opponents of this broad use of universal jurisdiction contend that it has one major 
potential danger. This is the likelihood of its manipulation by states against sitting high-ranking 
officials of enemy states who benefit from immunity ratione personae. They argue that mere 
political rivalry among states can lead to the risk of one state trying to lift the immunity of sitting 
officials of another state by baselessly commencing international criminal proceedings in the 
national courts of the former state.
45
 
 The advantage of multiple jurisdictional choices offered by this mechanism may 
outweigh its shortcoming mentioned in the preceding paragraph. Even so, it has features that 
undermine its effectiveness in confronting the problems of the state immunity rule. First, though 
the legal instruments under which this mechanism is adopted disclose that state immunity should 
not be a barrier to the prosecution and punishment of the crimes they prohibit, this intention is 
not expressly declared in some of the instruments. National courts are thus left with the difficult 
task of inferring these intentions by means of judicial interpretation.
46
 This situation may lead to 
inconsistent practice among national courts. Thus, in circumstances where the courts of one state 
may deny immunity, the courts of another state may still grant immunity. In R v Bow Street 
Stipendiary Magistrates, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte
47
 (No 3) (the “Pinochet case”), for example, 
part of the dissenting opinion of Lord Phillips states as follows: 
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Where states, by convention, agree that their national courts shall have 
jurisdiction on a universal basis in respect of an international crime, such 
agreement cannot implicitly remove immunities ratione personae that exist 
under international law. Such immunities can only be removed by express 
agreement or waiver.
48
 Such an agreement was incorporated in the 
Convention on the Prevention and Suppression of the Crime of Genocide 
1948, which provides: “Persons committing genocide or any of the other 
acts enumerated in article III shall be punished, whether they are 
constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials, or private individuals.” 
Had the Genocide Convention not contained this provision, an issue could 
have been raised as to whether the jurisdiction conferred by the 




 Secondly, although some relevant international legal instruments are intended to confer 
universal jurisdiction and abolish immunity over the international crimes they prohibit, some of 
them contain provisions which undermine the universal jurisdiction mission and render the anti-
immunity efforts of the mechanism less effective. For instance, under article 4 of the UN 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
50
 (“Genocide 
Convention”), “Persons committing genocide … shall be punished, whether they are 
constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials or private individuals”. However, article 6 
provides that “Persons charged with genocide … shall be tried by a competent tribunal of the 
State in the territory of which the act was committed, or by such international penal tribunal as 
may have jurisdiction with respect to those Contracting Parties which shall have accepted its 
jurisdiction.” By article 6, the Genocide Convention fails to even vest universal jurisdiction in 
the courts of all states parties to the Convention. It vests jurisdiction over the crime only in the 
territorial state.  
 The foregoing means that where the alleged offenders are in control of political power in 
the state in which the genocide was committed, they can manipulate the state‟s judicial system 
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against their prosecution. Again, where such an international penal tribunal envisaged by the 
Convention (e.g., the current ICC) is established, a state party to the Genocide Convention in 
whose territory genocide was committed, or whose officials committed it, may not accept the 
Court‟s jurisdiction.
51
 In these two scenarios, the culprits could go scot-free. In the first scenario, 
there is no obligation to “prosecute or extradite” to another state for prosecution under the 
Genocide Convention, and there is no will to prosecute domestically. In the second scenario, the 
state involved may not be bound by the enabling statute of the penal tribunal. Thus, the immunity 
and impunity of the culpable officials will continue to thrive. It may be argued that there is now 
universal jurisdiction over genocide under customary international law.
52
 This would compensate 
for this serious weakness in the Genocide Convention. However, this may not be sufficient 
compensation, given the general political unwillingness of states to employ the universal 
criminal jurisdiction mechanism, even in the face of clear treaty obligations to do so.
53
 
 The factors of lack of express provisions on disregard of state immunity and conferment 
of universal jurisdiction, and self-contradictory provisions, all of which are discussed in the 
preceding paragraphs, played out in Re Sharon & Yaron
54
. In this case, the Belgian Cour de 
Cassation held that article 6 of the Genocide Convention denied Belgian courts universal 
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jurisdiction over the first accused person‟s alleged international crimes. A number of survivors of 
the 1982 massacre in Sabra and Shatila Palestinian refugee camps (Lebanon) had lodged a 
criminal complaint against Ariel Sharon (Israeli Defence Minister at the time of the massacre and 
Prime Minister at the time of the complaint) and Amos Yaron (commander of an Israeli army 
unit at the gates of the refugee camps), accusing them of genocide, crimes against humanity and 
war crimes. In denying jurisdiction and dismissing the case against Sharon, the Cour de 
Cassation held thus: 
International custom does not allow heads of state or government to be 
prosecuted before criminal courts of a foreign state, absent international 
rules binding upon the states concerned. Certainly, Article IV of the 
Convention on Genocide provides that persons who have committed … 
genocide shall be punished without taking into account their official 
status. Nevertheless, Article VI … only envisages prosecution … before a 
competent tribunal of the state in the territory of which the act was 
committed or before the International Criminal Court. It follows … that 
immunity … is excluded before the courts referred to in Article VI, but it 
is not … before a court of a third state that intends to exercise jurisdiction 
not provided for in the treaty.… The 1949 Geneva Conventions and the 
Additional Protocols … do not contain any provision impeding the 




 Thirdly, due to political, economic and allied considerations, the courts of many states 
have not been willing to apply the universal jurisdiction mechanism in order to try and punish 
high-ranking officials of foreign states.
56
 Typical examples are the numerous criminal cases 
commenced in the courts of Germany, France, Argentina, Sweden, and Spain, against Donald 
Rumsfeld (former US Defence Secretary), George Walker Bush (former US President) and other 
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 The charges indicted them for their roles in the torture of detainees 
in the US‟ detention facility in Guantanamo Bay in Cuba, Abu Ghraib Jail in Iraq, Afghanistan 
and in secret “black sites”
58
 operated by the US around the globe.
59
 The US had failed to 
prosecute these officials and so the charges were commenced pursuant to these other states‟ 
universal jurisdiction laws. Many of the charges have, however, been dismissed in response to 




In practice, this mechanism is rarely invoked against high-ranking state officials. It is 
almost exclusively employed to try and punish ordinary individuals and state officials of lower 
rank.
61
 This habit is not unconnected to the desire of states to maintain reciprocal friendly 
relations with each other.
62
 The result is that state immunity, together with its problems, 
continues to operate in the international criminal justice system, despite the existence of the 
universal criminal jurisdiction mechanism. The consequence of this situation for the world was 
captured by Guerreiro who commented: 
  Despite the acceleration in legislative activity that followed the creation 
of the Tribunals at Nuremberg and Tokyo, realpolitik still loomed large 
over the protection of Human Rights, in such a manner that the world 
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witnessed, for the first three decades of the Cold War, individuals acting 
blatantly against mankind without being punished. Among the most 
serious cases, the military interventions in Vietnam and the Gulf and 




 The observations of the International Council on Human Rights Policy (“ICHRP”) 
express the impact of this troubling scenario on the international criminal judicial process itself. 
According to the Council: 
Prosecutions of current leaders should ideally be given a high priority 
because they may actually stop abuses …. However, the prosecution of 
serving heads of state is both legally and politically very difficult…., some 
of the opinions in the House of Lords decision in the Pinochet case include 
very troubling language concerning the absolute immunity of a current 
head of state. Piercing the veil of immunity will undoubtedly be all the 
more difficult in a case involving a sitting head of state. Indeed, the 
Pinochet case illustrates how great a challenge immunity can pose even in 
the case of a leader who has long been out of power. States are likely to be 
all the more reluctant to prosecute (or extradite) a current leader based on 
the possible foreign policy consequences of such action…. If it seems that 
prosecutions are only proceeding against the small fish, then over time the 
sense of unfairness, that big fish are let off the hook, will call into question 




 In essence, state practice makes the universal jurisdiction mechanism an instrument of 
social dichotomy and selective justice. It is a tool used against ordinary individuals and state 
officials of low rank, while high-ranking state officials who order or commit the most heinous 
international crimes are often shielded from its operation. Realpolitik has thus converted this 
laudable mechanism into an instrument of injustice, thereby defeating its anti-state-immunity 
potential.  
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Fourthly, there is lack of uniformity among states as regards national legislative 
implementation of the universal criminal jurisdiction principle. As it is an international law 
principle, universal jurisdiction relies on national laws and instruments for its implementation. 
However, state legislative practices in this regard are inadequate and inconsistent.
65
 Some states 
have enacted statutes with universal jurisdiction, while others have not. Even among states that 
have enacted such statutes, the scope of exercise of the jurisdiction differs. Some core 
international crimes are included in the statutes of some states, while other core crimes are not 
covered.
66
 Length of punishment may also differ. Furthermore, although some states have 
domesticated the international legal instruments prohibiting some international crimes, some of 
the domesticating instruments fail to expressly provide for universal jurisdiction. On this, Dalila 
Hoover observes that though most states accept that it is morally right to exercise universal 
jurisdiction over international crimes, some of these states, citing the examples of China, 
Denmark and Norway, fail to enact appropriate comprehensive legislation for the purpose.
67
 
Their failure arises from politics, national legal incapacity to implement the laws, and failure to 
include the concept of international crimes in their criminal laws.
 68
 
 The sum effect of these inconsistencies is a fragmented situation where the national 
courts of some states hold foreign high-ranking state officials accountable for international 
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crimes pursuant to the universal criminal jurisdiction mechanism, while the courts of other states 
do not.  
A fifth challenging factor in the use of the universal criminal jurisdiction mechanism in 
the fight against state immunity and its problems is found in the negative attitudes of some states. 
Some states remain adamantly committed to the practice of absolute state immunity (mostly a 
civil issue but with some criminal repercussions), subjection of international crimes to domestic 
limitation statutes, and refusal to conclude or implement relevant extradition treaties. Once any 
of these commitments holds sway, universal jurisdiction ceases to be efficacious. Under Chinese 
law, for example, government officials or persons with official capacity are still granted absolute 
immunity from criminal prosecution (including for heinous international crimes).
69
 China‟s 
negative approach is also followed by some other states.
70
    
Under the UN Convention on the Non-applicability of Statutory Limitations to War 
Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity
71
 (“UN Statutory Non-Limitations Convention”) 
international criminal prosecutions for war crimes and crimes against humanity are not affected 
by any limitation statute and, therefore, cannot be time-barred. However, some states observe 
this rule more in the breach than in compliance. Danish national law, for instance, subjects 
prosecution for international crimes to a ten-year limitation period.
72
 Under the French law, war 
crimes are subject to statutory limitation, increased from ten to thirty years in 2010.
73
 The 
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existence of this limitation incapacitates the use of universal jurisdiction to combat immunity and 
the impunity of foreign high-ranking state officials before various national courts. 
Where there is no extradition treaty between two states or where the states refuse to 
respect such a treaty, attempts by one state to exercise universal criminal jurisdiction over high-
ranking state officials within the other state‟s territory will not succeed, although this may not 
affect the possibility of prosecution in other states. Dalila Hoover speaks of this situation as 
follows: 
… although the right to extradite for crimes exists under international law, 
many States fail to have extradition laws. The Pinochet case for instance, 
made clear the extent to which national laws regarding extradition can 
create obstacles and delay the exercise of universal jurisdiction.  In another 
instance, following the amendment of its 1993 law, Belgium retained 
pending cases including that of former President of Chad, Hissène Habré. 
Belgium sought his extradition from Senegal where he was arrested. 
However, the Senegalese court did not grant Belgium‟s request for 
extradition. Instead, the court referred the matter to the African Union 
which decided that the matter fell within its competence and ultimately 
mandated Senegal to prosecute Hissène Habré. These two instances 
illustrate how proceedings to extradite are made more difficult and are 
often left to the discretion of political rather than judicial authorities.
74
    
 
Sixth, it is only immunity ratione materiae (functional immunity) of foreign state 
officials that can be removed before national courts in appropriate cases pursuant to the universal 
criminal jurisdiction mechanism. This is affirmed in the dissenting opinion of Lord Phillips in 
the Pinochet case
75
. On the other hand, immunity ratione personae (personal immunity) remains 
absolute and sacrosanct before a foreign court and cannot be removed or disregarded for as long 
as the culpable official remains in office. In the words of Michael Tunks, “… no nation has yet 
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gone so far as to actually pass judgment against a sitting head of state.”
76
 This is why the 
international criminal charges and/or prosecutions commenced against sitting heads of state, 
heads of government, and foreign ministers, in the following cases were declared inadmissible 
and dismissed on grounds of immunity ratione personae of the accused persons: Re Mugabe
77
, 






, the Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 
April, 2000 (Democratic Republic of Congo v Belgium)
81
 (“ICJ Arrest Warrant Case”), and Re 
Gaddafi
82
.   
 It appears that the only known case where the immunity ratione personae of a sitting 
high-ranking state official (a head of state) has been denied in criminal proceedings before a 
foreign court is the case of US v Noriega
83
. However, the denial of immunity in this case was 
justified on the ground that the US government had never given any recognition to General 
Manuel Noriega as the head of state of Panama. The US merely considered him as the de facto 
ruler of Panama to whom the protection of state immunity did not accrue. The correctness or 
otherwise of the court‟s reasoning in this case with regard to the effect of non-recognition on the 
immunity of an incumbent ruler of a sovereign state is beyond the scope of this thesis. However, 
the danger illustrated in subjecting to a foreign court the issue of whether Noriega was a de facto 
ruler or a de jure head of state may fall within the scope of the thesis. The US court‟s ruling on 
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this point was transparently bogus. The Noriega case illustrates well the other side of the 
argument: use of national courts that presents problems of politics and abuse.     
 The seventh area of concern about this mechanism is its potential to lead to neo-
colonialism due to the fact that it is inherently open to abuse and national manipulation. There is 
reasonable fear on the part of less developed states that a vigorous campaign of universal 
jurisdiction would allow developed states to exercise undue political influence and manipulation 
over the leadership of the less developed ones. This would lead to “jurisdictional imperialism” (a 
form of colonialism), and worsen the current North-South divide in international relations and 
politics.
84
 The ICHRP frames this concern thus: 
The term “jurisdictional imperialism” might be used to describe the 
concern that most universal jurisdiction prosecutions are likely to take 
place in North American and European courts, whereas the majority of 
those prosecuted are likely to come from developing countries. This is a 
real concern given that in recent years – though not before – many of the 
gravest human rights crimes have occurred in developing countries. It is 
also clear that western states are more likely to have the resources and 
legal structures in place to support universal jurisdiction prosecutions. 
This imbalance could discredit a legal process that claims to be truly 
international. Were former colonial powers to take a sudden interest in 
crimes committed in their former colonies, though their own colonial 
record has been exempt from scrutiny, it might appear to be unfair or an 
abuse of power. There is no easy answer to this problem….
85
 
 Recently, Rwanda advanced this argument in protest against the exercise of universal 
jurisdiction by France and Spain, when judges from both states issued warrants of arrest against 
some high-ranking Rwandan officials.
86
 Rwanda described itself as a victim of abuse by the 
universal jurisdiction asserted by French and Spanish judges. On similar grounds, the AU has 
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also resisted the exercise of universal jurisdiction on nationals of AU member states by national 
courts of non-AU member states.
87
 In fact, universal jurisdiction and the ICC are seen as “… the 
new weapons of choice of former colonial powers targeting weaker African nations.”
88
 Paul 
Kagame (current Rwandan President) questions the justice of resort to this mechanism in the 
following terms: 
… lately, some in the more powerful parts of the world have given 
themselves the right to extend their national jurisdiction to indict weaker 
nations. This is total disregard of international justice and order. Where 
does this right come from? Would the reverse apply such that a judgment 




 This situation reveals that national courts may sometimes not be trusted when it comes to 
fair trial of high-ranking officials of other states. The foregoing analysis, therefore, shows that 
contrary to expectations, the universal criminal jurisdiction mechanism, as it is currently 
practised, is not effective enough to respond to the numerous problems arising from the 
application of the state immunity rule in the international criminal justice system. On this note, 
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5.4  Weaknesses of the  Hybrid Criminal Tribunal Mechanism     
The emergence of the hybrid criminal tribunal mechanism in the international criminal 
justice system has certainly contributed in no small measure to curbing some of the problems of 
state immunity. This is seen in the good number of high-ranking state officials that have been 
stripped of their immunity, tried and punished by the relevant hybrid (internationalized) criminal 
tribunals examined in Chapter 4.
90
 Their contribution is summed up thus
91
: 
All the … judicial institutions [hybrid tribunals] … have vigorously 
emphasized the irrelevance of customary immunities and have prosecuted 
many individuals regardless of their official position, thereby further 
confirming that heinous and illegal actions under international law could 
no longer be defended under immunity. Today, international crimes could 
never be official functions and the official position of any accused person, 
whether as Head of State or Government or as a responsible government 
official, shall not relieve such person from criminal responsibility nor 
mitigate punishment. 
 
 Notwithstanding its usefulness in the fight against state immunity and official impunity, 
the mechanism exhibits shortcomings that undermine its effectiveness. Some of these 
shortcomings, associated with some of the tribunals under this mechanism, are the same as those 
of the ad hoc international criminal tribunal mechanism earlier discussed in this Chapter
92
 and, 
therefore, need no further detailed examination. They include: geographical and temporal 
jurisdictional limitations, implementation of ex post facto laws, and undue influence from the 
                                                             
90  See also, e.g., Fox, Hazel, “International Law and Restraints on the Exercise of Jurisdiction by National Courts 
of States”, in Evans, Malcolm D (ed), International Law, 4th ed (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014) 336 at 345-
346; Sriram, Chandra Lekha, “Wrong-Sizing International Justice?: The Hybrid Tribunal in Sierra Leone” (2005) 
29:3 Fordham ILJ 472 at 486-488.  
91  Abegunde, Babalola, “Irrelevance of Immunity for International Crimes Particularly Crimes under International 
Humanitarian Law” (2007) 4:2 JLD 1 at 2. See also Waduge, Shenali, “The Push for a Sierra Leone Type Tribunal 
Against Sri Lanka – OPED”, Eurasia Review, March 27 2014, online: < http://www.eurasiareview.com/27032014-
the-push-for-a-sierra-leone-type-tribunal-against-sri-lanka-oped/>; Costi, Alberto, “Hybrid Tribunals as a valid 
Alternative to International Tribunals for the Prosecution of International Crimes”, Human Rights Research, online: 
<http://www.victoria.ac.nz/law/centres/nzcpl/publications/human-rights-research-journal/publications/vol-3/Costi.p 
df>; Frulli, Micaela, “Head of State Immunity: Lessons from the Taylor Trial”, Academia.edu, online: < http://www. 
academia.edu/6185800/Head_of_State_Immunity_Lessons_from_the_Taylor_Trial>; Serra, Gianluca, “Special 
Tribunal for Lebanon: A Commentary on Its Major Legal Aspects”, Jura Gentium, online: < http://www.juragentium 
.org/topics/wlgo/en/serra.htm>. 





world powers in their creation and administration, which impairs the tribunals‟ impartiality and 
of independence. Some of the tribunals also administer victor‟s justice. This is specifically 
alleged against the IST. While alluding to this situation about this tribunal, Robert Cryer stated:  
The legitimacy of the Tribunal is … considered by some to be 
compromised by the relationship between the Iraqi Governing Coalition 
and the US/UK „Authority‟ in Iraq…. the ghost of victor‟s justice has been 
raised again, as although Ba‟ath crimes are to be prosecuted, the 
jurisdiction of the Special Tribunal is structured so that it is impossible to 




Again, the creation of some of them is dictated by the political whims and caprices of the 
international community. Thus, some of the tribunals have been created where the international 
community is favourably disposed to doing so, while other deserving situations have been 
ignored. An example of such ignored situations relates to the repeated calls to establish a Sierra 
Leone (SCSL) type tribunal in Sri Lanka to try the numerous international crimes allegedly 
committed during the recently concluded Sri Lankan civil war.
94
  
The hybrid criminal tribunal mechanism also manifests some peculiar weaknesses. For 
instance, most hybrid tribunals are institutionalized within the domestic court systems of the 
states concerned (“host states”). These host states mostly provide the infrastructural and other 
facilities needed for their functioning. Again, many of their judges are appointed and paid by the 
host states. Because of these factors, there is sometimes undue interference from the host states 
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in the smooth operation of some of the tribunals.
95
 In some cases, the decision as to which high-
ranking state official to proceed against is influenced by the host state, since “he who pays the 
piper calls the tune”. Indeed, some heads of state and/or government of the host states have 
turned the tribunals into instruments of intimidation and suppression of political opponents. This 
situation impairs the independence and impartiality of the tribunals and their capacity to contend 
against state immunity and impunity in the international criminal justice system. The ECCC 
typifies this situation as follows
96
:  
Despite the fact that the ECCC was established with the intention … to try 
international crimes in accordance with international standards, the result 
… was the opposite; … the ECCC was infected by the shortcomings of the 
Cambodian system. The Cambodian Government controls the proceedings 
and nothing happens in the trial without its … consent. The international 





 The influence of the Cambodian Government is very clear in cases … 
which involve current generals in the Cambodian army. Obviously, 
investigating the allegations against these generals would embarrass the 
Cambodian Government. To avoid such embarrassment, the government 
constantly interferes with the proceedings to the point that the 
investigating judge was forced to resign .… In the Nuon Chea case, the 
government‟s interference is more subtle but nevertheless exists. Every 
time issues are raised relating to the government‟s interference the 
microphones are turned off and the broadcast of the trial breaks. In 
addition, the structure of the court, with a majority of Cambodian judges 
proved to be disadvantageous to the defence; none of the defence requests 
                                                             
95 Allegations of such interference have been leveled against the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia 
(“ECCC”) and the Iraqi Special Tribunal/Iraqi Higher Criminal Court. See, e.g., Global Policy Forum, “The Iraq 
Tribunal”, online: <https://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/163/28693.html>; Bright Knowledge, 
“Famous Cases: The Trial of Saddam Hussein”, online: <http://www.brightknowledge.org/knowledge-bank/law-
and-politics/features-and-resources/famous-cases-the-trial-of-saddam-hussein>; International Center for 
Transnational Justice, “Creation and First Trials of the Supreme Iraqi Criminal Tribunal”, ICTJ Briefing Paper, 
October 2005, at 11, online: <http://www-tc.pbs.org/weta/crossroads/incl/trial_Tribunal.pdf>; Ringer, Brandy, 
“Political Interference and Judicial Misconduct Impede Justice in Cambodia”, The Jurist, 6 December 2011, online: 
<http://jurist.org/hotline/2011/12/nisha-valabhji-cambodian-interference.php>.   
96 Pestman, Michiel et al, “Milestones in International Criminal Justice: Mixed Tribunals and Developed 
International Justice – Beyond the ICC”, Chatham House: International Law Meeting Summary, 16 October 2012 at 
4, also online: < http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/public/Research/International%20Law/16 
1012summary.pdf>. 





during proceedings was ever accepted. The defence case cannot be 
presented effectively, through witnesses and documents: new documents 
cannot be used during cross-examination of witnesses, questions cannot be 
raised during court hearings and everything must be done in writing. As it 
normally takes a few months to receive the Court‟s reply, this is another 
effective way to silence the defence. … it is clear that the proceedings are 
a farce. Prime Minister Hun Sen has publicly stated that Nuon Chea 
committed genocide and that he should be convicted. In the Cambodian 
context this is a very clear instruction to everyone, including the judges. 
This should not be the example that the international community sets for 
proceedings according to international standards. … 
 
 The next mechanism whose weaknesses are examined is the Permanent International 
Criminal Court mechanism.   
 
5.5    Weaknesses of the Permanent International Criminal Court Mechanism
98
 
 The legal regime of the International Criminal Court Mechanism – the Rome Statute
99
 - is 
carefully designed to overcome the numerous weaknesses of the ad hoc international criminal 
tribunal mechanism, the universal criminal jurisdiction mechanism, and the hybrid criminal 
tribunal mechanism. In principle, at least, it disarms some of the criticisms of earlier attempts at 
responding to the problems of the state immunity rule. The International Criminal Court 
mechanism (“ICC mechanism”) is intended to be a global mechanism.
100
 This is seen, inter alia, 
in the high number of ratifications the Rome Statute has received so far.
101
 Thus, in principle, it is 
subject to no geographical jurisdictional limitation (though article 12 of the Rome Statute limits 
its jurisdiction to the territories or nationals of party states, which is currently a practical 
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limitation). Unlike the ad hoc and hybrid criminal tribunal mechanisms, it was not created by, or 
at the behest of the World Powers, but by a conference of sovereign states, big and small, who 
willingly participated in the process.
102
 To avoid the problem of limited temporal jurisdiction (as 
regards future commission of international crimes), the ICC mechanism is a permanent justice 
mechanism with no completion period.
103
  
Furthermore, the problem of ex post facto exercise of temporal jurisdiction is solved 
under this mechanism by the fact that the ICC‟s temporal jurisdiction commences from the date 
of entry into force of its enabling instrument.
104
 The ICC has no jurisdiction over crimes 
committed before this date. The ICC is also not set up to administer victor‟s justice; it is not a 
post-war justice institution created by the victorious party to punish the vanquished. It is created 
as a mechanism to administer uniform, equal, universal, independent, and impartial justice, 
devoid of political and allied manipulations.
105
 Ideally, it is the most suitable mechanism for 
responding to the problems of the state immunity rule in the international criminal justice 
system.     
Although the ICC mechanism appears an attractive tool to use against the state immunity 
rule and its problems, it also has some shortcomings that adversely affect its effectiveness. These 
shortcomings range from selective justice to undue external influence, preservation of bilateral 
immunity agreements between states, limited jurisdictional bases, and jurisdictional politics over 
certain crimes. The shortcomings are examined below. 
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 5.5.1   Selective Justice 
 Currently, the ICC mechanism manifests some forms of selective justice. This selective 
justice is displayed along geographic, nationality and thematic lines.    
 As already shown, the ICC is a court with a global mandate. Besides, in international law, 
all states are equal in sovereignty.
106
 Thus, the high-ranking officials of all states should be equal 
before the ICC mechanism, without discrimination. Consequently, the mechanism‟s attempt at 
disregarding/abolishing state immunity should not focus exclusively on the officials of some 
states, while exempting those of other states. Article 27(1) of the Statute reinforces this position 
thus: “The Statute shall apply equally to all persons without any discrimination …”  
  In practice, however, the mechanism has been highly selective of the nationalities and 
regional identities of the state officials on whom its anti-state-immunity regime focuses. Despite 
the high number of ratifications the Rome Statute has received from states in all geographic 
regions (continents), the Court‟s efforts against state immunity are exclusively focused on 
officials of African states.
107
  
There are three ways (trigger mechanisms) by which a situation may be referred to the 
ICC: voluntary referral by a state party, referral by the UN Security Council (UNSC) of a 
situation in a state that is not a party to the Rome Statute, and the ICC Prosecutor acting proprio 
motu.
108
 Generally, situations referred to the ICC go through three phases: preliminary 
examination, formal investigation, and substantive cases (including indictments, arrest 
warrants/summonses to appear, and trial). After exhausting all the three trigger mechanisms, 
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some high-ranking state officials (including sitting heads of state) have been subjected to the 
substantive case phase. Thus, some have been indicted, others have been arrested and are 
currently undergoing trials, while arrest warrants/summons to appear before the Court to answer 
charges have been issued against yet others.
109
 Some of the situations involving these and some 
other state officials are also undergoing formal investigations.
110
  
However, it is worthy of note that these high-ranking officials who have been denied 
immunity and subjected to investigations, indictments, arrests, and trials are all officials of 
African states.
111
 The situations giving rise to the cases against them arose from the use of all the 
three referral (trigger) mechanisms stated above.
112
 Most of the situations subject to preliminary 
examinations are also situations in African states
113
, and the state officials to be eventually 
investigated and indicted in these situations will also be African state officials. These facts give 
rise to the appearance that the officials of these African states have become sacrificial 
“scapegoats” within the working of the ICC mechanism, while their counterparts in other regions 
are untouchable “sacred cows”. This selective justice practice undermines the mechanism‟s anti-
state-immunity regime. It also undermines the concept of sovereign equality in international law 
                                                             
109 See International Criminal Court, “All Cases”, online: <http://www.icc-cpi/int/en_menus/icc/situationsandcases 
/cases/pages/casesindex.aspx>. 
110  Coalition for the International Criminal Court, “Cases and Situations”, online: <http://www.iccnow.org/?mod= 
casessituations>. 
111  These include Omar Al Bashir (sitting President of Sudan), Muammar Gaddafi (Libyan sitting head of state at 
the time of indictment and issuance of arrest warrant), Uhuru Kenyatta (sitting Kenyan President), Laurent Gbagbo 
(former Ivorian President), William Ruto (sitting Kenyan Vice President), Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo (former Vice 
President, Central African Republic),Abdel Rahim Hussein (current Defence Minister of Sudan), and Saif Al-Islam 
Gaddafi (acting Libyan de facto Prime Minister at the time of indictment and issuance of arrest warrant). See 
International Criminal Court, “All Cases”, op cit, note 109. 
112 These are: four state referrals, two UN Security Council referrals, and two ICC Prosecutor‟s proprio motu 
referrals. See International Criminal Court, “Situations and Cases”, online: < http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/si 
tuations%20and%20cases/pages/situations%20and%20cases.aspx> 







(including the equality of all states‟ high-ranking officials).
114
 It shows that within the ICC 
mechanism, “all animals are equal, but some animals are more equal than others”.
115
 The 
situation raises the question as to whether the anti-state-immunity regime of the ICC mechanism 
is solely meant for African state officials.   
 As noted by Edwin Bikundo, “The contradiction within universality is how a court set up 
by the international community with the potential to cover all states whether members of the 
Rome Statute or not only has African cases even after utilizing all the various means by which it 
may be seized of jurisdiction.”
116
 Bikundo also comments
117
: 
... In an empirical sense, Africans are the only ones currently under active 
investigation and trial at the ICC. … The beings tried are broadly familiar 
as sacrificial scapegoats while those doing the trying are familiar as 
sovereigns. A very specific form of scapegoating is done in international 
criminal law. The accused are supposed to bear the highest responsibility 
for the worst crimes known to humanity. The selection of Africans 
exclusively for this dubious honour, while not random, is definitely 
arbitrary. It is not random because there are real prima facie grounds 
indicating that persons from the region selected are responsible in some 
way for the commission of absolutely heinous acts …. It is arbitrary 
however because out of a total human population in the billions the few 
Africans selected neither have the monopoly on international criminality 
… nor can they be singled out solely as the very worst offenders. 
 
 Since the entry into force of the Rome Statute, there has been commission of crimes 
under the Rome Statute by high-ranking state officials in many other regions. The ICC has not 
deemed it fit to address the crimes in these other regions.
118
 For example, US officials allegedly 
committed/ are committing a series of crimes against humanity against persons held in the US 
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detention facilities in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Similar allegations were made against US 
officials regarding detainees in the Abu Ghraib Jail in Iraq and also in Afghanistan.
119
 The US 
has strangely styled most of these detainees “unlawful combatants”.
120
  These are in addition to 
the many allegations of war crimes that US officials have committed in Iraq, Afghanistan, and in 
some other states.
121
 Although the US is not a party to the Rome Statute, the UNSC has the 
power to refer these situations to the ICC
122
, but has refused to do so. 
 Other notorious instances are the alleged war crimes and genocide committed by both 
sides during the recently-concluded Sri Lankan civil war
123
; alleged war crimes by UK officials 
in Iraq and Afghanistan
124
; Russia‟s alleged “ethnic cleansing” of Georgians in South Ossetia, 
Georgia
125
; the Tibet genocide in northern China alleged to have been committed by some 
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highest-ranking Chinese state officials
126
; and the current Syrian civil war
127
. Yet others are the 
2006 Israel-Lebanon war
128
, the Israel-Palestine continuous armed conflicts
129
; and the ongoing 




 This selective justice along geographic and nationality lines is further exacerbated by 
some powers that the Rome Statute confers on the UNSC in relation to the ICC. Experience has 
shown that due to the high-level politics in the UNSC, the Council would not refer to the ICC a 
situation in any of its permanent member states or their allies. It would only refer situations in 
less developed states in which none of the permanent members has an interest. This position is 
exemplified by the fact that out of all the situations of alleged commission of grave Rome Statute 
crimes by high-ranking state officials in the whole world, the Council has only managed to refer 
the situations in Darfur, Sudan
131
 and in Libya
132
.  
 Furthermore, the power that the Rome Statute vests in the UNSC to defer (suspend) an 
investigation or trial before the ICC
133
 (though not yet used) stands to unduly influence the anti-
state-immunity effort of the ICC mechanism. By this deferral power, the UNSC powerful 
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member states can perpetually frustrate the ICC‟s investigation or trial of any of their officials or 
those of their allies, more so since the deferral is renewable.
134
   
 In addition to geographic and nationality lines, the ICC mechanism also practices 
selective justice along thematic lines. Regulation 33 (titled “Selection of cases within a 
situation”) of the Regulations of the Office of the Prosecutor
135
 gives the ICC‟s Office of the 
Prosecutor a wide discretion to select “the most serious crimes” committed within a situation as 
potential cases before the Court based, inter alia, on “gravity” and “the interests of justice”.
136
 
Neither the Regulations, nor the Rome Statute, define these terms. Pursuant to this discretion, the 
ICC Prosecutor has adopted a “Thematic Approach” to investigation and prosecution of Rome 
Statute crimes. The approach entails selecting or prioritizing a particular theme(s) of crimes for 
investigation and prosecution and disregarding the rest that do not involve the theme(s).
137
 
Applying this approach, the OTP refused to investigate the situations in Iraq, Palestine, and 
Venezuela, respectively.
138
  The implication of this approach for the success of the ICC 
mechanism‟s efforts at abolishing state immunity is that the immunity-induced impunity of high-
ranking state officials, as regards the non-selected crimes, continues. If a culpable officer‟s 
crimes do not fall within the selected theme, he goes free. The major general defect of this 
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approach is that where state officials commit grave Rome Statute crimes that do not fall within 




, one of the 
imperfections of the ICC system is the “„principle of selective justice‟, according [to] which only 
some cases can be prosecuted by the ICC.” According to him: 
 The use of this criterion, as a way of choosing the cases that would be 
pursued by the Court affects, negatively, the mission to uphold 
international law, since some cases receive more attention…. This 
represents what is known as double standard ... This is a rekindling of the 




 Although prioritization of cases to be brought before the ICC may sometimes be 
necessary, a poor and unbalanced approach to this stands to hamper the mechanism‟s efforts to 
abolish state immunity.  
These analyses show that the weakness of selective justice deals a serious blow to the 
ICC mechanism‟s attempt at disregarding/abolishing state immunity. In addition to this is a 
weakness stemming from the preservation of bilateral immunity agreements between states, 
which is examined next.  
 
 5.5.2   Preservation of Bilateral Immunity Agreements  
 The Rome Statute contains some provisions that render the ICC mechanism‟s efforts to 
abolish state immunity counter-productive. One such provision preserves the validity of bilateral 
immunity agreements concluded between states. By article 27(2) of the Statute, it could be 
recalled, “Immunities or special procedural rules which may attach to the official capacity of a 
person, whether under national or international law, shall not bar the Court from exercising its 
jurisdiction over such a person”. The importance of this provision cannot be underestimated, as it 
                                                             
139 See Phooko, op cit, note 107 at 206. 
140 Guerreiro, Alexandre, “From Breisach to Rome: International Court‟s Long Road”, op cit, note 63 at 36. 





eviscerates the cover for criminal impunity which state immunity and its allied jurisdictional 
bars
142
 had hitherto engendered for some state officials.  
 However, the value of this provision is seriously undermined by a parallel provision of 
the Rome Statute. Under article 98:  
1. The Court may not proceed with a request for surrender or assistance 
which would require the requested State to act inconsistently with its 
obligations under international law with respect to the state … 
immunity of a person or property of a third State, unless the Court can 
first obtain the cooperation of that third State for the waiver of the 
immunity. 
2. The Court may not proceed with a request for surrender which would 
require the requested State to act inconsistently with its obligations 
under international agreements pursuant to which the consent of a 
sending State is required to surrender a person of that State to the 
Court, unless the Court can first obtain the cooperation of the sending 
State for the giving of consent for the surrender. 
 States that are not parties to the Rome Statute and/or are unwilling to cooperate with the 
ICC will find the provision a valuable tool for exempting their high-ranking officials from the 
Court‟s reach.
143
 Accordingly, the US has had no hesitation in taking advantage of this provision 
by using its political and economic clout to induce some other states (especially less developed 
states) to conclude Bilateral Immunity Agreements (BIAs) with it. Under any of these BIAs, the 
other state undertakes not to surrender any national of the US to the ICC. The other state shall 
also not refer to the ICC any Rome Statute crime that a US national has committed, whether 
within or without the territory of this other state.
144
 The US has already concluded these 
agreements such BIAs (also known as “Article 98 Agreements”, “Impunity Agreements”, or 
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) with more than one hundred other states to ensure that 
no US official is surrendered to the ICC.
146
 Pursuant to its BIA campaign, the US has also 
enacted the American Servicemembers‟ Protection Act
147
 (“ASPA”). Apart from vetoing any 
collaboration with the ICC, the ASPA abrogates foreign economic and military support for any 
state that refuses to sign a BIA with the US.
148
 Above all, the ASPA authorizes the US President 
to use all means to release any US personnel detained or imprisoned by, on behalf of, or at the 
request of the ICC, and individuals detained or imprisoned for official actions taken on behalf of 
the US.
149
   
 Clearly, the ultimate implication of the insertion of article 98 in the Rome Statute is the 
weakening of the of the ICC mechanism‟s efforts to abolish state immunity and overcome its 
numerous problems.
150
 The outcome is the promotion and legalization of international criminal 
impunity among high-ranking state officials. 
 
 5.5.3   Jurisdictional Politics as to Certain Crimes 
 Another weakness of the ICC mechanism is the significantly high level of politics 
entrenched in the Rome Statute regarding the ICC‟s substantive, temporal, and personal 
jurisdiction over some international crimes. This is mostly felt in the areas of war crimes and the 
crime of aggression. These are examined below.  
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  5.5.3.1 Politics as to War Crimes Jurisdiction 
 The general rule under the Rome Statute is that the moment a state becomes a party to the 
Statute by ratifying it, that state automatically accepts the Court‟s jurisdiction.
151
 Thus, as from 
the date of ratification, the ICC can start exercising jurisdiction over Rome Statute crimes 
committed by the state‟s nationals or on its territory.  
 Unlike genocide and crimes against humanity over which the rule applies without further 
conditions, however, the case of war crimes is different. Article 124 of the Rome Statute gives a 
state the discretion, upon becoming a party to the Statute, to declare that for a period of seven 
years after the entry into force of the Statute for that state, it does not accept the Court‟s 
jurisdiction with respect to war crimes allegedly committed by its nationals or on its territory. 
This is to say that a state can “opt-out” of the ICC‟s jurisdiction over war crimes by its nationals 
or on its territory for a transitional period of seven years from the date of its ratification of the 
Rome Statute. France and Colombia have made such declarations.
152
 
 Technically, it is very difficult to understand the practical importance of the inclusion of 
this article in the Rome Statute, since it is capable of weakening the ICC with respect to certain 
war crimes situations. Upon a critical look, however, it appears that it was inserted to serve some 
political interests
153
, i.e., to exempt from the ICC‟s jurisdiction, at least temporarily, the powerful 
states‟ high-ranking officials and those of their allies who have become more notorious for war 
crimes, although any state party may take advantage of the provision. By this provision, the ICC 
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cannot try officials who are shielded from trial by their deferring states. The intriguing puzzle is 
expressed by William Schabas
154
 who questions:   
… If a State declares that it does not accept the Court‟s jurisdiction over 
war crimes, does this mean that its nationals [officials] cannot be 
prosecuted, even if the crime is committed on the territory of another State 
Party, as would ordinarily be the case? Does article 124 allow the creation 
of a privileged group of nationals [state officials] who are insulated from 
prosecution by the Court for war crimes, wherever they are committed? … 
 
Whatever the motive, the outcome is a weakness of the ICC mechanism whose presence 
and functioning leaves room for immunity to subsist and allows criminal impunity among high-
ranking state officials to persist.   
  
  5.5.3.2   Politics of Jurisdiction as to the Crime of Aggression 
 For all other crimes contained in the Rome Statute, the commencement of the ICC‟s 
jurisdiction was upon entry into force of the Statute.
155
 For the crime of aggression, on the other 
hand, commencement of the Court‟s jurisdiction was postponed indefinitely – pending the 
adoption by a Review Conference of states parties to the Statute of a provision defining the crime 
and stipulating the conditions for exercise of jurisdiction over it.
156
   
 The consequence of this jurisdictional postponement for the ICC mechanism‟s regime 
against state immunity was that pending the adoption of the definition, high-ranking state 
officials perpetrating this crime could not be stripped of their immunity and prosecuted before 
the ICC. This means that, as regards the crime of aggression, the ICC mechanism could not 
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respond to the problems of the state immunity rule. This position undermines the mechanism, 
more so, given the extreme gravity of the crime in international law. Thus, culpable state 
officials would continue to evade legal accountability, and their impunity in relation to this crime 
would flourish, while justice continues to elude their victims.  
 According to some sources, the fundamental reason for this jurisdictional postponement 
over this crime was that, during the negotiation of the Rome Statute, there was no agreement on 
how the crime should be defined.
157
 Upon a critical appraisal, however, it could again be argued 
that this jurisdictional postponement was politically motivated
158
 to shield from the ICC‟s 
jurisdiction high-ranking officials of some states, more especially the powerful. It was not 
necessarily based on non-existence of an acceptable definition, since various international 
instruments
159
contained definitions of the crime of aggression before the negotiation of the Rome 
Statute, although it was possible to have a valid divergence of views.    
 Eventually, a definition of this crime was adopted by a Review Conference in 2010.
160
 
Under this amendment, the jurisdictional politics still continues. The actual commencement of 
the Court‟s jurisdiction over the crime was again postponed to the future.
161
 Even then, discretion 
is given to a state party to accept or refuse the Court‟s jurisdiction when aggression is committed 
by its officials or agents
162
, and the Court cannot try aggression when it is committed by the 
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officials/agents or on the territory of a state non-state party to the Rome Statute.
163
 Above all, the 
Court cannot try aggression unless the UNSC first determines that a situation of aggression 
exists.
164
 This, in reality, is a recognition of the high politics nature of this crime. 
 The ultimate implication of all of this political furor over the crime of aggression, it could 
be argued, is to further weaken the ICC mechanism as to curbing state immunity in this matter. 
The abolition of the state immunity rule over the crime under this mechanism is a mere sham. 
The Court is tactically denied the power to lift the cloak of the immunity of high-ranking state 
officials who commit this crime and to hold them individually accountable for it. Essentially, 
culpable state officials may continue to commit this crime with impunity and their victims may 
hope for but would not find justice. Thus, this is one area where some of the difficulty arises 
from the fact that state responsibility may be the more appropriate (or at least more practical) 
avenue for redress. 
  All these politics go a long way to re-affirm the position that states, especially the 
powerful ones, are tenaciously inclined to allow aggression to retain its original status as a state 
crime that is subject to the regime of state responsibility, as opposed to individual responsibility, 
since the crime is essentially committed against the territorial integrity and political 
independence of a state and not against individuals. However, this inclination could be attacked 
on the ground that, like other international crimes, aggression is a crime against international law 
and is also planned and executed (even if to a lesser degree) by individuals. Thus, the individual 
officials that plan and execute it should not be allowed to hide under the cover of state 
responsibility to avoid personal accountability, when their counterparts who commit other (and 
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even less grave) species of international crimes are stripped of their immunity and held 
personally accountable.    
 
5.6 Overview 
 In addition to the specific shortcomings of each of the response mechanisms earlier 
discussed, some general weaknesses are common to all of them. First, all the mechanisms are 
focused exclusively on what are referred to as the “core international crimes”
165
, including 
genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity (including torture), and the crime of 
aggression.
166
 Thus, other international crimes that do not belong to this category do not come 
under the radar of the anti-state-immunity crusade of the international criminal justice system. 
For example, neither of the ad hoc/hybrid tribunals, nor the ICC, has jurisdiction over the 
international crime of piracy.
167
 Thus, none of these tribunals can lift the immunity of a culpable 
high-ranking state official to be tried for this crime.  
Overall, the commission of international crimes that do not belong to the “core crimes” 
category is likely to continue with impunity by state officials, and their victims will remain 
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Consequences of the Juxtaposition between Transnational and International Crimes”, Opinio Juris, 6 September 






without remedy. It appears that the only possible exception to this practice is the universal 
criminal jurisdiction mechanism where a high-ranking state official could be denied immunity 
and tried for any other crime for which universal jurisdiction is available under customary 
international law, but only if there is political will on the part of the forum state to do so. The 
prioritization may be justified, inter alia, on limited resources and the need not to congest the 
tribunals and the ICC with cases. But the level of injustice that victims stand to suffer for the 
non-inclusion of these other crimes in the jurisdiction of these tribunals and the ICC may 
necessitate a reappraisal of the prioritization.   
The second and most significant weakness is that the efforts of the international criminal 
justice system to disregard/abolish state immunity are generally directed at weaker states. This is 
more visible in the ad hoc international criminal tribunal, the hybrid tribunal, and the 
International Criminal Court mechanisms. Since the latter part of the twentieth century, the only 
ad hoc international criminal tribunals that have been established by the United Nations Security 
Council are the ICTY and ICTR. As earlier noted, the overturning of the immunity of state 
officials under the constitutive instruments of these tribunals has been done in regard to the weak 
break-away states of the former Yugoslavia in Eastern Europe and Rwanda in Africa, 
respectively.
168
 There is no doubt that deserving situations in some weaker states like Syria, 
Yemen and Sri Lanka have not been addressed. However, the fact that only officials of weaker 
states have so far been deprived of their immunity, when there is also strong evidence of 
culpability of their counterparts of the stronger states, goes to show this lopsidedness.  
As for the hybrid tribunals, the Iraqi Special Tribunal/Iraqi Higher Criminal Court was 
created, inter alia, to try and punish high-ranking Iraqi state officials.
169
 The anti-immunity 
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, the Special Court for Sierra Leone
172
, the East Timor Serious Crimes 
Panels
173
, and the Senegalese Extraordinary African Chambers
174
 target Asian and African 
officials, while no such regimes have been created to address similar crimes committed in or by 
officials of the developed states. As already shown, the ICC mechanism, although intended to be 
universal, has so far been implemented exclusively against officials of African states. 
This lopsided practice raises the question whether officials of these less developed states 
have a monopoly over the commission of international crimes. The answer to this question is in 
the negative.
175
 There have always been situations in all parts of the world where high-ranking 
state officials commit grave international crimes.
176
 For instance, apart from the fact that the ICC 
has a potentially global mandate to try these crimes but fails to act, some of the crimes are 
committed by officials of the powerful states within the geographical and temporal jurisdictions 
of some of the existing ad hoc and hybrid tribunals. None of these officials has ever been 
deprived of his immunity and tried before any of the tribunals. Nor has any such tribunal been 
established in any of the powerful states to try the international crimes that may have been 
committed within their territories by their high-ranking officials.  
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5.7   Conclusion        
 Each of the mechanisms of response to the problems arising from the application of the 
state immunity rule in the international criminal justice system contributes to ensuring individual 
criminal accountability for high-ranking state officials. These mechanisms show that all 
individuals, irrespective of political status, are formally equal in the international criminal justice 
system. However, each mechanism has shortcomings that render it substantially ineffective in the 
crusade to remove state immunity as a cover for international crimes.  
The creation of the ad hoc international/ hybrid criminal tribunal mechanisms is highly 
influenced by the interests of the developed states (especially the world powers of the relevant 
times). The geographical and temporal jurisdictions of the tribunals created under these two 
mechanisms are very limited. Their legal regimes lack substantive jurisdictional uniformity, as 
the substantive jurisdiction of each tribunal is dictated by the peculiar historical exigencies and 
circumstances of a given place at a given time. Above all, these mechanisms either administer 
victor‟s justice or have problems with independence and impartiality. The latter defect, for some 
of the hybrid tribunals, partly arises from their being established within the local court systems of 
the respective host states that also fund and staff them. As such, these host states wield undue 
influence over their operations. 
 As to the universal criminal jurisdiction mechanism, it is susceptible to political abuse, 
as some states could employ it against the officials of enemy states. Again, economic/political 
and allied factors, and the desire to maintain friendly international relations, make most states 
reluctant to apply the mechanism against officials of friendly foreign states. Some of the legal 
instruments adopted pursuant to this mechanism do not confer universal jurisdiction and/or 





simultaneously provide for limitations on their enforcement, rendering the abolition a nullity. 
Also, state practice as regards national legislative enforcement of this mechanism is inconsistent. 
While some states have statutes conferring on their national courts universal jurisdiction over 
international crimes, others do not. Some states still adhere to the absolute immunity rule in 
international criminal proceedings before their national courts, while others subject international 
crimes to their municipal statutes of limitation.  The need for extradition treaties between states 
also hampers the effectiveness of the mechanism. Above all, the anti-state-immunity regime of 
this mechanism is restricted to immunity ratione materiae (functional immunity), but allows 
immunity ratione personae (personal immunity). Thus sitting high-ranking state officials cannot 
lose their immunity under this mechanism.   
One major weakness of the ICC mechanism is selective justice. It has, so far, 
geographically concentrated on Africa to the exclusion of deserving situations in other regions of 
the world. The selective justice is also seen in the nationalities of state officials whom the 
mechanism is, in practice, inclined to proceed against. Officials of the developed states and their 
close allies do not come onto the ICC‟s radar, despite the gravity of their crimes (although 
culpable officials of a few developing states, like Yemen and Sri Lanka, have also ignored). The 
mechanism is also selective as to the heads of crimes it addresses. The ICC‟s OTP has an unduly 
wide discretion to pick and chose the situations and categories of Rome Statute crimes over 
which the ICC will exercise jurisdiction. Furthermore, the UN Security Council unduly 
influences this mechanism. This is done by its permanent member states‟ self-interested exercise 
of the powers the Council has under the Rome Statute to refer situations to the ICC. Also, the 
Council‟s power to defer investigations or trials by the ICC, although not yet exercised, is 





shield their officials and those of their allies from the ICC, and could likely abuse the latter 
power the same way.  
In addition, the mechanism‟s provision for bilateral immunity agreements (BIAs) 
concluded between states essentially stands to defeat its efforts to abolish state immunity. In fact, 
the US takes advantage of these BIAs to shield its officials from the ICC‟s jurisdiction. 
Furthermore, although all the Rome Statute crimes are also customary international crimes 
susceptible to universal jurisdiction, the ICC has no universal jurisdiction over them. Thus, 
where they are committed within the territory, or by the officials of, a non-state party to the 
Rome Statute, the ICC ordinarily lacks jurisdiction to try them. States parties to the Rome Statute 
have some discretion to defer the ICC‟s jurisdiction over war crimes and the crime of aggression 
committed on their territories, or by their officials. Moreover, a state party has the discretion to 
reject the ICC‟s jurisdiction over aggression committed by its officials.    
    Finally, besides these peculiar weaknesses, all the mechanisms have two major 
common shortcomings. The first is that almost all these mechanisms‟ efforts against state 
immunity are  restricted to the “core international crimes” (genocide, war crimes, crimes against 
humanity, and the crime of aggression). While this may be a necessity in view of limited 
resources and the need for non-saturation of the relevant tribunals and courts with cases, the 
disadvantage is that other species of international crimes committed by state officials may be left 
unaddressed and their victims denied justice. The second is that this crusade is lopsided against 
high-ranking officials of the weaker states and in favour of those of the powerful states. 
The overall implication of all these weaknesses of the mechanisms is that the whole legal 





international criminal justice system remains weak. Consequently, the problems sought to be 













                                                  CONCLUSION 
6.1 Introduction 
 This thesis has examined the problems arising from the application of the state immunity 
rule in the international criminal justice system and the achievements and weaknesses of the 
legal mechanisms adopted by the international community to respond to these problems. This 




 State Immunity Rule: 
1) The state immunity rule evolved to guarantee the sovereign equality of all states, big 
and small, mighty and weak, by ensuring that no one state or its high-ranking officials are 
unnecessarily brought into litigation in the courts of another state. This rule is also meant to 
ensure that the smooth governance of states is not hampered or distracted by judicial 
proceedings, civil and criminal, against their high-ranking officials before foreign courts.  
2) Application of the state immunity rule in the international criminal justice system leads 
to many problems which contradict the rationales for the rule and undermines the individual 
accountability and administration of justice missions of the international criminal justice system. 
One of these problems is that the protection accorded by the rule induces among some high-
ranking state officials a culture of impunity as regards violation of peremptory international legal 
norms. This impunity is manifest in the officials‟ habit of systematic commission of heinous 
international crimes, such as genocide, torture, aggression, war crimes, and crimes against 





independence by means of senseless wars and other acts of aggression, which erodes the 
sovereign equality rationale behind the rule. Other problems arising from the application of the 
rule include perpetuation of injustice against victims of international crimes committed by high-
ranking state officials, creation of social inequality between state officials and ordinary 
individuals as regards legal accountability for international crimes, political self-perpetuation, 
and bad governance.  
Due to the foregoing problems, the state immunity rule has become unpopular in the 
international criminal justice system. Some high-ranking state officials have converted it into a 
means by which they avoid individual accountability for their international crimes, in which 
cases the international criminal justice system is effective only against individuals not protected 
by this immunity. The application of this rule, therefore, defeats its object and purpose, weakens 
the international criminal justice system, and undermines public confidence in its ability to 
dispense justice. 
 Mechanisms of Legal Response:  
3) In response to these problems, the international community, among other reasons, has 
created various legal mechanisms to abolish or avoid the application of the immunity rule in the 
international criminal justice system. These mechanisms are the old ad hoc international criminal 
tribunal, the use of universal criminal jurisdiction, the modern ad hoc international criminal 
tribunal, the hybrid/internationalized criminal tribunal, and the permanent international criminal 
court.  
Under the two ad hoc international criminal tribunal mechanisms (old and modern), the 





commit stipulated international crimes within  given states/regions during specific time frames.
1
 
The practice under the universal criminal jurisdiction mechanism is that customary international 
law confers on all states jurisdiction to try perpetrators of certain international crimes in their 
national courts, despite their official status, nationalities, place of commission of the crimes, or 
absence of other jurisdictional connections. This jurisdiction is conferred and exercised on the 
ground that the prohibitions of these crimes (e.g., genocide, war crimes, crimes against 
humanity, aggression, and torture) have attained the status of jus cogens or peremptory norms.
 2
 
Due to this status, perpetrators of the crimes are deemed hostis humani generis (enemies of all 
humankind), since the crimes shock the conscience of humanity and affect the international 
community as a whole. Consequently, every state has a powerful duty erga omnes (owed to the 
whole world), if not necessarily a hard legal obligation in every case, to bring the perpetrators to 
justice. This customary international law practice is complemented by treaties concluded by 
states on some specific crimes, which impose on the states parties an obligation aut judicare aut 
dedere – to prosecute or extradite the offender to another state party which is willing to prosecute 
him or her.  
Under the hybrid/internationalized criminal tribunal mechanism, some judicial tribunals 
are created in some states, often by or at the behest of the international community via the UN, 
and empowered to try individuals for both domestic and international crimes committed within 
the territories of the given states at particular points in time.
3
 The permanent international 
criminal court mechanism is represented by the current ICC established to administer a 
globalized international criminal justice on a non-temporary basis.  One common denominator of 
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the international-level mechanisms is that immunity is not a bar to the prosecution and 
punishment of any individual for an international crime before an international criminal tribunal 
or a competent national court. While immunity does still operate before the courts of states 
utilizing universal jurisdiction, its application has dwindled as regards international crimes, 
particularly immunity ratione materiae. 
4) Pursuant to the anti-state-immunity regimes of these mechanisms, some high-ranking 
state officials, who would have otherwise been shielded from trials and punishments for 
international crimes before foreign courts, are today tried and punished for these crimes. 
Consequently, the state immunity rule has lost its strength in the international criminal justice 
system. 
These mechanisms are commendable, as they ensure equality of all persons, high-ranking 
state officials and ordinary individuals alike, in international criminal law. They make state 
officials to understand that they can be subjected to the full weight of international criminal law 
despite their official positions, and that official status should not be a license to commit 
international crimes. The mechanisms reduce the impunity with which these officials commit 
these crimes. They also afford some justice to victims of the crimes who would have otherwise 
been denied such justice. On the whole, the mechanisms seek to strengthen the international 
criminal justice system and induce public confidence in it. 
Weaknesses in the Response Mechanisms: 
5) Despite the usefulness of these mechanisms, each has some shortcomings that 
undermine its effectiveness in combating the problems associated with the application of the 





may still go free from legal accountability, and their victims still suffer injustice. On the whole, 
the shortcomings weaken the anti-state-immunity efforts. The major shortcomings are as follows:  
First, Many of the tribunals under the ad hoc international criminal tribunal mechanism 
and some of those under the hybrid criminal tribunal mechanism were created by a few states – 
always powerful states, and sometimes states which had emerged as wartime victors. The anti-
state-immunity provisions of the legal instruments of these tribunals were made by the world 
powers of the relevant periods in world history, while most other states had no input, which 
weakens their legitimacy.  
Second, although the ad hoc international and hybrid criminal tribunals served some good 
purpose in the absence of a universal criminal court, the geographical and temporal jurisdictions 
of each tribunal operating under the ad hoc international criminal tribunal and the hybrid 
criminal tribunal mechanisms are very limited. In fact, as regards temporal jurisdiction, each 
tribunal is a temporary judicial institution and has a completion period beyond which it will not 
continue to operate. Thus, all international crimes within the tribunal‟s substantive jurisdiction 
that are committed outside the stated geographical and/or temporal coverage cannot be tried by 
the tribunal. Therefore, the immunity of a high-ranking state official who commits these crimes 
remains unaffected. Furthermore, the tribunals‟ creation is dependent on the political disposition 
of the international community at a given time, again highly influenced by the self interest of the 
world powers. Thus, such tribunals were created in some situations, but not in other deserving 
situations. Consequently, the immunity of state officials who commit grave international crimes, 
at times and in places regarding which the international community is not favourably disposed to 





Third, some of these tribunals administer “victor‟s justice”. They are judicial institutions 
created after conflict situations by the victorious parties to try and punish officials of the 
vanquished parties. Culpable officials of the victorious parties are hardly subjected to trials 
before them. In addition, the victorious powers appoint their loyalists as judges of some of the 
tribunals to try their enemies. All these taint the anti-state immunity regimes of some of the 
tribunals established under these two mechanisms with selective justice, partiality, and lack of 
independence from external influences. These make the regimes look more like a vendetta 
mission. 
Fourth, with particular regard to the hybrid criminal tribunal mechanism, the fact that 
most of the tribunals are located within the domestic judicial structure of the state concerned, and 
are funded by the same state, has in some situations subjected the tribunals to undue external 
influence from the host state, including using them against their political opponents When there 
is need to disregard the immunity of a high-ranking official of the incumbent government and try 
him before the tribunal, the influence of the government in power may stifle the attempt.  
Fifth, under the universal criminal jurisdiction mechanism, some relevant treaties do not 
expressly abolish immunity. Some states also fail to expressly vest in national courts the 
universal jurisdiction which either the treaties or the customary norms are intended to confer. 
Consequently, national courts are left with the difficult task of inferring the intentions of states 
parties when interpreting the treaties as regards their anti-state-immunity positions. This situation 
leads to inconsistency in judicial interpretations in that, while the courts of one state may be 
prepared to disregard immunity in a given circumstance, the courts of another state may not be 
so prepared. Moreover, political and diplomatic considerations make national courts of states 





the mechanism is sometimes employed only against ordinary individuals and low-ranking 
officials who are not entitled to state immunity protection, at least ratione personae in the case of 
the later. Similarly, inconsistent legislative practice among states also bedevils the effectiveness 
of this. Some states have statutes conferring on their national courts universal jurisdiction over 
international crimes, while others do not. Among states that have enacted such statutes, the 
categories of international crimes covered and the scopes of punishment differ. Some states also 
subject international crimes to their municipal limitation statutes. As well, absence of an 
extradition treaty between two states could stultify the effectiveness of the mechanism, even 
when the two states are parties to a treaty providing for or intending universal jurisdiction. This 
is because some universal criminal jurisdiction treaties have no provisions on extradition.  
Sixth, the anti-state-immunity regime of the universal criminal jurisdiction mechanism is 
restricted to immunity ratione materiae (functional immunity). Immunity ratione personae 
(personal immunity) survives intact under this mechanism. Thus, where a high-ranking official 
entitled to immunity ratione personae and a low-ranking official that has only immunity ratione 
materiae jointly commit an international crime, the later could be deprived of immunity and 
punished, while the former may continue to be free forever. 
Seventh, this mechanism is prone to abuse by states. While there is fear that the 
developed states could turn it into an instrument of neo-colonialism and use it to exercise some 
political influence and manipulation over the leadership of the less developed ones, there is also 
the fear that developing states could turn it into a machinery for retaliation against the developed 
states. Thus, the use of this mechanism is not likely to guarantee fair trial of other states‟ 





Eight, the ICC mechanism has, thus far, suffered from practising selective justice.  After 
utilizing all the three referral (trigger) mechanisms available to the Court, all the high-ranking 
state officials so far denied immunity under the ICC mechanism are those of African states, 
despite deserving situations in some other regions. Nor is it willing (in some cases) or 
jurisdictionally able (in most others) to operate against high-ranking officials of the powerful 
states and their allies who have allegedly committed grave crimes. It is also selective in regard to 
the situations and heads of crimes it handles. This approach undermines the credibility of the 
mechanism, especially in the eyes of African states. 
 The ICC mechanism is unduly influenced by the UN Security Council and its permanent 
members. This is most visible in the Council‟s powers under the Rome Statute
4
 to refer to the 
ICC situations in states not parties to the Statute. The Council can also defer (suspend) 
investigations or trials before the ICC
5
, although it has not yet exercised this power. In fact, the 
Council and its permanent members have used the referral power to protect their interests and 
those of their allies, and to act against weaker states in which they have no interests. Thus far, the 
Council has only exercised the referral powers against high-ranking officials of Sudan and Libya.  
 Another weakness bedeviling the ICC mechanism is its preservation of bilateral 
immunity agreements (BIAs) between states. On the one hand, the Rome Statute abolishes the 
immunity of state officials regarding crimes falling under ICC jurisdiction.
6
 On the other hand, it 
recognizes the validity of BIAs.
7
 A BIA bars a state party to it from surrendering to the ICC for 
prosecution or investigation a national of the other state party, and from co-operating with the 
ICC as regards such prosecution or investigation. The US, has been using BIAs extensively to 
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exempt their high-ranking officials, and in fact all its nationals and foreign contractors working 
for it, from the ICC mechanism and to frustrate the mechanism‟s anti-state-immunity efforts. 
The ICC mechanism is also weakened by limited jurisdictional bases. Out of the five 
recognized bases of criminal jurisdiction in international law (i.e., the territorial, nationality, 
protective, passive personality, and universal bases), the Court‟s jurisdiction is essentially 
restricted to two (the territoriality and nationality bases).
8
 In particular, the ICC, a notionally 
universal court that is created to try crimes susceptible to universal jurisdiction (genocide, war 
crimes, crimes against humanity, and aggression), does not itself have universal jurisdiction over 
these crimes. The Court can only proceed against a high-ranking state official if such an official 
is a national of a state party to the Rome Statute or if his or her alleged crimes are committed 
within the territory of a state party to the Statute.
9
 Thus, where the crimes are committed by state 
officials who are not nationals of a state party and/or the crimes in the territory of a non-state-
party, the ICC cannot lift the officials‟ immunity and try and punish them, unless the UN 
Security Council rarely decides to refer the situation to the Court. 
Another factor that undermines the ICC mechanism‟s capacity to effectively combat the 
problems of state immunity is jurisdictional politics over certain crimes. First, on becoming a 
party to the Rome Statute, a state still retains the discretion to defer the Court‟s jurisdiction for 
seven years with respect to war crimes allegedly committed by its nationals or on its territory.
10
 
Although this has not been a major problem because most states parties have not taken advantage 
of it, its retention in the Rome Statute poses a potential problem. Second, there is some 
controversy concerning the ICC‟s jurisdiction over the crime of aggression. Although a Review 
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Conference on the Rome Statute has eventually defined aggression
11
, a state party could reject 
the ICC‟s jurisdiction over aggression that its officials have committed.
12
 Also, the ICC lacks 
jurisdiction over aggression committed by nationals or on the territory of a non-state party.
13
 
Above all, even where a state party has accepted the ICC‟s jurisdiction over aggression, the 
Court‟s exercise of it is still at the mercies of the UN Security Council. The ICC Prosecutor may 
not proceed with an investigation in respect of a crime of aggression committed by a state party‟s 
high-ranking officials, unless the Security Council has first made a determination of an act of 
aggression so committed by that states‟ officials.
14
  
The implications of these jurisdictional politics for the mechanism‟s anti-state-immunity 
regime are twofold. First, where a state party defers or rejects ICC‟s jurisdiction over war crimes 
or aggression, as the case may be, committed by its officials or by the officials of another state 
within the former state‟s territory, the ICC cannot disregard the immunity of these officials and 
hold them accountable. Second, where the Security Council, in the case of aggression, is 
politically motivated to refuse to make a determination that the officials of a state have 
committed aggression, the ICC cannot disregard the immunity of the officials and try them, even 
when there is clear and irresistible evidence of their culpability. 
Finally, besides these lapses of the respective mechanisms, the efforts of the international 
criminal justice system to combat the problems of the state immunity rule have two major 
general weaknesses. The first (especially as regards the ad hoc international/ hybrid tribunal and 
ICC mechanisms) is that it is restricted to the “core international crimes”, i.e., genocide, war 
crimes, crimes against humanity, and the crime of aggression. Other international crimes that fall 
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outside this category, such as aggression and slavery, are not covered, and the immunity of state 
officials in respect of the latter crimes may, therefore, continue. The second is that the efforts are 
lopsided against developing states and in favour of developed ones. So far, it is only high-
ranking officials of developing states that have lost their immunity and been tried and punished 
under the various response mechanisms (although there are culpable officials of some developing 
states that have not been proceeded against). 
 The need to correct the foregoing weaknesses of the various response mechanisms and 
better overcome the various problems arising from the application of the state immunity rule in 
the international criminal justice system, therefore, gives rise to the suggestions made in this 
thesis. These are reviewed below.  
 
6.3 Suggestions 
 In view of the foregoing findings, the following suggestions are made with a view to 
strengthening the anti-state-immunity crusade of the international criminal justice system: 
1) All international treaties that confer universal international criminal jurisdiction on the 
national courts of states but which fail to expressly abolish the state immunity rule as a 
jurisdictional bar should be amended to abolish this rule. By so doing, the difficulties and 
inconsistencies of judicial interpretation before national courts as to the anti-immunity position 
of these treaties will be avoided. This will help to make the anti-state immunity position of the 
universal criminal jurisdiction mechanism consistent, certain and predictable, although some 
overzealous national courts may still try to abuse it. 
2) States should clearly and unambiguously implement the extradite-or-prosecute 





parties should hold them accountable if they do not. Moreover, if the universal jurisdiction in 
question is customary, then states should make sure it is present in their laws. Although the latter 
suggestion may be harder because customary universal jurisdiction is permissive and not 
mandatory, states, in the interest of a better and improved international criminal justice system, 
are urged to implement same.  Again, this will help to obviate the interpretational difficulties and 
inconsistencies which national courts encounter and display when trying to infer the intentions of 
states parties to relevant treaties and state practice in customary international law as regards 
universal jurisdiction. Again, states should be encouraged not to subject international crimes to 
their municipal statutes of limitation. If these suggestions and that in (1) above are implemented, 
the anti-state-immunity crusade via the universal criminal jurisdiction mechanism will be 
strengthened. 
3) Given the fact that there is universal jurisdiction over the crime of genocide under 
customary international law, an effort should be made to amend the Genocide Convention
15
 so as 
to provide an obligatory universal jurisdiction. This will be more necessary in order to bring the 
Convention in line with other criminal suppression treaties. By so doing, the anti-immunity 
provision
16
 of the Convention will become more meaningful and result-oriented.  
4) National criminal prosecution authorities should eschew political, economic, and allied 
considerations in their decisions as to prosecution of foreign high-ranking state officials before 
their national courts for international crimes. There is no doubt that the desire by states to 
maintain friendly international relations will make constitute a challenge in this regard. However, 
due to the fact that systematic commission of international crimes by high-ranking state officials 
has the effect of destabilizing international peace and security and adversely affects the socio-
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economic and allied well-being of many states, including the forum state, states should increase 
their willingness to prosecute. To this end, it is further suggested that an international conference 
on the use of the universal criminal jurisdiction mechanism should be organized, perhaps by the 
UN, to sensitize states to the numerous advantages of this mechanism in the international 
criminal justice delivery system and to encourage them to intensify their application of it. In 
order, however, to allay the fears of abuse of the mechanism by some states, the conference 
should establish a committee that will ensure fairness in the application of the mechanism by 
states. Interestingly, a similar was recently convened between the African Union (AU) and the 
European Union (EU).
17
 In view of the global importance of the universal jurisdiction issue, it is 
strongly suggested that the UN should emulate this AU-EU example.  
5) In the light of the numerous weaknesses of the ad hoc international criminal tribunal 
mechanism and the hybrid criminal tribunal mechanism, it is suggested that the two mechanisms 
be scrapped. In their place, there should be uniformly and concurrently established by the UN, in 




 international organizations, permanent 
regional and sub-regional international criminal tribunal mechanisms. This will be similar to the 
practice in the international human rights system where there are permanent global international 
                                                             
17  Here, the 10th and 11th meetings of the AU-EU Ministerial Troika held in 2009 addressed the issue of universal 
jurisdiction in the context of the relationship between the AU and the EU. The meeting discussed and underlined the 
necessity to fight impunity in the framework of international law to ensure that individuals who commit grave 
offences such as war crimes and crimes against humanity are brought to justice. The African side stated that there 
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18  E.g., the Council of Europe, the African Union (AU), and the Organization of American States (OAS). 
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East Asian Nations, the South African Development Community, the Andean Community, and the Commonwealth 





human rights protection and enforcement institutions
20





 levels of international co-operation. In this regard, the effort by the 
AU to establish a standing African criminal court may be relevant. It should be noted that out of 
disenchantment with the ICC mechanism‟s exclusive focus on African leaders, in particular, and 
Africans, in general, the AU has resolved to create a criminal chamber within the upcoming 
African Court of Justice and Human Rights by vesting this court with jurisdiction over 
international crimes committed by Africans or in Africa.
23
 However, the good faith or bad faith 
of this step by the AU is yet to be clearly determined. In the light of the controversy, it is 
suggested that the UN itself should be in charge of the creation of such permanent regional and 
sub-regional international criminal tribunals.   
The advantages of the suggested permanent regional and sub-regional international 
criminal tribunal mechanisms are multifarious. First, the allegation that the ad hoc international  
and mechanism, for example, was created by a few powerful states when other states had no 
input, will be overcome, since the new mechanisms will be created with the participation of most 
states and will better represent the intent of the wider international community. Second, their 
geographical jurisdictions will be much wider, their temporal jurisdictions non-temporary, and 
their substantive jurisdictions (if they are created concurrently) uniform and consistent. Third, 
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the tribunals under these mechanisms will be only empowered to try crimes committed after the 
adoption of their enabling legal instruments and, thus, avoid the weakness of administration of ex 
post facto laws associated with the current ad hoc and hybrid tribunal mechanisms. Fourth, there 
will be no administration of victor‟s justice, nor an undue focus on weaker and developing states, 
since the new mechanisms will be permanent and empowered to try crimes committed in both 
peacetime and armed conflict situations by officials of all states and will operate in all regions 
and sub-regions. Finally, they will experience much less undue external influence which now 
bedevils the ad hoc international and hybrid tribunal mechanisms. 
6) The selective justice practice of the ICC mechanism should be discontinued. The ICC 
should extend its anti-immunity efforts to all alleged Rome Statute crimes that are committed by 
high-ranking officials of all states, developed and less developed, in all regions of the world, and 
in all deserving situations. Thus, the current concentration on African officials and situations 
must end. In the operation of the mechanism, there should be neither untouchable “sacred cows” 
nor exemplary “scapegoats”. Furthermore, the OTP‟s thematic approach, whereby priority of 
investigation and prosecution is given to some heads of Rome Statute crimes as opposed to 
others, should be abolished. All international crimes within the Rome Statute‟s purview are very 
grave. The injustice meted out to victims of the neglected crimes is also devastating, and the non-
subjection to justice of the culpable state officials aggravates their impunity and sends the wrong 
signal to society. 
7) The undue external influence which the UN Security Council and its permanent 
members wield over the ICC mechanism should be abolished. This should be done in three ways. 
First, the provision of the Rome Statute
24
 which empowers the Council to refer situations to the 
ICC should be repealed, since the Council‟s permanent members are highly selective about the 
                                                             





states whose situations they refer to the Court. No doubt, the repeal of this provision will imply 
that the ICC will no more have any jurisdiction over heinous international crimes committed in 
the territories of non-member states of the Rome Statute when such crimes threaten international 
peace and security. However, this imminent lacuna can be easily filled by further amending the 
Rome Statute and expanding its jurisdiction by conferring on the Court universal jurisdiction 
over all Rome Statute crimes. This change is readily supported by the fact that all the crimes 
within the ICC‟s jurisdiction are already customary international law crimes that are susceptible 
to universal jurisdiction.
25
 There is also no doubt that this conferment of universal jurisdiction 
will raise, on a rather massive scale, the feared problem of imposing a treaty on non-party states. 
Again, this fear is somewhat misconceived. Article 38 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties
26
 clearly provides that although a treaty does not bind a third state without its consent, 
“Nothing … precludes a rule set forth in a treaty from becoming binding upon a third State as a 
customary rule of international law, recognized as such.”
27
 
Secondly, the provision of the Rome Statute that empowers the Council to defer 
(suspend) investigations or trials by the ICC
28
 should also be repealed. This provision seriously 
undermines the mechanism‟s independence in its fight against the problems of state immunity. 
 Thirdly, the new provision introduced into the Rome Statute by the Kampala Accord
29
 
(“Kampala Amendment”) whereby the decision of the ICC Prosecutor to proceed with an 
investigation of a situation of alleged aggression depends on a prior determination by the Council 
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Res 95(1), 1946 (of 11 December, 1946); UN General Assembly Resolution on the Crime of Genocide, GA Res 
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26  1969, 1155 UNTS 331. 
27  Emphasis supplied. 
28  Rome Statute, supra, note 4, art 16. 





of the existence of a situation of aggression should also be abolished. This provision leaves the 
ICC mechanism at the mercies of the Council when it is alleged that aggression has occurred. 
8) The provision of the Rome Statute which preserves the validity of BIAs concluded 
between states
30
 should be repealed outright. This provision obviously undermines the whole 
anti-state-immunity regime of the ICC mechanism, and the US has turned it into an instrument 
for the promotion of impunity among its high-ranking officials.
31
 If the anti-state-immunity 
mission of this mechanism is to be realized, the immunity rule should be abolished without 
exception. 
9) Also the temporal jurisdictional politics over war crimes and the crimes of aggression 
under the ICC mechanism should be eradicated. The discretion given to a state, upon becoming a 
party to the Rome Statute, to defer the commencement of the ICC‟s jurisdiction for seven years 
with respect to war crimes allegedly committed by its nationals or on its territory
32
 should be 
abolished outright. In fact, the ICC‟s jurisdiction over war crimes committed within the territory 
or by the officials of any state should commence from the date of entry into force of the Rome 
Statute.
33
 A similar discretion regarding the crime of aggression
34
 should also be eradicated. 
These discretions only increase the impunity of high-ranking state officials in respect of these 
crimes.   
10) More generally, the current practice of restricting the anti-state-immunity disposition 
to the “core international crimes”, i.e., genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and the 
crime of aggression, should be discontinued. The crusade should extend to all other species of 
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international crimes, such as piracy and slave trade
35
. By doing this, the impunity of state 
officials regarding these presently uncovered crimes may reduce. 
11) Finally, the present lopsided nature of efforts to disregard/abolish state immunity in 
the international criminal justice system whereby only officials of less developed states are 
stripped of their immunity and tried and punished should be changed. All existing response 
mechanisms should extend their anti-immunity efforts to high-ranking officials of all states, 
strong or weak, who commit international crimes.  This would supplement the suggestion in (5) 
above as to the establishment of permanent and jurisdictionally harmonized international 
criminal tribunal mechanisms in all regions (and, if possible, sub-regions) of the world.    
 
6.4 Conclusion 
 The state immunity rule evolved in international law principally to promote mutual 
respect for the sovereign equality and political independence of all states  by ensuring that no one 
state or any of its high-ranking officials is impleaded before the municipal tribunals of another 
state without the consent of the former. From the examination of this rule, it is evident that its 
application in the international criminal justice system results in significant social, political, 
economic, and other problems that outweigh its benefits. Many high-ranking state officials who 
benefit from the rule abuse it, so that many of its commendable rationales are substantially 
defeated. 
 The desire to overcome these problems and to ensure individual accountability and 
justice in the international criminal justice system led the international community to create 
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completely ruled out that a state official can unexpectedly involve in any of them. Thus, if the anti-state-immunity 
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various legal mechanisms to disregard or abolish the immunity of officials in relevant 
international criminal proceedings. Consequently, today, high-ranking officials of a state 
(including its past or incumbent heads of state and/or government) can be tried and punished by 
competent foreign or international judicial tribunals for some international crimes committed in 
the abusive exercise of their state‟s official /public powers. Many of these officials have already 
been so tried and punished, and others are currently undergoing their trials. Thus, the strength of 
the state immunity rule has weakened. It is no more a rule that affords high-ranking state 
officials absolute and unquestionable protection or exemption from external judicial scrutiny of 
their international crimes.   
 However, the effectiveness of the anti-state-immunity efforts is bedeviled by many 
weaknesses associated with the different response mechanisms. The combined effect of these 
weaknesses is that many culpable high-ranking state officials still escape individual 
accountability for their international crimes, and the problems arising from the application of the 
state immunity rule in the international criminal justice system invariably continue. This thesis, 
therefore, suggests various reforms to the mechanisms. The major impact of these suggested 
reforms is that they will enable the mechanisms overcome the weaknesses and become effective 
in responding to the problems of the state immunity rule. If the suggestions are followed, the 
administration of international criminal justice involving state officials will contribute to 
accomplishing the individual accountability and justice missions of the international criminal 
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